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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A system is a configuration of components combined to perform 
a particular task. The reliability of a component or system is the 
probability that the device will work successfully. To analyze a 
system, this analysis must be based upon an analysis of the components 
with regards to their configuration within that system. 
The system reliability depends upon the reliability of the compo-
nents that make up that system. In analyzing the reliability of a 
system or component, a confidence level is associated with each 
reliability since the actual reliability of an item cannot be deter-
mined precisely. This confidence level provides a measure of the 
quality of the reliability estimate. 
SPARCS* (Simulation Program for Assessing the Reliability of 
Complex Systems) is a program that provides interval estimates for 
assessing the reliability of complex systems. The system components 
consist of two component types: Bernoulli components (attribute 
type) and Poisson process components (time-to-failure type). The 
model uses information about the logical configuration of a system 
in the form of success states or failure states and failure-history 
~·•sPARCS was developed in conjunction with a grant from the Air 
Force System Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, in Dayton, 
Ohio as project number F33615-74-C-4077. The result of that contract 
is technical report AFFDL-TR-75-144 [62]. 
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data for each component as input. System mission time may also be 
input as an option to obtain a MTBF (mean-time-between-failure) for 
the system. 
The system logical information is analyzed using Poincaire's 
theorem (the method of inclusion-exclusion) to provide a syste~ equa-
tion as a function of the system components. Each component's failure-
history data is used to provide component reliability or unreliability 
values for use with the system equation. This failure-history data 
are parameters of Bayesian conjugate prior distributions on the compo~ 
nent reliabilities. A beta distribution is used for the Bernoulli 
process components and a negative-log gamma distribution is used 
with the Poisson process components. 
SPARCS is an efficient procedure written in PL/1 that uses Monte 
Carlo methods to provide an "empirical" distribution on the system 
reliabilities (or unreliabilities) and the system MTBF. This is accom-
plished for a system of any logical configuration. and complexity. 
The procedure involved is facilitated by the use of modularization 
which allows large systems to be broken down into smaller independent 
modules which may be analyzed separately and later combined. 
Purpose and Scope of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to provide a computerized procedure 
for the determination of confidence bounds and appropri3te limits 
for the reliability (or unreliability) of a complex system of any 
logical configuration. The scope of this study is limited to the 
development of such a procedure. In particular, a system equation 
will be developed which is a function of the component reliabilities 
3 
and their logical placement within the system. The components will 
be of two basic types: Bernoulli components and Poisson process compo-
nents. Monte Carlo Techniques will be used, in conjunction with this 
equation, to provide point estimates for the system reliability. 
These point estimates will be ordered and analyzed statistically 
to provide empirical confidence bounds and limits on the (un)reliabili-
ty of the system under analysis. The mean, variance and standard 
deviation as well as an estimated reliability for the system will 
be provided. 
Methodology 
Since there is usually no failure-history data available for 
the system under evaluation, failure-history data for each component 
is used based upon the best available data. This information is sup-
plied to SPARCS along with information concerning the logical configu-
ration of the system components and a "mission time" for determination 
of a system MTBF if desired. 
Poincaire's Theorem (inclusion-exclusion) is used to generate 
an equation for the system as a function of the system components 
and their placement within the system. Component (un)reliabilities 
are provided for this equation based upon the historical component 
test information supplied by the user. 
System components are of two basic types: Bernoulli (pass-fail) 
components and Poisson process (time-to-failure) components. The 
model uses the component failure-history data to provide reliability 
confidence assessment for a system containing any logical combination 
of either or both types of these components. Fl'))r each component type, 
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Bayesian analysis is used to provide the (un)reliability for that 
component. For Bernoulli components, the Bayesian prior is the beta 
with accumulated successes and failures as sufficient statistics. 
For Poisson process components, the Bayesian prior is the negative-
log gamma with accumulated total tl.me in tests per test unit and 
accumulated failures as sufficient statistics. These sufficient 
statistics are parameters of the beta prior and the negative-log 
gamma prior. 
Monte Carlo techniques are used to enter the appropriate Bayesian 
prior distribution to provide an estimate of the reliability for 
that component. The Monte Carlo techniques utilize the historical 
test data as sufficient statistics when entering the appropriate 
distribution. Each component reliability is placed in the reliability 
equation in its proper position. This.function is then evaluated 
to yield a point estimate for the reliability of that particular 
system. The Monte Carlo procedures produce a number of these point 
estimates which are used to provide confidence limits and statistical 
information on the empirical distribution of these reliability point 
estimates. 
These system reliability point estimates are sorted in increasing 
order. Percentage points are provided by an analysis of these ordered 
values. The mean, variance and standard deviation of this empirical 
distribution is determined. An e~timated reliability for the system 
is also calculated by placing the mean value of each component into 
the system equation. If the mean-time-between-failures (MTBF) is 
desired, the MTBF is presented for each percentage point value by 
direct conversion of that value into an MTBF. 
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Background 
A program by J.L. Burris, called Model for the Analysis of the 
Probabilities of Systems (MAPS) [11] provides the system equation, 
using Poincaire 1 s method, and the basic input-output format. SPARCS, 
Simulation Program for Assessing the Reliabilities of Complex Systems, 
provides the Monte Carlo techniques and statistical techniques neces-
sary to develop and analyze the empirical distribution of system 
point estimates. These point estimates can be generated for a system 
of any logical configuration: series, parallel, or series-parallel. 
Complex systems may be broken down into smaller subsystems (modules) 
which are later combined to determine the system reliability or unreli-
ability. This modular idea along with the use of PL-1, makes it pos-
sible to handle complex systems with a considerable saving of time 
and computer storage. 
Chapter Organization 
Chapter II discusses the pertinent literature around which the 
model revolves. Current methods for assessing the reliability of 
simple systems and Monte Carlo methods for reliability confidence 
assessment are discussed. Literature concerning concepts around.which 
SPARCS revolves is presented such as Poincaire's Theorem and Bayesian 
reliability analysis. 
Chapter III discusses the system and logical aspects used in 
SPARCS. Poincaire's Theorem and its development is analyzed. 
Chapter IV discusses the statistical distributions used in the 
model. A brief discussion of the beta and negative-log gamma 
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distributions are presented. The implementation and reason for implemen-
tation of the uniform prior is analyzed along with a discussion of 
the statistical aspects of confidence bounds and confidence limits 
used in reliability. 
Chapter V describes the tests and analysis used for model valida-
tion. The duality concept, tests df the uniform prior for component 
( un )reliability and some simple binomial and exponential tests are 
analyzed. These tests show that the concepts are intact.in the model 
and that the model does produce very good results as compared to 
other results in the field. 
Chapter VI analyzes some of the techniques and procedures incorpo-
rated into the model. The International Mathematical a·nd Statistical 
Library (IMSL) routines that provide component reliabilities are 
checked for inherent error. Tests of the pseudo-random number genera-
tors and the sorting routine incorporated into the model are described. 
Finally, a discussion of sample size determination is presented. 
Chapter VII discusses the model software procedures. An analysis 
of the storage requirements and the purpose of each procedure is 
presented. The JCL aspects are also discussed to facilitate system 
transitions. 
Chapter VIII is a documentation of SPARCS. A discussion of what 
the model does as a composite unit is presented. The input format 
is explicitly delineated to enhance user use. 
Chapter IX summarizes the model methodolo~y and test conclusions. 
A small section lists possible extensions of this work. 
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Finally, four appendices are at the end of the chapters. The 
first two appendices present the JCL used with the model. The next 
two are a program source listing of SPARCS and an Ap~llo Lunar Excur• 
sion Module (LEM) test run. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
In reliability confidence assessment, predictibn statements 
are made concerning the reliability of a system from life test data 
accumulated fou each syst~m component. The reliability of a system 
is associated with a probability that shows the confidence of the 
reliability estimates. Estimation of the reliability of a system 
that provides no confidence or predictive value for the reliability 
of that system ignores the possibility of variability in these esti-
mates. 
This chapter reviews the literature that deals with procedures 
for assessing the reliability of systems. Included in this review 
is a historical development of techniques and statistical descriptions 
of procedures that are employed in systems reliability confidence 
assessment. 
A History of Reliability Confidence Assessment 
This section of the literature review traces the early development 
of reliability estimation and assessment techniques. Early articles 
and books on reliability are reviewed dealing with both component 
and system reliability analysis. 
8 
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Early Articles 
In 1953, Epstein and Sobel [23] write a classic article on reliabi-
lity assessment for components, dealing with the exponential distribu-
tion. Life testing procedures are proposed for estimating the reliabi-
lity of exponential type components. Their procedure contends that 
only r out of n component failures need to occur within a specified 
testing time, where r < n, to provide an estimate of the component 
reliability. Assessment is performed usint the Chi-square distribution 
with 2r degrees of freedom, where r is the number of failures. 
In 1957, Buehler [8] and Steck [87] publish articles which consi-
der assessing the reliability of simple systems as well as a technique 
for single component reliability assessment. In each case, binomial 
components are considered. Buehler [8] provides confidence limits 
on a system of two binomial independent components which are linked 
in a parallel configuration. A Poisson approximation to the binomial 
distribution is used and his analysis is specialized to small probabi-
lities of failure and moderate sample sizes. Steck [87] proposed 
a more general solution to the problem. His solution requires an 
ordering of component test results that produces complex manipulations 
for all but simple systems. In each case, reliability analysis was 
applied to systems of components. 
In 1963, Rosenblatt [76] uses aU-statistic as discussed by 
Hoeffding [35] to analyze a simple binomial system. This article 
begins to hint at analysis of systems of a more complex nature in 
which the components may be either series or parallel or a combination. 
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Early Books and Tables 
The first text· explicitly dealing with the subject of reliability 
was written by Bazovsky [3] in 1961. Bazovsky provides discussions 
of network analysis, component reliability assessment and simple 
~ 
system reliability estimations. In 1962, :Lloyd and Lipow [47] write 
a text on reliability which used approximations such as the Poisson 
approximation to the binomial as developed by Buehler [8] to produce 
confidence bounds on the system reliability. This was used in lieu 
of methods which combined confidence bounds on the components to 
obtain confidence bounds on the system as proposed by Conner and 
Wales [15]. Earlier, Lipow and Riley [ 46] had tabled upper confidence 
limits on 1, 2, and 3 component serial systems. 
Early Monte Carlo Technigues 
In the late 50's and early 60's, system reliability analysis 
was approached using Monte Carlo techniques. The earlier techniques 
consisted of simulating the success or failure of each component 
as events. These component success or failure events were then combined 
logically to see if the system succeeded or failed. However, little 
information is written describing these early techniques. 
Simple System Reliability Assessment 
In the mid 60's, the literature begins to expand. The earlier 
articles on component and simple system reliability analysis are 
extended by use of approximations and exact expansio~s. However, 
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most of the literature continues to deal with assessing the reliabi-
lities of simple series or parallel systems of exponential and binomial 
type components. Since SPARCS also deals with both exponential and 
binomial type components, the literature interest is channeled in 
that direction. 
Binomial Systems 
Confidence limits for systems consisting of binomial type subsys-
tems of more than two components are discussed ~y Madansky [52] in 
1965. Madansky uses a maximum likelihood ratio test in lieu of the 
Poisson approximation suggested by Buehler [8]. However, his procedure 
did not obtain reliable values for systems with high reliabilities. 
The Poisson approximation of Buehler produced much better values 
in these cases. Consequently, his procedure is applicable only to 
systems with moderate reliabilities. 
Since Buehler's method is developed for systems with two binomial 
components and Madansky's procedure does not produce good results 
for highly reliable systems, Harris [33] tries to devise a method 
to provide confidence limits for systems of more than two components 
which will produce adequate results for highly reliable systems. 
To accomplish this, Harris uses the Poisson approximation to the 
binomial distribution in conjunction with a' un~form qmdorn variate 
to produce confidence limits for systems of more than two binomial 
componen,ts. An article by Myhre and Saunders [67] used by Harris 
[33], succinctly analyzes the method of Madansky. 
Springer apd ~hompson [83] are one of the earliest to try the 
Bayesian approach to binomial corQ.ponent systems. A Bayesian prior 
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distribution, which is unifonn in the abpence of data, is applied 
to the system under analysis. A transform is applied to each component 
and the results combined to produce confidence limits on the system 
reliability. 
In 1972, Easterling [19] develops a procedure which uses a maximum 
likelihood es.timate of the system reliability. The maximum likelihood 
estimates are substituted into an incomplete beta function to obtain 
confidence limits on the reliability of the system of binomial compo-
nents. Mann [54] produces a basic simplification of Buehler's [8] 
article which removes the two component restriction on system size. 
For systems of more than two components, the Wilson-Hilferty [93] 
transformation to the chi~square is used to provide a standard normal 
variate for system reliability confidence assessment. Winterbottom 
[94] provides a comparative study of exact and approximate methods 
for providing lower confidence limits on the reliability of binomial 
systems. Exact methods are methods that do not use approximations 
in their techniques to facilitate calculations. Approximation methods 
revoive around the use of approximation procedures such as chi-square 
approximations, normal approximations,.· the Wilson-Hilferty transfor-
mation and others. Thus, approximate methods are ways of approaching 
exact results which are used as a standard. 
Exponential Systems 
Confidence intervals for exponential component systems are discus-
sed by Lentner and Buehler [44] in 1963. Life testing procedures 
are applied to these exponential type components as developed by 
Epstein and Sobel [23]. By defining fixed "mission times," gamma 
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variates are used to provide a linear function of more than two parame-
ters which are analyzed through the use of "similar regions" as des-
cribed in Lehmann and Scheff~ [42] and Lehmann [41]. 
In the mid 60's, El Mawaziny [21] expands the work of Lentner 
and Buehler [44] to produce explicit expressions for an exponential 
type system of any size. A linear combination of incomplete gamma 
functions is used to derive confid~hce limits on exponential systems 
by elaborate computer techniques. Later, El Mawaziny and Buehler 
[22] provide a large scale approximation to El Mawaziny's procedure. 
This approximation follows El Mawaziny' s [21] idea of no restrictions 
on the number of system components with each component following 
exponential failure laws. 
Springer and Thompson [84, 85] provide an extensive analysis 
of exponential type c.omponents in parallel configuration. Bayesian 
confidence limits are placed on redundant exponential systems from 
component test data in which component tests are terminated at the 
first failure. The analysis is for components and systems having 
extremely high reliabilities. Later, Thompson and Chang [89] generalize 
the technique of Springer and Thompson [85] to remove the restriction 
of the single life sample with termination at the first failure. 
In 1971, Leiberman and Ross [43] expand the work of Kraemer 
[38] and Sarkar [77] to provide lower confidence limits on systems 
of two independent exponential components. Analysis of the two exponen-
tial components are shown to produce a distribution for the system 
reliability that approximates a Gamma distribution. 
Grubbs [32] develops a process which provides a lower limit 
on the system reliability for systems consisting of exponential 
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time-to-failure components using the number of component failures 
in specified "mission times." His method is designed to be used in 
lieu of methods involving Monte Carlo simulation techniques. Grubbs' 
method uses the first two moments of the "fiducial" distribution 
of the system failure rate to fit a non~central Chi-square distribution. 
His method requires a minimum of calculation and uses tables of stan-
dard normal deviates to obtain the system lower confidence limits. 
Mann and Grubbs [56] combine the earlier methods of El Mawaziny 
[21], Lentner and Buehler [44] and Grubbs [32] to propose a simple 
method to approximate the system lower confidence limits for exponential 
series systems. The general results supplied by Patnaik [71] concerning 
the noncentral Chi-square approximation and the Wilson-Hilferty 
transformation [93] are used in conjunction with Fertig [27] and 
Cox [18] to provide these lower limits. 
The "approximately optimum'' method of Mann and Grubbs [56 J is 
later simplified by Mann [55]. Essentially, the process uses a trans-
formed chi-square probability density function and the moments of 
this function to provide an approximation that tends to agree within 
approximately a unit in the second decimal place with the method 
of El Mawaziny [21] which is considered an "exact" method. 
Complex Systems 
Complex systems are systems with other than s~tict series or 
parallel configuration in which the component types may be intermixed. 
Generally, systems are restricted' to either all exponential or all 
binomial components in series or parallel configuration. Some litera-
ture intimates tpat their procedures may be ext~nded easily to include 
complex systems but never actually follow through with such an 
explanation. 
15 
In the early 60's Rosenblatt [76] hints at an expansion of her 
method to a more logically complex system as does Mann and Grubbs 
[57] and Wolf [95] later. However, no formal details are presented. 
Mann and Grubbs propose the application of simplified approximations 
to a complex system of "mixed" components by finding equivalent Beta 
or binomial transformations for their.simplified exponential.computa-
tions. However, the requirement that .a complex system be expressed 
as a series or parallel system composed of more series and parallel 
components restricts their calculations. Nowhere in the literature 
was there found an explicit analysis that purported to place confidence 
limits on a complex system of any logical configuration using "mixedi' 
historical component information in any order with the exception 
of an article by Levy and Moore [45]. 
Monte Carlo Techniques 
In 1961 and 1962, Burnett and Wales [10] and Bosinoff and Klion 
[7] proposed Monte Carlo techniques for system reliability assessment 
in which component life distributions are used to provide component 
reliabilities. These reliabilities are placed in a system reliability 
equation to provide interval estimates on the system reliability 
through repeated Monte Carlo trials. The basic assumption in each 
instance is that the components have exponential life distributions, 
are all connected in series, and are 'independent. 
These basic simulation assumptions are still used~ Generally, 
Monte Carlo C;tnalyses st,ill assume simple series or parallel systems 
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irt which all components are either exponential or binomial type compo-
nents with the exception of Levy and Moore [45]. 
Levy and Moore [45] analyze a system which is not a strict series 
or parallel system with either binomial or exponential type components. 
Their components are a mixture of Weibull, normal, lognormal, exponen-
tial and Gamma type components in a complex system of seven components. 
A group of values are provided for each component. These values are 
ordered to form an "empirical" distribution. Then, random numbers 
are used to enter these "empirical" distributions to obtain.component 
reliabilities. The complex system is broken down into easily manipulated 
parallel or series subsystems. These subsystems are combined to form 
either a simple series or parallel system which can be analyzed with 
relative ease. 
In the 70's, Mann [55] and Berkbigler and Byers [4] use Monte 
Carlo techniques to analyze the effect prior distributions have on 
the lower confidence limits of the system reliability. However, in 
each case, a simple series system is used to provide the analysis. 
Development of the SPARCS System 
Reliability Assessment Model 
Early Minimal State Analysis 
In 1956, Moore and Shannon [64], inspired by a paper presented 
the same year by von Neuman [91], develop methods for producing hignly 
reliable systems from components of low reliability •. This paper 
set the framework for minimal state analysis of complex systems. 
Moore and Shannon provide bounds on the number of components needed 
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to achieve a specified system reliability and initially develop the 
concept of minimal state analysis. They show that the reliability 
of a network consisting of independent components of equal reliability 
is S-shaped. In 1959, Mine [61] further expands these procedures 
by examining complex systems which are represented as Boolean functions. 
In 1962 and 1963, Birnbaum, Esary and Saunders [6] and Esary 
and Proschan [24, 25], expand the work of Moore and Shannon [64]. 
Birnbaum, Esary and Saunders explore the reiiability of complex systems 
in which the reliability of each composent is the same. Esary and 
Proschan extend this concept to systems in which the reliability 
of the components are not necessarily analogous. In each case, minimal 
paths, defined as "a smallest set of components which by functioning 
cause the system to function" [24], are used to provide an upper 
bound on the system reliability. Minimal cuts, defined as "a smallest 
set of components which by failing cause the structure to fail" [24], 
are used to furnish a lower bound on the system reliability. In 1965, 
Barlow and Proschan [2] also enlarge this minimal state concept by 
further examination of coherent systems, i.e. structures which have 
tne property that replacing failed components with functioning compo-
nents cannot cause a funcioning structu're to fail. 
System Reliability Egyation Development Using Poincaire' s Theorem 
In 1971, Locks [48] uses Poincaire's 'I;heorem, based in part 
on the theory of inclusion-exclusion discussed in Feller [26, pp.26ff], 
in conjunction with the minimal state defl.nitions and concepts of 
the early articles mentioned above, to develop an exact system (un)re-
liability equation which is a function of the system components. 
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The minimal states of the system under investigation are used to 
obtain a polynomial that represents the reliability of unreliability 
of the system as a function of success states (minimal paths) or· 
failure states (minimal cuts). The system reliability or unreliability 
estimates can be obtained for a system of any size and any logical 
configuration. 
A complete description of the use of Poincaireis Theorem for 
developing the exact system reliability equation as a function of 
the system minimal states is presented by Locks [48]. Locks [49] 
also presents an error analysis between his exact method for providing 
upper and lower bounds on the (un)reliability of a system and the 
earlier minimal state methods for forming the upper and lower bounds. 
Earlier Computer Models for System Reliability Analysis 
In the late 60 1 s, a program called SCOPE (System for Computing 
Operational Probability Equations) [88] was developed for the Saturn 
and Apollo space programs. This program was the basis for MAPS (Model 
for the Analysis of the Probabilities of Systems) [11], developed 
in 1972 by J. L. Burris. MAPS is coded in PL/1 as opposed to the 
FORTRAN coding of SCOPE and incorporates a modularity concept that 
allows large systems to be broken down into smaller subsystems. 
MAPS is a computer progt;"am designed to produce a point estimate 
of the reliability of a comple~ system as a function of the reliabili-
ties of the components that make· up 'that system. An analysis of the 
system network by the user provides the minimal states for the system. 
These minimal states are used as input to generate an equation for 
the system as a function of the component reliabilities or 
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unreliabilities. An estimate of the reliability (or unreliability, 
depending upon the type of analysis desired by the user) is input 
for each component. These component reliability (unreliability) 
values are then substituted into the reliability (or unreliability) 
e·quation to produce an estimate of the reliability (unreliability) 
of the system. Parts of this program were used as a base for the 
development of SPARCS [61]. 
Sample Size Determination 
A formal method for sample size Determination has not been incorpo-
rated into the model. Burdick and Naylor [9] and Naylor, Balintfy, 
Burdick and Chu [68, PP• 335-338] discuss the sample size determination 
problem as one of the major problems in simulation. When the data 
to be analyzed lack independence and normality, an efficient raethod 
\ . 
for the determination of how many observations to measure and when 
to begin measurement becomes very difficult. Without some knowledge 
of the types of distributions obtained from analysis of systems 
of different configurations, the sample size cannot be efficiently 
determined. 
Consequently, the law of large numbers and the Central Limit 
Theorem are used to provide an estimate of the number of simulation 
runs necessary for a certain confidence interval about the mean. 
Although this basic sample size formula is provided for use with 
the model, it will be shown that SPARCS provides very good results 
with reasonably small sample sizes. These small sample size values 
are compared with values obtained from larger samples obtained from 
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literature and verified using a duality check. The reason for these 
results with small sample sizes may revolve around the idea that 
conventional sample size procedures are based upon the sampling 
of events whereas SPARCS in fact samples reliabilities. 
Statistical Development of the Model 
System reliability confidence assessment may be approached through 
the use of three statistical procedures: Classical analysis, Bayesian 
analysis, and fiducial analysis. Since system reliability assessment 
is a function of the components that make up that system, these proce-
dures revolve around a method for analysis of the system components. 
In the classical approach, prior information is not taken into . 
account and prediction limits are placed around an estimate of the 
true reliability. These limits provide a true frequency interpretation 
not produced by the other two methods [39, 69]. The Bayesian procedure 
[1, 30] and the fiducial procedure [28, 36] take into consideration 
prior data and knowledge plus the statistician's personal assessment 
of this prior knowledge. The Bayesian analysis generally uses an 
ignorance (uniform) prior .as the basis for any resultant posterior 
distribution. The fiducial analysis was introduced by R. A. Fisher 
[28]. One of the basic differences between fiducial priors and uniform 
prior revolves,around the idea that fiducial priors assume prior 
experience with this experience being used as a base. The uniform 
prior, in the absence of data, uses the assumption of no prior know-
ledge (ignorance). The difference between Classical analysis and 
Bayesian analysis (including fiducial a~alysis) is succinctly 
summarized by Springer and Thompson [83]. The confidence limits 
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in the Bayesian sense are defined such that the probability of a 
particular estimate lying outside these limits will not exceed the 
specified posterior probability. In the Classical sense, as developed 
by Neyman [70], the confidence limits stipulate that the frequency 
with which prediction lies outside these confidence limits will not, 
in the long run, exceed the specified confidence. Consequently, limits 
obtained by Bayesian and fiducial procedures do not provide an exact 
frequency interpretation in all instances. However, these are used 
quite extensively in reliability analysis because standard classical 
procedures are unavailable for all except the simplest systems [95]. 
Bayesian Analysis 
Bayesian priors as discussed by Locks [50, p. 115ff] are used 
in the model to determine the reliability of each component for asses-
sing system reliability. Raiffa and Schlaifer [75] provide an analysis 
of the theory behind the Bayesian approach. Using the Bayesian ap. 
proach, historical data about each component is allowed to be incorpo-
rated into an appropriate Bayesian prior distribution provided for 
that component. Because the resulting posterior distribution depends 
upon the specific prior chosen, it is evident that problems are 
generated because of this prior. Mann [57] analyzes the selection 
of prior distributions and their effect on the res.ul ting confidence 
limits. She found that for an exponential series system, the Bayesian 
bounds, although exact in the Bayesian sense were smaller than the 
'· 
classical bounds in every case. 
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In our case, the unifonn prior is used in the absence of data 
for each component. Lawless [39] and Sarkai:' [77] analyzed the use 
of bounds generated by uniform priors on a system of exponential 
components and found them to be more conservative than bounds provided 
by fiducial priors. In comparing the Bayesian uniform prior approach 
with the classical approach, Schick and Prior [78] found that the 
uniform prior approach produced lower confidence limits on the system 
reliability that were larger than that produced by exact methods. 
Fertig [27] analyZed a serial system composed of exponential components 
from both the classical and Bayesian approach. He concluded that 
there are no prior distributions in the absence of data that can 
yield the exact unbiased confidence bounds provided by the classical 
approach. A review of the Bayesian controversy is analyzed by Easter-
ling [20] and Lawless [39]. A sumn1ary of the finding and results 
for numerous articles is found in Mann, Schafer, and Singpurwalla [58]. 
Although some of the literature seems to indicate the lack of 
an optimum prior, it is believed that the unifonn prior used in SPARCS 
in conjunction with an exact method, Po incaire 1 s. Theorem, for determi-
ning a system reliability equation as a function of the components, 
does in fact produce confidence bounds which indicate .that the uniform 
prior does produce very good results. These results a~e verified 
through the use of a duality check in which system reliabilities 
and unreliabilifies were compared from minimal path and minimal cut 
analysis. The results show very accurate complementary confidence 
levels for syst~ reliability and unreliability and tend to indicate 
that a uniform prior is perhaps the optimum prior. 
CHAPTER III 
SYSTEM AND LOGICAL ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
An estimate of the reliability of a complex system can be deter-
mined by the development of art exact equation that is a function 
of the component reliabilities. This equation is developed for any 
logical system from an analysis of the system states. These states 
are of two types: success states called paths and failure states 
called cuts. 
An algorithm has been developed for combining system minimal 
states, say minimal paths, to provide an equation for the system 
reliability. This algorithm, called Poincaire's Theorem (inclusion-
exclusion), uses Boolean algebra and the theory of partially ordered 
sets to produce a system reliability equation as a function of the 
components. Set concepts, as presented by Feller [26], are developed 
in the concept of reliability by Locks [48]. Th~ analysis that follows 
closely parallels the analysis provided by Locks [48]. 
Once the system equation is developed, confidence assessment 
for the system reliability can be performed. Since SPARCS specifies 
that the components be either attribute or P~isson process components, 
Monte Carlo methods are used to provide the individual component 
reliabilities, for the generated system equation. This is done a number 
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of times until a resultant empirical distribution of the system reli-
ability estimates is produced. 
Mathematical Concepts 
Network diagrams may be used to analyze a system to determine 
the ways in which the success or failure of a system can occur. In 
a success-type network, called a logic diagram; each mode indicates 
the success or non-failure of a component or specific element of 
the network. In this context, a path is a set of components which 
by functioning cause the system to function. A minimal path is a 
smallest set of components which by functioning cause the system 
to .function even if all the other components fail [25]. 
In a failure-type network, often called a fault tree, each mode 
denotes a failure of non-success for a particular element or component 
of the network. Then, a cut is a set of components which by failing 
cause the system to fail. A minimal cut is a smallest set of components 
which by failing cause the system to fail even with all other campo-
nents functioning [25]. 
The analysis of any element of a network is binary in nature. 
Either the element is a success (1) or it is a failure (0). Consequent-
ly, Boolean algebra is used to provide a mathematical representation 
of the system states. Following this analysis~ a. systa-n, which we 
will call ASYS, :i,s cpmposed of n binary components or elements i, 
i = 1, 2, ••• , n. A 1 denotes a success and a 0 denotes a failure.· 
Then, any state of ApYS can be represented as a binary n-dimensioned 
vector 
' • • • • • X ) n 
where 
I 
x. = 1 is a success and 
~ 
= 0 is a failure. 
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n The set of states {x} that make up the network has 2 different 
elements because of the binary nature of each element. States may 
be written as a function of X which has a value of unity, f(X) = 1, 
for those vectors which make the structure perform, (paths) and a 
value of 0, f(X) = 0, for those vectors which make the structure 
fail (cuts). It is assumed that all states are either paths or cuts. 
In a system of the form 
c 
there are three elements. An analysis of the network can be provided 
by an analysis of the three elements. If each state is analyzed in 
order with the Boolean representation of eac;h component (A, B, C) 
·as 
then the binary representations for the minimal paths are 
(1) 
and those for the minimal cuts are 
XJ 
x4 
0 0 1 
1 1 o. 
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This provides a complete analysis of the network through an analysis 
of each state. 
The probability of at least one of the minimal paths occurring 
is given as 
(2) 
This is the sum of the probabilities of each minimal path minus their 
intersections. The probability of at least one of the minimal cuts 
occurring is 
(3) 
which is the sum of the probabilities of each minimal cut minus their 
intersection. This is the basis for Poincaire 1 s Theorem which follows. 
For each network component i, i = 1, 2, ••• , n, .the reliability 
rl.., 0 ~ r. ~ 1, is the probability of success, x. = 1. Then 1- r. 
1. . 1. 1. 
is the probability of failure, x. = 0. Each component is assumed 
1. 
to be independent. Consequently, the probability of a particular 
state, pr(X) of X, is the reliability of the functioning components 
times the unreliability of the failed ones. 
pr(X) ; (r. 
i=l 1. 
x. 
1. 
(1- r.) 
1. 
[ 48] (4) 
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Poincaire's Theorem 
By definition, V is a minimal path if it is a path and it does 
not include another path. This is the shortest path through a logic 
diagram and is so structured that the system functions even if all 
the other elements fail. For any path X, this may be represented as 
f(V) = 1, v 1- x. (5) 
V is a minimal cut if it is a cut and is not included in another 
cut. The system fails with a minimal cut even if all the other elements 
are successful. This may be represented similar to ( 5). as 
f(V) = O, (6) 
Every path can be shown to include at least one minimal path 
and every cut is included in at least one minimal cut. Then the proba-
bility of the outcome of a network (sue;cess or failure) includes 
any given minimal state (path or cut) and is the numerical product 
of the probabilities of the state components (reliability or unreliabi-
lity), which identify the state (path or cut). An analysis of these 
systemminimal states leads to Poincaire's Theorem. Since there is 
a dual relationship between minimal-paths and minimal-cuts, Poincaire's 
Theorem is developed for paths an~ easily converted to cuts. Minimal 
cuts are just the min~mal paths for failure [ 48]. 
Since every success state includes at least one minimal path, 
if there are m minimal paths vl' v2 ' • ~.' vm' then the system reliabi:-
lity is the probability that at least one of these minimal paths 
are contained in a random outcome of system success •. 
m 
R(ASYS) = pr (U (VJ. ~ X) ) 
i=l 
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(7) 
The above expression is a combination of m expressions, an expression 
for each minimal path. At each step, the probability associated with 
that minimal path is combined with the previously combined minimal 
path probabilities. This is shown as 
j 
R. = pr ( U (V ~ X) ) 
I k=l k 
j-1 
R. = pr ( ( U (V ~ X) ) 
I k=l k 
v 
i-1 
(V. ~ X) ) 
I 
R. = R + h(V.) - pr ( ( U (V ~X) & (V ~X) ) 
I i-1 I k=l k I 
(8) 
This combination ultimately yields an equation for the system reliabi-
lity developed from an analysis of the minimal paths and a function 
of the component reliabilities. This expression, (8), expands very 
quickly as the number of minimal paths increase. The expression with 
3 minimal paths, vl, v2, v3, is developed in three steps. 
Rl = h(Vl ) 
Rl = Rl + h(Vl)- h(v1 + v2 ) (9) 
RJ = R l + h ( V J ) - [h(Vl + v 3) + h(Vl + v3 ) - h(Vl + v2 + v3 )] 
R3 may be expressed 
If R3 is expanded to include m minimal paths, it becomes a prototype 
of the general case. For any step j, j = 1, 2, ••• , m, let {hz\ , 
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denote the set of ( ~) minimal states. expressed by h(V i + Vk) where i < ' 
k< j. Let {h3 } denote the set of (~)minimal states expressed by 
h(V i + Vk + V 1 ) where i < k <. 1 < j. Following this expansion, the general 
case becomes: 
j 
R. = L: J 
k=1 (10) 
- • 0 0. 0 0 + (-1) j-1 
which i.s Poincare 1 s Theorem. 
In (10), at step j, j = 1, 2, ••• , m, 1the maximum number of 
. 2j terms 1s - 1 [48]. Generally, the actual number of·terms is some 
number less than 2j - 1 because in expanding (10), there are elements 
in comrnon which can be merged with or cancelled ag~linst each other. 
Without these cancellations and combinations, (10) becomes cumbersome 
and possibly infeasible for large systems. 
The above procedures are exactly the same for an analysis of 
minimal cuts. The only difference is the system reliability R(ASYS) 
becomes the system unreliability R(ASYS). Then, R(ASYS) is a combina-
tion of the minimal cuts to provide the system unreliability as 
a function of the component unreliabilities. In either case, it 
is assumed that every path is contained only in paths and every cut 
contains only cuts and all components are independent, 
Application of the Theorem 
Assume a system of the following configuration containing five 
components. 
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The system contains three paths: 125, 135, and 145. If any 
path functions, the system will function. Let r 1 , r 2, r3, r4, r5' 
represent the reliability of each component, then following Poincaire' s 
Theorem, (10), the system reliability equation becomes 
- r r r 4r + r r r r r • 1 3 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Because of the complementary relationship of the system reliability 
and unreliability, the system unreliability may be found as 
R = 1 - R 
If an unreliability analysis is desired, the system cuts are 
identified as 1, 234, and 5. Thus, the system will fail if any one 
of these three situations occurs even if the other components are 
not failed. Again following Poincaire's Theorem, (10), if r1 , r2 , 
( ll) 
(12) 
r3' r4, r5 represents the unreliability of each component, the system 
unreliability equation becomes 
( 13) 
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The system reliability can be obtained as the complement of the unreli-
ability: 
R = 1 - R (14) 
Equation Development by MAPS 
The development of the system equation as a function of the 
components is provided in a program by J. 1. Burris [11]. This equation 
generating routine is used in SPARCS to provide the equations for 
tl1e simulation of complex systems. The minimal paths or minimal cuts 
are provided by the user. EQGEN, the part of MAPS (and SPARCS) that 
generates the system equation, uses this information to provide the 
system equation as a function of the component reliabilities or 
unreliabilities. Component value~ a~e placed into this equation for 
each simulation run to provide an estimate of the system reliability 
or unreliability. 
CHAPTER IV 
STATISTICAL ASPECTS 
Introduction 
SPARCS provides an analysis of a complex system of any logical 
configuration in which the components are either Bernoulli or Poisson 
process components. Bayesian analysis is applied to the two component 
types. It provides a convenient method of incorporating sample observa-
tions with prior distributions to provide adjusted estimates of compo-
nent reliabilities. These prior distributions are functions of prior 
data and test observations. In this way, prior knowledge and historical 
data can be used to provide reliability assessment. 
Using two basic component types allows the use of predefined 
natural conjugates. These natural conjugates allow the combination 
of future observations with these conjugate priors to yield a posterior 
distribution of the same family. In both cases, the priors, in the 
absence of data, are defined to be uniform priors. 
This chapter covers Bayesian analysis of Beta and Gamma type 
components. The Bernoulli and Poisson processes for providing component 
information are analyzed. Next follows a brief discussion of the 
purpose and fundamentals of the Bayesian approach with regards to 
reliability analysis. Finally, a detailed discussion for each type 
of component with a mathematical analysis for each is given. 
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In this discussion, a number of authors will be paralleled for 
a portion of the analysis. The Bayesian discussion will parallel 
Raiffa andSchlaifer [75, pp. 28-79], Lehman [41, PP• 10-21], 
Schmidtt [80 ], Locks [50, pp. 115129] and Mann, Schafer and Singpurwalla 
[58, PP• 379-404]. 
Bernoulli and Poisson Processes 
Bernoulli Process 
... 
A Bernoulli process is a process in which the probability of 
success (or failure) remains constant over a series of independent 
trials. The probability of success is generally denoted by p and 
that of failure by (l•p). Thus, the probability of any outcome is 
the product of the probabilities of t~e ·results of the independent 
trials: 
where 0 < p < 1. (1) 
This is known as the "kernel". of a binomial distribution which is 
the result of a Bernoulli process. 
There are two basic types of Bernoulli (attributes) testing. 
If the number of tests are fixed such that the number of successes 
(failures) becomes a random variable, the binomial family is used 
as representative of this procedure. When the number of successes 
(failures) are fixed and the number of tests become random, the nega-
tive binomial family represents this procedure. 
Since the reliabi 1li ty of a Bernoulli component is the probability 
of success of that component, the value of p is the unknown. Thus, 
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assessing the reliability of a Bernoulli component is the same as 
assessing the value of p. 
A beta distribution is used in reliability assessment for Bernoulli 
processes. This distribution is on the reliability p, which is a 
continuous random variable over the range (0,1). This function appears 
in the probability density function as developed from the "kernel": 
where 0 < p < 1. Here, 
(a+b+l )! 
a! b! 
f3 ( a+l, b+ 1) == ( a+b+ 1)! 
a! b! 
is known as a Beta function. 
Poisson Process 
. a b 
p (1-p) (2) 
(3) 
For a Poisson process, the probability density function, .distribu-
tion function, and reliability assessment is based upon the assum~tion 
of a constant failure rate, >-, which is independent of time. The 
amount of time necessary for the first failure to occur, T, is a 
random variable whose probability is subject to the exponential density 
function, -AX Ae • The time may be in ordinary units such as minutes, 
hours, etc., or in time blocks where each block represents one time 
unit. 
The probability that the time for a failure to occur, T, is 
less than time, t, is given below. If 
F(t) = pr(T ~ t) 
1-F(t) = pr(T > t) (4) 
then 
1-F(t) = exp {-At} 
and 
F ( t ) = 1 - exp { - A t } • 
By definition 
then 
f(t) = d(F(t)) 
dt 
f ( t ) = A exp { - A t } • 
For any time, t, the probability that failure occurs before time 
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t is the function represented by (4) and (6). The probability that 
failure occurs after t is the survival probability or reliability 
given by 
R(t) = pr(T > t) 1-F ( t ) = exp { - A t } 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
If the analysis is expanded to analyze cases in which more than 
one failure occurs, the reliability is judged not by the time for 
a single failure to occur but by the time for n failures to occur 
where n > 1. This expansion yields a probability density function 
on the time to the nth failure of the form 
f ( t) = An tn-l exp 1 - A t } • 
( n-1)! 
This expan·sion results in a Gannna probability density function in 
which the denominator is also known as a Gamma function, ~(n). 
(10) 
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Bayesian Reliability Analysis 
Bayesian analysis generally uses a continuous prior distribution 
on the reliability, p, over the range (0,~.). Beca•Jse of the inherent 
variability of data, the value for the reliability, p, can only 
be specified up to a confidence factor. The lower confidence limit 
on the reliability, p, at confidence level Y is the lowest value 
p such that 
£ 
and 
Y = pr(p 2. p ) 
£ 
1- Y = pr(p < p ). g, 
Thus, the Bayesian analysis partitions the prior distribution into 
(11) 
(12) 
two parts: the part below the lower confidence limit p with probabi· 
£ 
lity 1-Y and the proportion above with probability '}'. 
For a Poisson process, the prior is a Gamma distribution on 
the failure rate A with total testfug time and total failures as parameters. 
A change of variables technique is required to produce a distribution on 
the reliability, p. For· a Bernoulli process, the prior is a "Beta prior on 
the reliability, p, which may be used with both binomial and negative bi-
nomial data. The parameters for the Beta are total tests and total failures. 
In SPARCS, the components are defined to be of two types: Bernoulli 
and Poisson process components. These components lend themselves 
to priors from the Beta and Gamma families which are acceptable prior 
families as defined by Raiffa and Schla;i.fer [75]. These priors are 
mathematically tractable in that a posterior distribution may be 
reasonably determined from a prior distribution and a given observation 
from the same population. Both distributions are closed in the sense 
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that the posterior is a member of the same family as the prior. Thus, 
both distributions are associated with the Koopman-Pitman-Darrnois 
[ 75, 41] class of distributions. In these distributions, the likelihood 
obtained by repeated independent trials is a function of the additive 
sufficient statistics observed in these trials. Thus the priors for 
both distributions are the natural conjugates. This guarantees that 
the posterior distributions are of the same form and far.tily as the 
prior with parameters that are the sum of the sufficient statistics 
for the prior and the sufficient statistics for current data. 
Component Analysis 
Bernoulli Components 
Bernoulli analysis is utilized for components which are placed 
in tests and a record kept on the number of failures observed in 
the tests. The conditional probability given, p, that our Bernoulli 
process will generate r successes and n-r failures in some specified 
order is 
x. 1-x. 
1 1 
IT (p (1-p) (13) 
which is the likelihood of the sample observations from our population 
with the parameters (r,n) as sufficient statistics. 
For a Bernoulli process with p as a random variable, the natural 
conjugate is the Beta distribution which is continuous and d~fined 
by 
(14) 
Following the use of primes (')by Raiffa and Schlaifer, [75, p. 53] 
the Beta distribution has (n', r') as parameters which are sufficient 
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statistics. If the sample observations also have parameters (n,r) 
then it can be shown that the parameters of the posterior distribution 
on p are 
n' I = n I + n, r' 1 =r'+r, 
and the posterior is of the same form as the prior. Then by Bayes' 
Theorem, 
I r' n 1 -r 1 G1 (p r', n 1 :r,n)a: p (1-p) (15) 
r" n" -r" a:p (1-p) 
which is a Beta. 
The kernel of the beta prior distribution has the form 
(16) 
From this function, the normalizing constant, denoted as K[B] is 
developed such that 
fo1 G I ( p r' ' n r: r 'n) Ia 1 r" n" r" dp = p (1-p) - dp 1 
. =K[BJ[O . r"(l )n"-r" p -p dp = 1. 
( 17) 
Let 
a= r" 
b n" - r" 
then by use of successive integration by parts 
(18) 
Applying this to equation ( 17) above gives the incomplete integral as 
fop G1 (x/ a, b) dx = (a+b+l )! 
a!b! 
i p b . x "( 1-x) 
0 
dx (19) 
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which is the incomplete Beta function. This function (19) is of the 
same form as the prior function with the addition of the normalizing 
constant. 
Since (19) is the incomplete Beta function, it is represented 
as 
FP (p lr, n-r) = fop G'(x)a, b )dx 
= ro p Jn c•cxlr" ' n" - r" ) dx 
for easier analysis. For reliability-confidence assessment, p is 
the probability of success (reliability) of the component under 
analysis where 
r = number of successes 
n = number of trials. 
Now, since the Beta distribution is continuous, 
FP (p I r , n-r ) = pr(p < p ). 
~ £ 
For reliability-confidence assessment a lower limit is needed on 
the reliability and is accomplished by· 
where 
and 
L - Fp (p I r , n-r ) = pr(p -> p ) 
. ~ £ 
y pr(p~p ). 
~ 
Then, 1- Y is defined as the confidence that the actual reliability 
(p) is greater than the lower confidence limit (p£ ) placed on the 
( 2 0) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
( 24) 
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reliability and that p is the 1- Y percentage point of the Bayesian 
£ 
posterior distribution. 
Poisson Process Components 
The second type of components provided for are those on which 
statistics have been obtained on the number of failures relative 
to a specific testing time. These components are analyzed in one 
of two ways. If a Poisson process is used, the total number of failures 
(r) in a specified testing period (t) may be observed or the :components 
may be tested with regards to the total testing time (t) necessary 
to generate a specified number of failures (r). 
In either case, the natural conjugate prior is the Gamma distribu-
tion defined by 
f ( >.. I r , t ) a: A r- 1 exp { - A t } • (25) 
where A is defined as the failure rate which is a constant independent 
of time. 
For Poisson processes, the survival probability is the probability 
that a failure occurs after a specified time t and is defined by 
the relationship 
Rt = exp {- >..t} = pr(T > t) (26) 
where T is the time of the specified failure. This derives ·from the 
basic exponential density function 
f ( t I A ) = A exp {- 'At } • ( 27) 
Then 
F ( t I A ) = 1 - exp {- 'A t } (28) 
which is pr(T ::;,.. t). 
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Now the probability that T occurs at some time greater than 
t is 
R t = 1 - (1 - exp {- At} ) or 
R t = exp { - At } = p r ( T > t ) (29) 
which provides our survival probability. Then (29) is the conditional 
probability that the failure time T will be greater than a specified 
time t, given A. 
To provide the likelihood of the sample, the joint likelihood 
that a process will provide r failures in a specified time period 
t is 
r 
( IIi = 1 ( A exp { - A t i } ) ) exp {- A tr+1 } (30) 
If 
r+1 
t = 'E t. 
i=1 l. 
(31) 
then (31) is written 
Ar exp {- At} • (32) 
The time, T, for the fir'st failure to occur is derived from 
the basic exponential density function. The analysis may be extended 
to include cases where the reliability of a system is judged by the 
time for n failures to occur, .n > 1, and not by the time' for a single 
failure [75, p. 96]. Taking this into consideration, the gamma density 
function is used and is defined as [75, p. 225] 
I r-1 r { } f ( A r , t ) a: A t exp - At • (33) 
The joint likelihood is defined as [75, p. 225] 
[7 5]. (34) 
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If (34) is a sample observation from the population with (r,t) 
sufficient and (33) is the prior kernel with (r', ·t') sufficient 
then 
r"=r'+r, t 11 = t I + t, 
and the posterior will be of the same form as the prior. The posterior 
Gamma distribut~on is 
G 1 ( A f r" , t" ) a: ( , r-1 r { } ) ,... t exp - At' • r r { ( A t exp - A t } ) 
a: 
r" -1 r" { } A t exp - A t 11 • (35) 
which is a combination. of the natural conjugate and the joint likeli-
hood. 
Following earlier analysis, the normalizing function is determined 
from the Gamma density function such that 
r-1 
x exp {-x} dx = ( r-1)!. (36) 
The posterior distribution on the Poisson process follows in that 
I r" -1 r" t G I ( A r" ' t" ) = A t exp { - ). t" r · K(B) (37) 
r"-1 r" c 
A t , exp 1- At" } · 
( r"-1)! 
For easier analysis (37) is represented as 
100 
A.y 
(38) 
The posterior distribution for a Poisson process is on the failure 
rate, A such that 
Y = pr (A < ~Y ). 
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Following the reliability-confidence assessment on the Bernoulli 
components, the upper confidence limit on A is the Y percentage 
point of the Gamma distribution. The lower confidence limit on X 
is provided by 
Y = 1 - Fy ( "r I r, t) = pr( 1.. < "r ) 
1-Y = FY ( "rl r,t). 
However, for component reliability analysis, a Gamma distribution 
needs to be o~ the component reliability, p, instead of the failure 
rate, A.. From earlier analysis, 
(39) 
which is the survival probability (reliability) for a specified period 
of time--if 
then 
p = exp {- A. t} (40) 
which provides a lower confidence limit on p such that 
R = pr(pQ, ~ p). 
From (40) a conversion factor is obtained to provide a negative-log 
gamma on p instead of A. Hence, 
p = exp {- A. t} 
or 
"At= -ln(p). (41) 
If t in (40) is measured in "required" operation time (blocks) instead 
of minutes, hours, etc. and if t = 1, it becomes 
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A = -ln p - ln (1/p ). [so, P· 12s] 
Applying this conversion factor to (37), the negative-log gamma distri-
bution on p becomes [50, P• 125] 
F (plr",t") = tr ln(l/p )r-1 pt-1 
( r-1)! 
O<p<l. 
Calculations by SPARCS 
(42) 
SPARCS uses the incomplete Beta and Gamma distribution obtained 
from the International Mathematical and Statistical Library (IMSL) 
to provide a lower confidence 1 imi t (p ) on each ~omponent. If unreli-
.Q, 
ability analysis is desired, the unreliability (p ) is obtained 
u 
by the relationship: 
Here, p is an upper confidence limit on the unreliability. This 
u 
specifies that the true unreliability is between p and zero (0). 
u 
The reliability for each component is obtained in a series of 
steps. First, a uniform random number is generated which ,corresponds 
to the confidence level (1 - Y ), for both component types: 
1 - Y = F{J (p.Q, I r, n - r ) for the Beta 
and 
1 - y FY (p.Q,I r, t) for the negative.:..log gamma. (43) 
Next, the historical data supplied for each component is utilized. 
If the component is Beta, the number of successes and failures are 
used as parameters in conjunction with the random number. If the 
component is Gamma, the number of failures and the total testing 
time are used as parameters. 
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The parameters and the random number are used with the appropriate 
distribution to provide a random deviate from that distribution. 
This deviate corresponds to a lower confidence limit (p ) for that 
Q, 
component for a given confidence level (1 - Y ). When the reliability 
(p ) or unreliability (p ) for each component is obtained, this 
Q, u 
value is placed in the reliability (unreliability) equation for the 
system (or module) to provide an estimate of the reliability (unreli-
ability) for that system (or module). 
In the absence of data, the input parameters for each distribution 
become zero. Consequently, the observed prior on that distribution 
becomes indeterminate. To alleviate this problem, a uniform prior 
is provided for each distribution in the absence of data by adding 
one (1) to each parameter. For the Beta components the parameters 
become: 
n" + 1 
and 
n" - r" + 1 (44) 
and the negative-log gamma parameters become 
r" + 1 
and 
t" + 1 ( 45) 
This uniform (ignorance) prior also allows SPARCS to handle 
troublesome parameters. For example, in Apollo-Saturn component tes-
ting, many components have no failures for a representative period of 
testing time. Thus, one of the parameters ip zero. This would yield 
an indeterminate distribution and prevent analysis. The uniform 
prior alleviates this problem. 
CHAPTER V 
MODEL VERIFICATION 
Introduction 
In this cnapter SPARCS is extensively tested to determine that 
the concept employed in the model and the model results are intact 
and correct. This testing extended over a considerable period of 
time. However, to facilitate analysis, they are grouped into two 
basic categori~s. 
The first portion of this chapter discusses the results of tests 
of some of the concepts incorporated into the model. The duality 
concept [48] which is a result of Poincaire 1 s Theorem, is tested. 
Next, the pres~nce 
of data concep~ is 
of the uniform (ignorance) prior in the absence 
verified. 
The second portion provides tests of some simple binomial and 
exponential systems. The first runs consist of single component 
systems. Since reliability assessment for single components is avail-
' 
able, this will. verify that the statistical routines and basic concepts 
are implemented correctly. Next, test runs from SPARCS are compared 
with known non-randomized, randomized and Monte Carlo techniques 
for assessment of simple system reliability by Mann [54], Buehler 
[8], Harris [33], Berkbigler and Byers [4], and Grubbs [32]. Non-
randomized bounds require techniques which do not rely on a uniform 
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random variate from a uniform (O,l) distribution while randomized 
techniques do require a uniform variate. Honte Carlo bounds utilize 
simulation techniques to derive confidence bounds on the system 
reliability. 
Duality Verification 
Poincaire's Theorem contains a duality concept which describes 
a complementary relationship between the system reliability and unreli-
ability. This concept states that the system reliability, R, can 
be obtained as the complement of the system unreliability, R [8]. 
R = 1 - R (1) 
As discussed in Chapter III, the system reliability is a function 
of the reliability of the system components and is derived from the 
system minimal paths. The system unreliability is a function of the 
unreliability of the system components and is derived from the system 
minimal cuts. Although the system reliability and unreliability are 
obtained in two different ways, they still must be complementary. 
In providing interval estimates for system reliability or unreli-
ability, SPARCS uses the system minimal paths to provide a system 
reliability equation as a function of the component's reliabilities. 
The system minimal cuts are used to obtain a system unreliability 
equation as a function of the component unreliabilities. In either 
case, component failure-history data is used to enter the appropriate 
distribution (either beta or negative-log gamma). For the beta compo• 
nents, the failure-history data consists of total successes and total 
failures. For the negative-log gamma components, the failure-history 
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data consists of total failures and a specified number of "mission 
times." In each case, the values returned from the appropriate distri-
bution is the component reliability. Using the duality concept for 
each component, the component unreliability is found as 1-R. Component 
reliabilities are placed in the system reliability equation generated 
from the minimal paths to obtain a system reliability point estimate. 
Component unreliability values are placed in the systems unreliability 
equation generated from the system minimal cuts to obtain a system 
unreliability point estimate. 
A test run was made with the simple series-parallel system of 
Figure 1 and the more complex system of Figure 2. 
Figure 1. Series-Parallel System 
On the first example, system reliability assessment was performed. 
The four minimal paths for Figure 1 (x1x3, x1x4, x2x3, x2x4 ) were 
combined to provide reliability interval estimates for the system. 
Next, system unreliability assessment was performed on the same system. 
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The two minimal cuts (x1x2, x3x4 ) were combined to provide unreliabi-
lity interval estimates for the system. If the duality concept and 
Poincaire' s Theorem are utilized correctly, these should be complements 
of each other. 
Figure 2. Seven Component Example 
On the second example (Figure 2), the four minimal paths (X X X 
- . 1 2 4' 
X1X3x4 , x5x7, x6x7 ) were combined for the system reliability interval 
estimates and the six minimal cuts (X X X , X X , X X X X X X X 1 5 6 1 7 2 3 5 6' 2 3 7' 
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x4x5x6 , x4x7 ) provided system unreliability interval estimates. Again, 
these should be complements of each other. 
The reliability and unreliability values obtained from the duality 
tests are shown in Table I and Table II. The results show the duality 
concept intact. Since 
R =. l ... R (2) 
then 
R + R = 1 (3) 
The reliability values in each case are obtained from the system 
minimal paths. The unreliability values are derived from the system 
minimal cuts. The equ~tion generated in each case by Poincaire's 
Theorem is different. However, the reliability and unreliability 
values obtained should be complementary according to the duality 
concept. 
For example, assume a simple parallel system as depicted in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Parallel System 
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TABLE I 
SERIES-PARALLEL DUALITY VERIFICATION 
Reliability Unreliability Sum of 
Percent Lower Bounds Upper Bounds Values Variance 
1 .996452 • 003131 .999581 • 000417 
2.5 .995942 • 003415 .999357 • 000643 
5 .995591 • 003656 .999247 • 0007 53 
10 .995222 • 004979 1. 000201 (. 000201) 
20 .993751 • 006088 .999839 • 000161 
25 • 992806 • 007101 • 999907 • 000093 
50 .989835 • 009908 • 999743 • 000257 
75 .984355 • 014056 • 998411 • 001589 
80 • 982509 • 017350 .999859 • 000141 
90 .979810 • 020747 1. 000557 (. 000557) 
95 .972242 • 023081 .995323 • 004677 
97.5 • 970772 • 024031 .994803 • 005197 
99 .965649 • 025333 • 990982 • 009018 
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tABLE II 
SEVEN COMPONENt DUALITY VERIFICATION 
Reliability Unreliability Sum of 
Percent Lower Bounds Upper Bounds Values Variance 
1 .999530 • 000591 1. 000121 (.000121) 
2.5 .999263 • 000678 .999941 • 000059 
5 .999010 • 000999 1.000009 (. 000009) 
10 .998546 • 001607 1.000153 (. 000153) 
20 .997917 • 002277 1. 000194 (. 000194) 
25 .997600 • 002652 1. 000252 (. 000252) 
so .995886 • 004338 1. 000224 (. 000224) 
75 .992766 • 006847 .999613 • 000387 
80 .991539 • 007434 .998973 • 001027 
90 .988821 .10059 .998880 • 001120 
95 .986696 • 012361 .999057 • 000943 
97.5 .983445 • 015057 • 998502 • 001498 
99 .979860 • 017183 • 997 043 • 002957 
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There are two components, x1 and x2 whose reliabilities are R1 and 
R2,respectively. The system minimal paths are (X1 and x2 ) and the 
system minimal cut is x1x2 • Following Chapter III, the system reliabili-
ty equation generated from the minimal paths is 
Substituting in the component reliabilities gives 
The system unreliability equation generated from the system minimal 
cut is 
The component unreliabilities are (l-R1 ) and (l-R2 ) respectively. 
Substituting the component unreliabilities into the system unreliabi-
lity equation yields 
which may be expanded to obtain 
1 
Rl - R2 + R1R2 
(Rl + R2 - R1R2) 
which in fact is 1 minus the system reliability as derived in the 
system reliability equation, sr, obtained from the .system minimal 
paths. By adding the system unreliability and reliability 
s + s 
u r 
1 - (R1 + R2 - R1R2) + (R1 + Rz - R1R2) 
1. 
Ideally, the sum of the system reliability and unreliability should 
equal 1 since the reliability factors cancel. 
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To determine the accuracy of the values being generated by SPARCS, 
the system reliability and unreliability values at each percentile 
were added. Since the reliability factors should be equal, the sum 
of the system reliability and unreliability values should equal 1. 
The tables show that SPARCS is generating very good results. 
In each case, the sum of the reliability and unreliability percentile 
points for the system very closely approximate one. For the series-
parallel example, 100 simulation runs are made which produce a maximum 
difference of .0090. For the seven component example; 400 runs are 
made with a maximum difference of .00295. 
The values in each case do not exactly equal one. These values 
are obtained by finding percentile points from the empirical distribu-
tion generated by SPARCS. The idea that these points are determined 
by an interpolation procedure on an empirical distribution generated 
by Monte Carlo procedures can easily account for the slight differences 
being encountered. However, even with these small differences, the 
accuracy of the values is, in fact, very good, even with small sample 
sizes. 
Test of Uniform Priors 
The model was developed to handle components of two basic types: 
Bernoulli components and roi~son:process components. For the Bernoulli 
components, the prior distribution on the reliability p is a beta 
whose probability density function is 
f(pl r, n) r (l )n-r p -p ' r2.0; n2.r; 0 < p< 1 
fJ(r+l, n-r+l) 
( 4) 
where 
{3(rH, n-r-1-1) ·- r! (n-r)! 
(n+l)! 
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For Poisson process components, the prior distribution on p is the 
negative-log gamma whose probability density function is 
where 
f ( p I r , T ) = p T (1 n 1 / p ) r ( T+ 1 ) r+ 1 , r , T 2 0; 0 < p < 1 
r(r+l) 
rcr-1-1) r! [so, P· 115-128]. 
(5) 
( 6) 
In either case, a uniform (ignorance) prior is provided in the absence 
of data. This provision is used to remove the possibility of generating 
an indeterminate distribution in cases which contain components with 
very high reliabilities (no failures in a representative number. of 
tests). 
To test this provision, a system containing both types of compo-
nents was used. No component in this system contained any value (other 
than zero) for its historical data (failures, successes, or testing 
time). If the uniform provision is intact, there should be a S~lo 
probability for either success or failure for the system in the absence 
of data. 
The mean system reliability and the estimated system reliability 
values were observed to determine how well they approximated the 
50% probability for success or failure for the system. The mean system 
reliability is the value obtained QY summing the reliability point 
values for the empirically generated distribution and dividing by 
the number of Monte Carlo simulation runs required to generate this 
distribution. Thus, it is the "calculated" arithmetic mean of this 
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empirical distribution. The estimated system reliability is a value 
derived from the "average" reliability for each component. The "average" 
reliability for Bernoulli components is r+l which is the mean of 
n+2 
the beta distribution representing that component [50, p. 52ff]. 
For each beta distribution, r is successes an.d n is the number of 
tests. 
For the Poisson process components, the "average" reliability is 
(T+lrl which is the mean of the gamma distribution representing 
\1:+2 
that component [50, p. 159]. For each gamma distribution, T is actual 
testing time in mission equivalents and r is the actual failures. 
These "average" v·alues for each components are placed in the proper 
pos.ition in the system equation to derive an estimated reliability 
for the system as a function of the component "average" reliabilities. 
Thus, from this test, the system mean system reliability was .500852 
and the estimated system reliability was .492188 which compares favor-
ably with the 5Wa value that was needed. 
Simple System Tests 
There are currently no methods other than SPARCS for reliability 
confidence assessment of a complex system of any logical configuration 
in which component types may be freely intermixed. However, there 
are methods to approximate the reliability of simple series or parallel 
systems in which all components are of the same type. 
The results of the tests performed by SPARCS tend to be very 
good. Analysis of these two basic methods has shown that Monte Carlo 
bounds as suggested by Burnett and Wales [10] and Levy and Moore 
[45], which are approximated by Grubbs [32], tend to be slightly 
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conservative. For example, the lower confidence bounds for system 
reliability assessment obtained by Monte Carlo methods tend to be 
slightly lower than similar non-randomized bounds as developed by 
Buehler [8]. Conversely, upper bounds on system unreliability tend 
to be greater using Monte Carlo techniques than the same non-randomized 
bounds [56]. If this is the case, the bounds generated by SPAReS 
are better bounds than the less conservative bounds. Although SPARCS 
provides Monte Carlo bounds, the non-randomized and randomized bounds 
are also presented for reference in the forthcoming tables. 
Single Component Reliability Comparisons 
A test was used with the IMSL routines, as incorporated in the 
model, to determine that they were producing correct component reliabi-
lity values. Since confidence bounds can be approximated for components, 
these values should approximate the bounds produced by simulating 
values for a single component. Hand calculated lower confidence bounds 
were developed for a gamma and beta component. 
For the gamma component, the chi-square approximation was used. 
The upper confidence bound of the failure rate, A, at confidence 
level Y where 
Y = pr( ;... :::;__ Ay ) (7) 
is distributed as 
y = F X2(2r) (2AyT). r = failures 
T total times in test (8) 
From this, the lower confidence bound on the reliability, Ry , of 
a component may be found by a direct conversion: 
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[50, ·pp. 115-128]. 
Thus, by entering chi-square tables with 2r degrees of freedom and 
the confidence level Y, the value 2 AT can be obtained. Since the 
value of T is provided as part of the component historical data, Ay 
can be obtained. 
Then, Ay is placed in (9) to obtain a lower confidencebound 
on R Y at confidence 1 evel 'Y. Table III shows the hand calculated 
bounds as compared to the lower confidence bounds. determined by 
simulation. 
TABLE III 
LCB7~ FOR A SINGLE GA;MMA. COMPONENT 
WITH T=51.2 and F=5 
(9) 
Lower Confidence Chi-Square SPARCS Simulation 
Level Approximation Values Values 
• 95 • 83629 . .824990 
.90 • 855529 .854416 
.80 .876982 • 87 4309 
.so • 912808 • 911996 
.20 .941443 .942352 
.10 • 953601 • 955653 
• 05 • 962255 • .962827 
~"LCB = lower confidence bound. ·For this comparison, the uniform 
prior assumption was removed fr:om SPARCS. 
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For the beta component test, an approximation for the lower 
confidence bound on the reliability of a single component as developed 
by Mann [33] is used. For this approximation, the mean is 
m = ln(n + .5) - ln (n~r-.5), 
the variance is 
-1 -1 V = (n-r-. 5) - (n+. 5) , 
and the degrees of freedom are 
2 f =2m 
-v 
where n total time in tests 
r = failures. 
This information is used in conjunction with the Wilson-Hilferty 
(10) 
( 11) 
(12) 
chi-square approximation [57] to approximate a lower confidence bound 
in the expression: 
R = exp { -m(l - ( 2 I 9 f) + Z Y ( 2 I 9 f ) ) 3 } 
where Zy is the Yth quantile of the standard normal distribution. 
The results are found in TP.ble IV. 
Bernoulli System Tests 
(13) 
Buehler [8], Harris [33] and Mann [54] provide methods for appro-
ximating the reliability of simple systems consisting of Bernoulli 
type components. Buehler [8] provides confidence intervals for a 
system of two binomial components with small probabilities of failure 
and moderate sample sizes for historical test information. His inter-
vals are based upon a set of inequalities in conjunction with a Poisson 
approximation to the binomial distribution. These bounds tend to 
be conservative in general in that the 1- Ct confidence level may 
be frequently exceeded [33]. Harris [33] uses a random variate from 
Lower Confidence 
Level 
.95 
.90 
.75 
.50 
.25 
.10 
• 05 
TABLE IV 
LCB* FOR A SINGLE BETA COMPONENT 
WITH F=3 AND S=47 
Values From Mann 
Approximation 
.829573 
.849497 
.879815 
• 90897 
.933414 
.951533 
• 960684 
*LCB = lower confidence bound 
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SPARCS Simulation 
Values 
.832268 
• 850l51 
• 87 3055 
• 904778 
.933372 
.952446 
• 957405 
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a uniform (0,1) distribution to remedy the conservatism of Buehler's 
method. Harris also applies a Poisson approximation to obtain lower 
bounds on the reliability of r~dundant binomial systems and extends 
his procedure to accormnodate more than two component systems • Mann 
[54] develops a procedure to provide bounds on series or parallel 
binomial systems in which the component sample sizes are large and 
the component failures are small. Mann 1 s Approximately Optimum (AO) 
procedure can be used either with or without uniform random variates. 
For these bounds, the Wilson-Hilferty transformation for the .ipproxi-
mate noncentral Chi-square distribution is used. These methods, al-
though based on approximations, provide results which closely 
approximate supplied test values. Since some of the methods require 
extensive programming and mathematical calculations, test results 
were taken from several articles and compared with similar results 
produced by SPARes. 
The examples used for comparison were simple parallel systems 
containing two and three Bernoulli type components, respectively. 
The historical component information was the same type used in tests 
by each of the respective authors. The results are presented in 
Table v. 
Exponential System Tests 
As mentioned earlier, there are three basic approaches for provi-
ding confidence bounds on the reliability of simple systems. One 
approach was developed by Lentner and Buehler [ 44] and expanded by 
El Mawaziny [21] for simple series systems. This approach uses non-
randomized techniques for providing lower confidence bounds on the 
Buehler's 
Example Data Poisson 
Number ( r, s) Approx.[8] 
1 ( 3' 97) • 00412 
(5,95) 
(2,98) 
2 (3. 97) • 000133~': 
(5,95) 
TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF UPPER 90% CONFIDENCE BOUNDS FOR 
SIMPLE BERNOULLI SYSTEMS .WITH 
r FAILURES AND s SUCCESSES 
Harris Harris 
Non-Random Mann Random 
Poisson[33] Non-Random[ 54] Poisson[33] 
• 00486 • 00420 • 00416 
• 000186 • 000127 • 000145 
Mann SPARCS 
Random[ 54] ·Bound 
• 00417 • 004477 
• 000146 • 000132 
"/:Likelihood-ratio confidence bound substituted since confidence bounds are unavailable for k > 2. 
r = number of failures 
s = number of successes 
k = number of components 
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reliability of exponential series systems. Since the,procedure used 
by El Mawaziny, for more than two subsystems, tends.to be large and 
tedious, approximations have been developed by Mann and Grubbs [56] 
and El Mawaziny and Buehler [22]. 
Simulation, another technique used to provide confidence bounds, 
has been discussed by Levy and Moore [ 45] and Burnett and Wales [1 0] 
and others. A mathematical technique for approximating these bounds 
for simple series systems has been developed by Grubbs [32] to shorten 
the time involved in obtaining these bounds using computer runs. 
Lower bounds on the system reliability determined by the simulation 
techniques mentioned above tend to be lower than bound provided by 
the non-randomized techniques. 
Berkbigler and Byers [4] used the basic simulation techniques 
discussed earlier to provide 95% lower confidence bounds on the 
reliability of some simple exponential systems. The same data was 
used with SPAReS to compare bounds. Berkbigler and Byers [4] made 
1, 000 simulation runs as opposed to 400 runs by SPARes. The results 
are in Table VI. Both lower confidence bounds assume a uniform prior 
in the absence of data. 
Mann's [56] bounds are compared to the lower confidence bounds 
for exponential series systems of El Mawaziny [21] and El Mawa~iny 
and Buehler [22]. In addition, the simulation bound approximation 
developed by Grubbs [32] is compared. The same data was used with 
SPAReS to provide some similar bounds. The simulation bound should 
approach the bound of Grubbs [32]. Table VII shows the comparison 
between techniques. To obtain the values from SPAReS, the uniform 
Number of 
Systems 
2 
5 
TABLE VI 
95% LCB ON SIMPLE EXPONENTIAL SERIES SYSTEMS 
AS PER BERKBIGLER AND BYERS 
AS COMPARED WITH SPARCS 
Data Berkbigler and 
(r, T) Byers [4] . 
(1, 100) 
(3,140) .921 
(2,200) 
(3,225) 
(2,480) .914 
(5,400) 
(4,500) 
r = number of failures 
T = total time in test per test unit 
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SPARCS 
.920151 
.917189 
Number of Data 
Systems ( r, T) 
(4,25.53) 
3 (3, 56. 41J 
(2,23.47) 
(2,35.97) 
3 (2,14.61) 
(2,62.54) 
r = number of failures 
TABLE VII 
LCB ON SIMPLE EXPONENTIAL SERIES SYSTEM COMPARING 
SPARCS WITH OTHER MATHEMATICAL TECHNIQUES 
Confidence El El Mawaziny 
Bounds Mawaziny and Buehler Mann 
[21] [22] [56] 
.90 • 700 .738 .699 
.90 .732 • 811 .738 
T = total time in tests per test unit 
Grubbs SPARCS 
[32] 
.649 • 647609 
.693 .689471 
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prior assumption was removed to obtain a fiducial prior for comparison 
purposes. 
The confidence bound provided by SPARCS is lower than the other 
confidence bounds. However, the bounds provided by SPARCS closely 
approximate the bounds of Grubbs [32] as would also be expected since 
the bounds provided by Grubbs [32] were developed to closely approxi-
mate the bounds provided by simulation techniques. 
CHAPTER VI 
MISCELLANEOUS MATHEMATICAL ASPECTS 
Introduction 
SPARCS employs a combination of many techniques and procedures. 
A discussion of some selected techniques and parts is presented in 
this chapter. 
Beta and gamma proprietary routines from the International Mathe-
matical and Statistical Library (IMSL) [14] are used in SPARCS. These 
routines (MDBETI and GGTMAJ) provide component reliabilities for 
system reliability assessment. Analysis of these routines was 
performed in two steps. 
An error analysis on the values generated by these routines 
was provided by Keun K. Lee [40] in a master's report at Oklahoma 
State University. The inverse beta (MDBETA) and gamma (GGTMAJ) were 
compared to forward routines of the same type. After the routines 
were incorporated into the model, SPARCS was tested to see if the 
routines were producing component reliabilities consistent with 
hand calculated component reliability values as described in 
Chapter V. 
Two pseudo-random number generation routines are utilized by 
SPARCS. RANF is a routine that is coded in PL/1 and used with the 
beta components. GGUl is an assembler language routine that is an 
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IMSL subroutine used with the gamma type components. These routines 
are briefly compared and analyzed. 
A sorting technique developed by Donald Shell [81; 37, pp. 84-
86] is used to sort the system (ui:t)reliability point estimate.s into 
ascending ordE!r. This technique is very efficient for sorting large 
btocks of numbers. Since the number of simulation runs (and correspon-
ding reliability point estimates) may tend to be large for system 
assessment, this technique is chosen to sort the system (un)reliability 
values. 
Finally, sample size determination is discussed. The number 
of simulation runs (sample size) is left to the discretion of the 
user. A brief presentation of sample size determination is provided 
followed by a discussion of sample size versus accuracy tradeoffs 
discovered by SPARCS. This technique represents the "standard" sample 
size determination technique frequently used in simulation experiments. 
Inverse Beta and Gamma Analysis 
IMSL Error Analysis 
Lee [ 40] analyzed the IMS'L rout:Lnes utilized in SPARCS to deter• 
mine the amount of error inherent in these routines. First, the incom~ 
plete (forward) beta and gamma distributions were developed as 
polynomials which provided probability values for given appropriate 
percentage point values. These probability values were then compared 
with the probability values in Pearson's tables of the Incomplete 
Beta and the Incomplete Gamma functions [72, 73]. 
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For the beta distribut:ion, one hundred percentile point values 
t©~, GGTMAJ, ~~n~r~e~d ~ s~t. ©f 50 vaht~s. ThMe rantlt>m tl@Viahs (p'@r-.. 
~12ntili$@ p©ifit. v~lu~i§i) W@t'(g yg;(gtl Ills input t~ th@ inGGmphte (forward) 
t'liift$® ( o, l ), Th® K©lm©$©1'©V .. ~miJ;'fi@V (K .. ~) t.W§ !!lllmph .g~odn€ss t>f 
I 
H:Hy f;@§ts ©V~t= Ill fiift~@ ©f piaL'ilifi~t€f vali:i@s h©m a = i ·afi'Ei ~ = i 
M~ E© § = 100 ~itnd b = 100 in Vlllfi©i:is e©ffibtnati©ns. 
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TABLE VIII 
MAXIMUM ERROR FROM MDBETI 
Input OutRut Percentage Perce. tage Absolute 
a b Point Probability Point Error 
1 1 • 97 • 97 000 .96999 • 00001 
20 20 .71 • 99718 • 70992 • 00008 
so so .66 .99948 .69996 • 00004 
so 40 .69 • 99607 .68999 • 00001 
100 100 .64 .99997 .63998 • 00002 
100 110 .62 .99999 .61993 • 00007 
TABLE IX 
KOI.MOGOROV- SM IRNOV TEST FOR GGTMAJ 
Maximum Observed 
Absolute Signi:ficance 
n t Difference1' Level 
1 1 • 0666 p > .2 
13 4 • OS28 p > • 2 
s 29 • 0676 p > • 2 
so so • OS9S p > • 2 
100 100 • 077S p > . 2 
*Difference between empirical cumulative distribution function 
and uniform cumulative distribution function. 
·! 
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Ho F(X) G(X), for all X 
H1 F(X) I G(X), for at least 1 value of X 
where F(X) is the forward gamma and G(X) is the IMSL gamma deviate 
generator. The observed significance levels were greater than .2 
for most of the tests on GGTMAJ. 
Pseudo-Random Number Generators 
RANF 
RANF is a pseudo-random number generator that provides a number 
from a uniform distribution over the range (0,1). RANF is a composite 
of three multiplicative congruential generators as proposed by Maclaren 
and Marsaglia ts1 ]. 
In 1968, Marsaglia [59] showed that the standard multiplicative 
congruential method used for most pseudo-random number generators 
produced values with nonrandom characteristics. Thus, Marsaglia and 
Bray [60] developed the procedures as incorporated in RANF to remove 
these inconsistencies. 
RANF essentially uses numbers from one generator to shuffle 
numbers obtained from a second generator. This second generator is 
used to shuffle numbers from a third;gen,erator. The value obtained 
from the third generator is the pseudo-random number over the range 
0 to 1. RANF, as a composite generator, has been subjected to tests, 
\ 
by von Gelder [90] and Chandler [12], which have yielded some very 
good results. RANF generally passes all known tests of randomness. 
These tests show good results even if the component generators used 
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to provide the pseudo-random digits are not of the highest quality. 
However, RANF has not been exhaustively tested and, as with any such 
routine, there is the possibility of some nonoptimal results given 
favorable situations. 
GGUl 
GGUl is a proprietary subroutine of the International Mathematical 
and Statistical Library (IMSL) [14]. It is used in conjunction with 
the IMSL subroutine GGTMAJ to provide random gamma deviates for use 
in obtaining component reliabilities for gamma type components. 
GGUl is written in Assembler language and provides a pseudo-
random number from a uniform distribution over the range 0 to 1. 
It is a multiplicative generator that manipulates the binary digits 
(bits) and groupings of bits (bytes) to produce a pseudo-random number. 
The working of the generator is basically simple. Initially, 
the lower order bytes of the double precision seed are zeroed. A 
logical "or" is performed against the fifth byte of the seed to ensure 
a nonzero number for future multiplication. This value is multiplied 
by a constant (which may be altered) to produce a third number. The 
integer part of this number is truncated to leave the fractional 
part which is the pseudo-rand;m number over the range 0 to 1. 
Schmidt and Taylor Test.s 
Both RANF and GGUl were subjected to some simple tes~s for good-
ness of fit, randomness and autocorrelation proposed by Schmidt and 
Taylor [79, P• 229] and Poore [74, p. 101]. First a frequency distribu-
tion for each generator was obtained for different seed values. In 
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each case, visual inspection showed no unusual skewness as would 
be expected because of initial tests on these generators. Next, the 
runs test and test for autocorrelation [74, P• 241] were applied 
to each generator. Basically, the runs test is used to test the "random-
ness" of a sequence of numbers. Although numbers may fit a uniform 
distribution, this does not guarantee "randomness" [74, p. 241]. 
The autocorrelation test checks for the tendency of some numbers 
to be followed by other numbers. Thus, the amount of autocorrelation 
between each value from a pseudo-random number generator is examined. 
The test runs show very good results. Table X shows the results 
of these tests. 
TABLE X 
ABSOLUTE Z VALUES(! Z!) FOR RUNS 
AND AUTOCORRELATION TESTS ON 
RANF AND GGUI~': 
Test for Randomness 
Autocorrelation Tests 
RANF 
.885 
.727 
GGUl 
.794 
.510 
7:In both cases, the l:i,mitl.ng value is 1.96. 
In every case, the resulting values are well below our limit and 
show that each generator does produce values that show very little 
autocorrelation and a high degree of randomness. 
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The Shell Sort 
There are as many sorting routines as there are sorting needs. 
There are insertion sorts, exchange sorts, selection sorts, special 
purpose sorts and many others. SPARCS needed a sorting routine that 
would sort a large block of numbers with an efficient use of time 
and core storage. The sort chosen needed to be an internal computer 
sort without the aid of peripheral storage devices. The Shell [81; 
37, pp. 84-86; 82] sort was chosen as the best and simplest sort 
for our purposes. 
The Shell sort is initially discussed in a paper by Donald L. 
Shell in 1959 [81]. It divides the record of information to be sorted 
into groups of diminishing size. This grouping provides each element 
to be sorted with the capability of moving many positions in one 
jump. This group size diminishes until the final sort is just a 
straight insertion sort. The insertion sort considers one element 
at a time and compares it with a previous element or a group of ele-
ments that are sorted in the desired order. 
The size of the decreasing increments is very important. Although 
there is no 11 be-st11 size for a large number of elements to be sorted, 
it has been determined that some group sizes are better than others. 
In choosing group sizes, execution time is the main factor that needs 
to be minimized. Execut~on tim~ is determined by 5 factors: 1) size 
of the record, 2) number of ~orting passes, 3) the number of compari-
sons, 4) the Qumber of moves, and 5) the sum of the increment values 
or group sizes [37, pp. 84-86]. In SPARCS, the size of the record 
(number of simulation runs) is determined externally. Therefore, 
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to minimize execution time, the other 4 factors will have to be kept 
to a minimum. 
To choose the diminishing increment sizes, let 
hi= group or increment size of ith group 
N = record size 
Then, let 
h = 1 
1 ' hi+1 = 3hi + 1 
and stop when 
The first increment (group size) is hi and decreases until hi = h1 1. 
For example, 1f 
then: 
Here, 
N = 1000 
h = 1 1 
h2=3(1)+ 1 = 4 
h3 = 3(4) + 1 = 13 
h4 = 3(13) + 1 = 40 
h5 = 3(40) + 1 = 121 
h6 = 3(121) + 1 364 
h7 = 3(364) + 1 = 1093. 
hi+2 = h7 = 1093 > N = 1000 
so that the first group size (increment) is 
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The increment will continue to diminish on each pass until h.= 1 
1. 
which reduces to the straight insertion sort. In this manner, record 
elements will be moved closer to their correct position in large 
jumps before the final simple insertion. sort. 
For example, if 10 items are to be sorted with the following 
increments 
the sorting would proceed as follows. 
72 16 55 23 7 4. 
Sorting with h 3 5 would yield 
45 1 30 15 74 72 16 55 23 98. 
With h 2 = 2 yields 
~~ 
30 1 45 15 16 55 23 72 74 98. 
The final simple insertion sort yields 
1 15 16 23 30 45 55 72 74 98. 
For a large number of items, the Shell ~ort is more efficient 
than any of the other sort ' methods mentioned earlier [81]. The coding 
of the Shell sort does not require extensive core. Consequently, 
this sorting routine was chosen for use in SPARCS over other sorting 
methods analyzed. 
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Sample Size Determination 
Conventional Methods 
Conventional methods for sample size determination revolve around 
the Central Limit Theorem. This theorem, which is the basic theorem 
used in statistical inference, stipulates that if a universe has 
a mean~ and a finite standard deviation a, then the distribution 
of sample means, x, approaches a normal distribution with meafi p 
and standard deviation~ as the sample ~iz~ increases [13, p. 240; 
86, p. 259]. This theorem holds true regardless of the type of universe 
under analysis (assuming unimodality). 
The Central Limit Theorem is based upon the law of large numbers. 
This law states that sample means are approximately centered about 
the universe mean. These sample means tend to become more closely 
clustered about the universe mean as the sample size becomes larger. 
This relationship is represented succintly by Tchebycheff's inequality 
which states that for any set of data x1, ••• xn and any k 2 1, 
P( I X- J.LI 2 k 0' ~ < 1 • 
Thus, the probability of selecting a randomly selected value,x, 
which differs from the universe mean, p , by at least k standard 
deviations will not exceed 12 [13, P• 239]. 
k 
(4) 
Because of the Central Limit Theorem and the law of large numbers, 
interval estimates can be used to provide information about the uni-
-verse mean,~, and its relationship to a sample mean, x. A probability 
relationship concerning the deviation of a sample mean from the 
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universe mean is given by 
a_ < " < i -Za (L) = 1- a X - ,_..- Y2 X (5) 
where Z is standard deviation units from a standard normal distribution, 
and 0'- can be· estimated by 
X 
s 
(J_ = 
X Vn' 
for large samples and s is the standard deviation of the sample [79, 
p. 260; 74, p. 266-267]. 
Using the above information, the distribution of sample means 
can be standardized by 
z 
(6) 
(7) 
where Z is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard devia-
tion of 1. For the analysis in (5), the universe standard deviation 
must be known. When the universe standard deviation is not known 
and must be estimated, the Student-t distribution provides the appropri-
ate distribution of the form 
t X-fJ. = -----:-.:.:.s~-
(8) 
The Student-t distribution with n - 1 degrees of freedom, although 
not normally distributed, approaches the normal distribution as the 
sample size increases (where s is the sample standard deviation and 
n - 1 adjusts for small sample bias). Sif\Ce IfLOSt s·ample sizes greater 
than 30 observations are considered large, the normal approximation 
diseussed .below is used for the distribution of t [13, p. 266]. 
If the maximum allowabl~ deviation of i from /1 at a specified 
confidence level is represented as 
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x -/1 = 6 
(9) 
then the sample size, n, can be obtained iteratively as: 
z= 6 
..L 
~ 
6= z• s 
yn 
Vn= z • s 
6 2 
n (zd s) (10) 
where z standard normal statistic 
- N(O,l) 
s standard deviation of the sample 
6 = maximum allowable deviation between i and f.J.• 
Equation (10), then, would be the applicable formula 'for calculation 
of the required sample size for a specified confidence level for 
use with SPARCS. 
For a system with a variance (s 2) of .000327, a standard deviation 
(s) of .018076, and a maximum allowable deviation (6) of .001, the 
sample size, at the 95% confidence level, would be calculated as 
follows. 
2 2 
( z . s ) f,96 . • 018076 ) n = -6'-······· = • 001 
n = 1,255 
I \ (11) 
Consequently, it would take 1,255 simulation runs to provide a sample 
mean, x, that would have a maximum allowable deviation of .001 from 
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the true population mean at a confidence level of 95%. Furthermore, 
the standard deviation used in the sample size calculation v1ould 
probably have to be obtained as a result of a sample run. 
This procedure may also be used t.o obtain a confidence level 
that may be applied to the results of any simulation run without 
regard for sarr{ple size. The sample mean, ~' and standard deviation, 
s, are derived for each system run by SPARCS. If the maximum allowable 
deviation (o) is specified, a confidence level can be associated 
with the results of a specified sample run. For example, if a run 
of a system produces a standard deviation of .010204 in 400 runs, 
then for an allowable deviation of .001, the confidence level woulc 
be associated with 1.96 standard normal deviates or a 95% confidence 
level. 
z = .. !.001 
s 
.... ~--0.1.02 04 
vn- ..p;oo 
z - 1.96 (12) 
Thus, there is a 95% confidence that the population mean is within 
a maximum allowable dev~at:i,on of .001 from the sample mean. 
Sample Size Problems 
Alt?ough the above analysis of the sample size problem seems 
very succinct and explicit, Burdick and Naylor [9] and Naylor, Balintfy, 
Burdick and Chu [68, P• 332ff.] point to sample size determination 
as one of the major simulation problems. The problem revolves around 
two basic elements: 1) how many observations to measure and 2) when 
to begin measurement. 
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In most situations, practitioners appeal to the Central Limit 
Theorem, as presented above, relying on the assumptions of normality 
and independence to provide a sample size value [68, P• 335]. However, 
the efficiency of this method has been questioned by Fishman [29], 
Graybill [31] and Cooley [17] as to the number of samples required 
and the slowness of no~lity convergence. With some knowledge of 
the distribution of the universe to be sampled, the sample size can 
be determined more efficiently in same cases [29, 31, 17]. However, 
to my knowledge, there is no analysis that purports to classify dif• 
ferent distributions of reliability values (assuming they are dif-
ferent) obtained by analysis of different system configurations. 
Consequently, there is no method for efficiently determining sample 
size in SPARCS other than that proposed above. 
Secondly, the problems of autocorrelation [29, 31, 17] steady 
state and startup bias, as discussed by Conway [16], Moran [65, p. 87] 
and Morse [66, p. 61] directly affect the problem of when to begin 
measurement. However, these are areas about which there is very little 
. in-depth information and consensus as can be seen by analyzing the 
steady state discussion by Schmidt and Taylor [79, p. 346] and Conway 
[16]. Consequently, in practice, these problems tend to be arbitrarily 
determined or ignored. 
Model Sample Size Considerations 
The number of simulation runs (sample size), for each system 
under consideration by SPARCS, is supplied by the user. This supplied 
value may be calculated by equation (7) or arbitrarily assigned. 
Since there is no formal knowledge concerning resulting distributions 
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from system reliability assessment, these are the only two methods 
currently available for sample size determination; to my knowledge. 
Most of the values obtained for .validation purposes in Chapter V, 
were obtained from 400 iterations or less. These values were compared 
with literature values obtained from sample sizes of 1,000 iterations 
up. Comparison of the values in Chapter V shows a very close correla-
tion between answers obtained from the smaller sample sizes of SPARCS 
and the large sample sizes from literature. This phenomenon seems 
to follow for each comparison run made. Thus, it seems that reasonable 
accuracy ca~ ~e- obtained with SPARCS from smaller sample sizes. 
There are no explicit reasons proposed for these results. However, 
there are two situations that may contribute to this phenomenon. The 
first possible explanation is based upon the idea that SPARCS does 
not simulate discrete events but instead simulates system reliability 
values. An empirical distribution of reliability values is the purpose 
and direct result of this simulation. Consequently, this type of 
analysis may have an effect on the sample size. Secondly, the conven-
tional sample size determination methods discussed earlier were 
developed to pertain to any unimodal distribution. This encompasses 
a wide range of possibilities requiring a certain amount of "overkill" 
to acco;mpl:i.sh its objectives. However, it seems that the empirical 
distributions, as generated by SPARes, do not require as large a 
sample size as would be suggested by those methods to achieve adequate 
results. Perhaps, either one or both of these situations may be respon-
sible for the satisfactory results obtained from SPARCS relatively 
small sample sizes. 
CHAPTER VII 
PROCEDURE DESCRIPTIONS AND JCL ASPECTS 
Introduction 
MAPS (Model for the Analysis of Probabilities of Systems) written 
by J.L. Burr~s [11] is the basis around which SPARCS is developed. 
MAPS provides an estimate of the system reliability as a function 
of the reliabilities of the components. Originally programmed in 
two parts, MAPS I and MAPS II were combined to produce a one pass 
version of MAPS. This version was modified to provide for simulation 
and other cap·abilities. Consequently, many of the procedure names 
found in MAPS are also found in SPARCS. 
SPARCS contains a Shell sort, two random number generators, 
certain proprietary routines from the International Mathematical 
and Statistical Library (IMSL ), percentile calculation routines, 
simulation capabilities, and an MTBF (mean-time-between-failure) 
routine not found in MAPS. SPARCS is designed to call the MDBETI 
' ' 
and GGTMAJ routines from the IMSL library. If the facility using 
SPARCS does not subscribe to the IMSL library, these routines may 
be used as a road module. 
The storage requirements of each procedu~e ~nd array is presented 
with a discussion of the dynamic storage concept utilized by SPARes. 
JCL aspects of the model are discussed with and without the load 
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module. Appendix C contains a complete source program listing which 
may be used for reference dur!ing the discussion of each procedure. 
Procedure Descriptions 
UNITED (MAIN) 
UNITED is the main PL/1 procedure. It assumes control of the 
program calling other procedures when necessary, controlling the 
simulation process, inputting and outputting information, processing 
modules, calculating percentiles, sorting system reliabilities and 
determining when to stop. 
Initially UNITED reads in information needed to prepare for 
procedures that follow. Information about the simulation process, 
MTBF calculations and dynamic storage development is read first. 
Data for system identification, the type of analysis desired (reliabi-
lity or unreliability), p.rovision for user or program suppUed compo-
nent and system labels, information about the input form of minimal 
states (binary or hexadecimal) and an indication of whether punched 
output is desired follows. Next, the appropriate storage for dynamic 
arrays is allocated and UNITED begins its iterative calculations. 
Entry point CALCUL is located in UNITED~ CA~CUL, entered after 
'· ' 
the simulation process is comple~ed, provides statistical information 
on the arithmetic mean, sta~da~d deviation, average reliability, 
and MTBF for the system. The Shell sort [81] is used to sort the 
' \ 
system reliabilities or unreliabilities in ascending order. It breaks 
the items to be sorted into groups which are decreased in size fol-
lowing each sort procedure. Information is moved between these groups 
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until the items to be sorted are in the order desired. Tests and 
calculations show the Shell sort as very efficient in its use of 
computer time and storage when dealing with a large number of items. 
CONF, in conjunction with CA:(..CUL, then provides percentiles for both 
I 
the reliabilities or unreliabili ties and· t:.he MTBF if desired. When 
this is finished, UNITED terminates the program or reads a new system 
to be analyzed, whichever is applicable. 
FNPUT and HEXIN 
FNPUT procedure is used to input the minimal states for the 
system and for. each module. The minimal states are represented in 
either binary (bit string) or hexadecimal (character string) notation. 
A code (KODE) is used to indicate how the minimal states are represen .. 
ted. If hexadecimal notation is used, entry point HEXIN converts 
hexadecimal input to binary notation for ~se later in the program 
since binary notation is necessary to generate the probability equa .. 
tion(s). 
HEXIN procedure uses a "table lookup'1 approach to convert from 
hexadecimal input to binary notation. The hexadecimal option is 
allowed to enable the user to reduce the number of characters necessary 
to represent a minimal state, especially for large systems .or modules. 
EQGEN 
Probability equations are generated in EQGEN using Poincaire' s 
method as the primary algorithm. The minimal paths (or cuts) are 
combined and accumulated to form the equation. If the system 
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configuration is arranged into two or more modules, the probability 
equation is generated for each module, in addition to the equation 
generated for the system. The same computational process is used 
to generate ·both the system and module equations. 
For a system or module having n minimal states, the prob~bility 
equation has a maximum of 2n - 1 terms. Because of the cancellation 
of duplicate terms by EQGEN, the actual probability equation contains 
only a fraction of the maximum number of terms. Each minimal state 
is introduced and combined with the previously generated terms to 
form new terms. Terms that have zero coefficients are removed before 
the next minimal state is introduced. Terms of the probability equa-
tion are initially stored in an array called TERMS. Coefficients 
are stored in an array called COEF. 
Information about the system being analyzed, the probability 
equations for the system and each module are handled in OUT!. These 
procedures are handled by three major entry points. OUT! is used 
to assign labels to· the elements of the system an.d print control 
information concerning the system. OUT2 ~s ~sed to assign labels 
I 
to the elements of a module and print control information for that 
module. OUT3 is called to print tlne minimal paths and probability 
I 
equation for each module and the system. 
OUTl and OUT2 are also designed to store the necessary historical 
information about each component for further use in the simulation. 
Information as to the historical number of failures (FAILS); number 
of successes or testing time (PORT), and type of component (TYPE) 
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is stored. Next, the SIMULATE procedure is called to produce the 
results for the first simulation run. All other simulation runs 
are performed by entry point S~OUT of OUTI using this historical 
information stored during execution of OUTl and OUT2. 
A provis~on allowing the user to assign labels or the computer 
to assign labels to the components and modules is incorporated into 
OUTI. If the user wishes to assign particular names, OUTI uses these 
names as labels. Otherwise, the labels are assigned by OUTI. Components 
are assigned a number in order from 1 to 128. Modules are assigned 
labels in order from A - z, Al - Zl, A2 - Z2, A3 - Z3, A4 - Z4, etc. 
Thus modular elements are assigned labels beginning with an alphabetic 
character and nonmodular elements are assigned numeric labels. 
OUT II 
Output concerning the reliabilities of each component, module 
and the system are produced by the OUT II procedure. The output is 
in the following general order: 
1) Identification of the system or module. 
A listing of: 
2) the reliability (unreliability) yalue for each component 
as obtained in the first simulation run (This value is to 
be used as a check figure), 
-
3) the type of analysis to be performed on each component, i.e., 
either Beta or Gamma, 
4) historical data about the total testing time (if Gamma) or 
the total number of successes (if Beta) for each component, 
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5) the total number of historical failures observed with each 
component, and 
6) the computed reliability and unreliability for the module. 
For each additional module, steps 2 through 6 are repeated. Next, 
7) a listing of reliabilities (unreliabilities) for the system 
consisting of both modular and rtorunodular reliabilities), 
is provided and is the final output produced by OUT II. 
COMPUTE 
The COMPUTE procedure calculates a probability value for each 
module and combines these to produce a system reliability. The probabi-
lities for each module are calculated first and substituted into 
the system probability equation to compute the values of the system 
reliabilities. Each system reliability is stored in an array called 
RELSTO for later use. 
The reliabilities for the modules and/or the system are accumu-
lated on a term-by-term basis. A three step process is used. First, 
r 
the product of the reliability (unreliability) of each element in 
a term, denoted by a "1" in the bit string, is found. Next, the product 
found in the first step is multiplied by the coefficient of the term. 
This computes the reliability (unreliability) attributable to that 
tenn. Finally, the reliability (unreliability) calculated in step 
two is added to the accumulated reliability from previous ter~s. 
'· 
Both the system reliability and unreliability are a product 
of the COMPUTE procedure. If a reliability analysis is specified, 
the analysis uses component reliabilities to provide the system and 
modu~e reliabilities. If an unreliability analysis is desired, the 
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component unreliabilities are used to calculate the system and module 
unreliability. In either case, the complementary value of the specified 
analysis (reliability) is obtained by subtracting the result of that 
analysis (system reliability) from 1 (1 - system reliability= system 
unreliability). 
SLINE, PRINTER and DLINE 
The SLINE procedure is used to show continuation of a system 
reliability equation. If a reliability equation requires more than 
120 spaces on any line, an asterisk c~·,) is placed at the end of that 
line to indicate the continuation of the equation onto the next line. 
The PRINTER procedure is called· to place the asterisk ("k) at the 
end of the continued line. 
The DLINE procedure keeps track of the page number as each new 
page of output is initiated. It also provides for the printing of 
"7:'l',GONTINUED~b''" each time a new page is started. 
SIMULATE 
The SIMULATE procedure calculates a reliability or unreliability 
interval estimate for each component based on historical test informa-
tion provided for that component. Each component has a reliability 
(or unreliabili~y) value calcvlated for each simulation run. These 
values are g,,enerated from either a Beta or Gamma prior depending 
on the type of component being analyzed. 
The BETASUB procedure is used with Beta type components. It 
has two purposes: First, it calls the MDBETI routine from the IMSL 
(International Mathematical and Statistical Library) library which 
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provides interval estimates on the reliability (unreliability) of 
each Beta component. Next, after all the simulation runs are finished, 
it calculates the average reliability (unreliability) for each component 
to be used in the calculation of the average system reliability ('unreli-
ability). 
The GAMASUB procedure is used with Gamma (time-to-failure) campo• 
nents. It has the same basic purpose as the BETASUB procedure except 
that it calls the GGTMAJ routine from the IMSL library. Both interval 
estimates and average reliabilities (unreliabilities) are generated 
by GAMASUB from historical data provided for each component. 
Both BErASUB and GAMASUB procedures provide essentially the 
same information for their respective component types. In both instan-
ces, the his~orical component data is adjusted to provide uniform 
priors in the absence of data. 
RANF 
-
The RANF procedure provides a random number generator that is 
used in the Monte Carlo process. RANF, the name of the pseudo~random 
number generator, was provided by Dr. J.P. Chandler of Oklahoma State 
University. Essentially it is a composite of three multiplicative 
\ 
congruential random number generators. Tests have shown it to be 
a very good generator with few vices. 
IMSL Routines 
MDBETI and GGTMAJ are two IMSL (International Mathematical and 
Statistical Library) routines incorporated into SPARCS to be called 
by the SIMULATE procedure. If the IMSL library is available at the 
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facility using SPARCS, the appropriate routines may be called directly. 
If the library is not available, the appropriate routines may be 
incorporated as load modules. If the load module is used, the facility 
must have FORTRAN-G, PL/1-F, and Assembler F language capabilities. 
GGTMAJ is used with exponential (time-to-failure) type components. 
It generates a gannna random deviate using a rejection method. Two 
other routines, GGBTA and GGUl, are called by GGTMAJ during processing, 
one of which (GGUl) is an IMSL pseudo-random number gener~tor. Histori-
cal data about each exponential component is input as parameters 
and gamma random deviates are returned. GGTMAJ and GGBTA are in FORTRAN 
and GGUl is Jn Assembler. 
MDBETI is used with Poisson process (pass-fail) components. 
It generates a Beta deviate from the inverse beta probability distribu-
tion function in the exclusive range (0,1). MDBETA and UERTST are 
called during processing both of which are in FORtRAN the same as 
MDBETI. Historical data about each pass-fail component is input and 
a beta deviate is output in the range (0~1). Whether using the load 
module or calling the IMSL routines dire~tly from the IMSL library, 
familiarity with JCL capabilities is a n~cessity. 
System Size and Storage Capacity 
In SPARCS~ storage is dynamic and a function of the size of 
the system b~ing analyzed. St~rag~ si'ze ~s determined by three items. 
The OS (operating system) occupies a certain amount of core. This 
requirement is static and cannot be affected by the programmer. Conse-
quently, for our purposes, it is disregarded. Second, storage is 
required to hold the actual recorded program statements (object 
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program). This storage is static and requires about 72,000 bytes 
for SPARCS. Finally, storage for variables and arrays must be assigned. 
The dynamic capabilities of PL/1 are used when possible to save storage 
in the utilization of arrays. Thus, the arrays are allowed to expand 
or contract as the size of the systems under analysis changes. 
In discussing the system and storage size, three aspects are 
analyzed. The maximum system limitations for use with the program 
are presented. Second, the amount of core used with each procedure 
for statement storage is given. Finally, the amount of storage required 
for each array is examined. Dynamic arrays are identified and their 
core range specified where possible. 
System Size 
The system size limitations are presented in Table XI and are 
the same as required for the Burris program [11]. These values repre-
sent a maximum. If systems of a smaller size are used, SPARCS is 
designed to release unused core for use elsewhere. This is done automa-
tically by the program and does not require any special manipulations 
by the user. 
Procedure Storage Requirements 
The core requirements to store the statements from each procedure 
1 
are listed in Table XII. Since t:;he IMSU routines are subroutines called 
by BETASUB and GAMASUB, their storage requirements are included in 
the storage requirements of the,se routines. The procedures vary substan-
tially in size but OUTI is by far the largest. 
TABLE XI 
SPARCS-II SYSTEM LIMITS 
Maximum 
Number of Modules per System 128 
Number of Elements per Module 128. 
Number of Terms in Probability 
Equation of System or Module 2,000 
Number of Systems per Run No Limit 
Number of Simulation Runs No Limit 
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Marginal Storage 
Required (Bytes) 
11 
2, 015 
28 
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TABLE XII 
PROCEDURE STORAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR SPARCS 
Procedure· Storage Required (Bytes) 
UNITED (MAIN) 972 
CONF 268 
FNPUT 268 
HEX IN 540 
EQGEN 408 
OUTI 10,596 
SLINE 364 
PRINTER 240 
DLINE 240 
COMPUTE 348 
OUT II 444 
SIMULATE 336 
BETASUB 292 
GAMASUB 292 
RANF 260 
Total p,868 
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Array Storage Requirements 
Core information about each array is presented in Table XIII. 
If an array is static (does hot vary), the dimension size and the 
storage bytes required are given. Fot example, the array CODED is 
static, dimensioned 16, and requires 16 bytes of core storage. 
If arrays are dynamic they are identified as adjustable. Adjus-
table arrays are of two types: 1) those that have an upper limit 
and 2) those. that are not limited. If an array has an upper limit, 
the maximum dimension size and core reqruiement is given. For example, 
DCOM is adjustable with a maximum dimension size of 128 and a maximum 
core size of 384 bytes. Because they are adjustable, these arrays 
may take on any dimension value below the maximum with an appropriate 
reduction in core size. Therefore, DCOM may have a dimension size 
from 0 to 128 items and require from 0 to 384 bytes of core. 
Some arrays are indeterminate and are identified as such by 
two asterisks in the storage column. Indeterminate arrays are arrays 
with no upper limits to core size. This occurs when one or more of 
the dimension values for these arrays are not restricted. Generally, 
the use of the number of simulation r,uns, as; one of the dimension 
values is the primary cause for an indeterminate array. Since the 
number of simulation runs is not resyriqted, these arrays may take 
on any size necessary to accomo~ate th~ required information. 
Array 
CODED 
COEF 
COMPS 
DCOM 
DERMS 
DOEF 
DIERM 
FAILS 
FERMS 
HEX 
KOMPS 
LA 
MDESCR 
TABLE XIII 
ARRAY STORAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR SPARCS 
Description Dimension (Maximum) 
Set of 4 binary characters 
that. correspond to each 
hex character 
Coefficient of equation 
terms 
Labels for nonmodular 
elements 
Storage array for terms 
in module groups 
Terms of the system or 
module probability equa-
tion 
Coefficient of equation 
terms 
Terms of system or 
module equation 
Number of component 
historical failures 
Terms of the system or 
module probability equation 
Table of hex characters 
Default labels for 
nonmodular elements 
Dummy variable used in 
calculation of percentiles 
Description of modular 
elements 
16 
1,500 
128 
Adjustable 
(128) 
Adjustable 
( 128' 1500) 
Adjustable 
(128, 128) 
Adjustable 
(128) 
Adjustable 
, ( q8, 128) 
(1500) 
16 
128 
20 
128 
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Storage (Bytes) 
16 
4, 500 
384 
0 - 384 
0- 384,000 
0 - 65,536 
0 - 384 
0 - 229,376 
24 
8 
384 
80 
8, 960 
TABLE XIII (CONTINUED) 
Array Description 
MINPTH Minimal states of 
module or system 
MODSY Labels for modules 
MODSYM Default labels for 
modules 
N 
PORT 
PREL 
R 
REL 
RELSTO 
Variable used in random 
number generation 
Number of component 
historical successes 
or total testing time 
Intermediate storage for 
reliability calculations 
Parameter for the gannna 
variate in GGTMAJ 
Values for element 
probabilities per module 
or element 
Array used in sorting 
the system reliabi-
li ties 
SIMCOM Variable which holds the 
number of components 
SLAB 
SREL 
TERMS 
for each module and/or 
system 
Labels for elements of 
system or modules 
Storage array for 
computed module 
probabilities 
Terms of the system or 
module probability 
equation 
Dimension (Maximum) 
256 
128 
128 
128 
Adjustable 
(128, 128) 
Adjustable 
1 
Adjustable 
Adjustable 
(SIMNUM ·kl 
as maximum) 
Adjustable 
(128) 
Adjustable 
(128) 
Adjustable 
( 128) 
2,000 
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Storage (Bytes) 
4, 096 
384 
384 
572 
0-229,376 
0- 1,024 
4 
0- 1,024 
0 - 384 
0 - 384 
0 - 384 
24,000 
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TABLE XIII (CONTINUED) 
Array Description Dimension (Maximum) Storage (Bytes) 
TYPE Specifies whether each Adjustable 0 - 229,376 
component is a gamma ( 128, 128) 
or beta component 
WA Used in calculation Adjustable 0 - ? 7~7( 
the average reliability (total test time 
for a gamma component as maximum) 
z Used in Shell Sort Adjustable 0 - ? 7~-J~ 
routine (SIMNUM as ~'(1 
maximum) 
*""•Upper limit of array size indeterminate because one of the upper 
limits of the array has no upper limit set on it. 
7•1 The number of simulation runs are the upper limit for this 
array. There is no restrictions on the number of simulation runs. 
Note: Some of these values for core are hand calculated. Conse-
quently, they may be smaller than represented on certain systems. 
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JCL Aspects 
The JCL aspects of SPARCS can become intricate although not 
overly difficult. Appendix A and B illustrate the JCL used at Oklahoma 
State University to execute the program. The JCL aspects of running 
SPARCS will be discussed both with and without the use of a load 
module. The JCL cards needed are discussed in general terms since 
the exact format of the cards used will depend upon the computer 
system and the facility. 
Appendix A contains the JCL for referencing the IMSL package 
as a part of the system. If the IMSL package is referenced directly, 
a JCL card is needed in the LKED section to reference the IMSL object 
program and link it with SPARCS. The FORTRAN and Assembler libraries 
must be linked as in the load module in case some library functions 
are called. 
Appendix B provides the JCL for the IMSL routines as load modules 
on an IBM 360-65. The load modules are composed of FORTRAN G and 
Assembler F routines. The FORTRAN routin~s qr·e grouped and preceded 
by an EXEC card for FORTRAN G. This execute card need only compile 
the routine. Following the routines should be a SYSIN card for FORTRAN. 
The Assembler routine is preceded by an EXEC card for Assembler F 
and followed by a SYSIN card for Assembl~r. This routine also need 
only be GOmpiled. The main PL/1 program follows the IMSL routines. 
The basic JCL required to run and PL/1 program is adequate except 
for the LKED (link-edit) step. The LKED step requires a SYSLIB card 
to reference the FORTRAN and Assembler libraries for the load module 
routine. This allows the routine to use any stored functions they 
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may need peculiar to that language. This is only necessary if a routine 
calls a stored function. The GO. JCL card need only refer to the 
PL/1 program since all output is done there. 
Examples of the cards referred to are identified with asterisks 
in Appendix A and B. These were used with the IBM 360-65 at Oklahoma 
State University in Stillwater, Oklahoma. SPARCS with respective 
JCL has been checked out at Phillips Petroleum in Bartlesville, Okla-
homa artd Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio on IBM 370 
systems. 
CHAPTER VIII 
DOCUMENTATION OF SPARCS 
Introduction 
SP~CS, Simulation Program for Assessing the Reliabilities of 
Complex Systems, is a computerized procedure to provide confidence 
limits on the reliability or unreliability and the MTBF (mean-time-
between-failures) for a system of any logical configuration. The 
components that comprise this system may be either attribute or time-
to-failure components with no restriction as to their placement in 
the system. Interval estimates on the system (un)reliability and 
the MTBF, if desired, are provided by use of Monte Carlo techniques 
in conjunction with Bayesian component analysis. 
A PL/1 program by J. L. Burris [11] called MAPS, is used to 
provide a system equation as a function pf the component reliabilities 
(unreliabilities) from analysis of the system minimal states. The 
basic input-output format of the Burris program, the equation genera-
tion routine, and the modularity concept developed by Burris is the 
basic structure around which SPARps is d~veloped. 
In SPARCS, the component reliabilities (unreliabilities) are 
obtained from statistical analysis of historical data provided for 
each component. It is assumed that data for the attributes components 
is obtained from Bernoulli processes and th~ time-to-failure component 
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data is obtained from Poisson processes. It is also assumed that 
all components succeed or fail independently. 
General Description 
SPARCS is designed to provide statistical. information about 
the reliability (unreliability) and the MTBF of a complex system 
of any logical configuration• To use SPARCS, the system under consider-
ation must be capable of. being represen·ted as a iogical network 
of minimal states. A minimal system success state is called a minimal 
path [48], and is defined by a specified smallest set of components, 
which if they are all operating properly, will guarantee system success. 
A minimal system failure state is known as a minimal cut [48]; and 
is defined as a specified smallest set of components which, if they 
are all failed, guarantee system failure. This minimal state informa-
tion is provided by the user and is analyzed using Poincaire's Theorem 
[48, 26]. 
In Poincaire's Method, the system reliability, or probability 
of success, can be calculated from the component reliabilities if 
the minimal paths are known. This reliability value is the lower 
confidence bound on the system reliability. Likewise, the system 
unreliability, or probability of failure, or 1-system reliability, 
can be calculated from the component unr~liabilities, given the 
minimal cuts. This unreliability is the upper confidence bound on 
the system unreliability. This minimal state information alon~ with 
component failure data history, ·the number of simulation runs desired, 
and other information is input into SPARCS. For attributes-type 
components, this failure data consists of accumulated prior tests 
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and prior failures. For time-to-failure components, this data con-
sists of prior testing time and prior failures. Optionally, system 
mission time is also input to provide MTBF information for the system. 
SPARCS employs Monte Carlo methods to obtain component reliabilities 
(unreliabil:lties) from Bayesian prior distributions whose parameters 
are the component prior test data. These prior distributions are 
beta for attributes components, and negative-log gamma for time-to-
failure components. 
In this program, we have incorpbrated a random number generator, 
RANF, developed in FORTRAN by Professor J. P. Chandler of Oklahoma 
State University, based on an algorithm developed by Maclaren and 
Marsaglia [51] and receded in PL/1 for use with SPARCS. We also employ 
six library routines supplied by the International Mathematical and 
Statistical Library (IMSL). MDBETI, the inverse beta generator and 
GGTMAJ, the inverse gamma generator are referenced directly. GGTMAJ 
calls GGUl and GGBTA library routines while MDBETI calls MDBETA 
and UERTST and seems to be somewhat time consuming. 
A modularity concept is employed which enables large complex 
systems to be broken do~1 into smaller subsystems or modules. These 
subsystems are analyzed individually and later combined to provide 
an analysis of the system as a whole. This concept, originally deve-
loped in MAPS [11], along with other advantages of the PL/1 language, 
such as binary and varying bit string capabilities, makes it possible 
to handle large complex systems with a considerable saving of time 
and computer storage. 
The dynamic storage capability of PL/1 is used to overcome a 
major storage limitation of SPARCS. Early in the development of the 
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program, the storage requirements became greater than the IBM 360 
Model 65 system could accomodate. Using the dynamic storage concept, 
storage is allocated only when needed and released as soon as the 
program no longer needs that information. This produces a saving 
of between 250K to 300K for a medium~large system. 
Basically, SPARCS takes input information about the system sup-
plied by the user and generates a system reliability (unreliability) 
equation. This system equation is a function of the reliability or 
unreliability of the system components. Since each component is one 
of two basic types, Bernoulli or Poisson process, SPARCS must generate 
a random number to be used with each component. This random number 
along with the historical prior test information about each component 
is used to enter the appropriate distribution and provide a reliabili-
ty or unreliability estimate for each component. This estimate is 
placed in the correct position in the system equation to provide 
an interval estimate for the system reliability or unreliability. 
An interval estimate is determined for each simulation run desired. 
These estimates are then ordered and statistical information about 
the resulting empirical distribution of system interval estimates 
is provided. 
Output Description 
SPARCS output is broken down into f0ur major parts. Init~ally, 
a printout is provided of the system information read in by the user 
(Figure 4). The system identification and information about components, 
modules, etc. along with the minimal states for the system, either 
paths or cuts, are printed. From this information, the system reliability 
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reliability or unreliability equation is determined and provided. 
Since systems may consist of subsystems, the minimal states and the 
system reliability or unreliability equation uses letters to indicate 
subsystems (modules) and numbers to indicate components. Consequently 
in Figure 4, RA denotes the reliability of subsystem A. 
Next follows an analysis of each component that makes up the 
system (Figure 5). Each component has four lines of information. 
Line 1 gives the reliability or unreliability for that component 
provided by the first simulation run. This value is provided to give 
the user an idea of the general reliability or unreliability of that 
component. Since the components of our system are defined to be 
of two types, Line 2 specifies the type for this particular component. 
A Beta component is an attributes component using the inverse Beta 
to provide the component lower (upper) limit on the reliability (unre-
liability). A Gamma component is a time-to-failure component using 
the inverse Gamma to provide a lower (upper) limit on the component 
reliabilities (unreliabilities). Finally, Lines 3 and 4 provide the 
prior historical data parameters that are used to enter the appropriate 
distribution. If a component is a Bernoulli component, Line 3 is 
the total number of successes, P, obtained by testing similar compo-
nents. Line 4 is the total number of failures observed in these compo-
nent tests. If the component is a time-to-failure component, .Line 
3 is the total testing time, TIME, measured in units of required 
testing time observed in tests of similar ;components. Then, Line 
4 is the total number of failures observed in this testing time. 
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If no modules are used (Figure 5-A ), the component analysis 
is followed by an estimate of the system reliability and unreliability. 
Thfs estimate is provided as a result of the first simulation run 
only. lf the system has modules (Figure 5-B), each module is handled 
like a minisystem. Module information and minimal states are printed 
first. A subsystem (module) reliability or unreliability equation 
is developed and the information about each component of the module 
is presented. Finally, an estimate of the module reliability and 
unreliability is provided and stored for future use in the system 
equation. For systems with modules, the system component information 
is presented after the subsystem information along with the system 
reliability and unreliability interval estimates for the first simula-
tion run. 
The last part (Figure 6) presents statistical information about 
the empirical distribution of interval estimates provided by the 
Monte Carlo procedures. Initially, the mean, variance, and standard 
deviation is given for the resulting distribution. An estimated reliabi-
lity or unreliability for the system is determined and printed using 
maximum likelihood estimates for the (un)reliability of each component. 
An analysis of the system MTBF is optionally provided. If this option 
is chosen, the system mission time and the estimated MTBF ip printed. 
The estimated MTBF is a direct conversion of the estimated system 
reliability (unreliability). The interval estimates of the reliabili~ 
ties (unreliabilities) are ordered and percentile points are provided 
as direct conversions from the system reliabilities. 
Finally, an analysis of the frequency and cumulative frequency 
counts of cases is printed. This information divides the range of 
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the reliability (unreliability) interval estimates into 20 equal 
parts. The first line under each subdivision is a frequency count 
and the second line a cumulative frequency count of interval estimates. 
Hopefully, this information makes it easier to visualize the resulting 
empirical distribution of interval estimates. 
Limitations 
The core size increases as the size of the system under analysis 
increases. SPARCS can ideally handle a system of up to 128 components 
or subsystems. Each subsystem can contain up to 128 components. Conse 
quently, we can ideally handle a system of up to (128 x 128) 16,384 
total components. Also, each probability equation can co~tain up 
to 2,000 terms. Then, the total number of terms for such a system 
would be as high as 258,000 (128 x 2,000) terms. However, it is estima-
ted that such a system would require something over 600 K to execute. 
No. of 
No. of 
No. of 
No. of 
No. of 
No. of 
modules 
elements 
per system . 
per module. 
TABLE XIV 
SYSTEM LIMITS 
minimal states per system or module. . 
terms in probability equation of system or 
systems per run. . . 
simulation runs. 
128 
128 
. . . . 256 
module. . .2,000 
. . . . • No limit 
No limit 
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Input Information 
Information to be input should follow in this general order: 
(1) information used to allocate and release storage, 
(2) information to identify each system, 
(3) control information about the components, modules, and 
states to be used in the system, 
( 4) label information about the system elements if provided 
by the user, 
(5) component information, and 
(6) minimal states for the system. 
If the system has modules, then 
(7) control information about the components and states to 
be used with appropriate module, 
(8) labels for the modu~e e'lem~nts if provided by the user, 
and 
(9) the module minimal states. 
Numbers 7, 8, and 9 are repeated for eacb module of the system. The 
·, 
use o£ modules is left to the discretion.of the user. If no modules 
are used, npmbers 7, 8, and 9 are disreg~rded. 
Card Input 
For input information, the baste PL/1 input rules are followed. 
They are as follows: 
(1) all nonnumeric data must be left justified within the field, 
and 
(2) numeric data may be punched anywhere within the field. 
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The minimal states may appear anywhere on a card as long as each 
state is separated by a comma, semicolon or a blank space. 
Card 1--Allocation and MTBF Information 
Column Parameter 
FFk MAX COM 
FF~·~ SIMNUM 
FF~·~ MXTERM 
FF~·~ STIME 
FF~·~ SUN ITS 
Description 
Maximum number of components in the system £E 
in any module 
Number of simulation runs desired 
Maximum number of minimal states in the system 
or in any module 
System mission time if MTBF analysis is desired; 
0 otherwise 
Units of system mission time placed in single 
quotationmarks; use 'NO' if MTBF option not 
used ('NO' in single quotation marks) 
Card 2--System Identification Card 
Column Parameter Description 
1-80 SYSID Alphameric system identification 
Card 3--Control Information 
Column Parameter 
1-3 NMOD 
5-7 NCOM 
9-12 NPATH 
14 A TYPE 
Description 
Number of modules in system 
NJ.lmber o~ elements in system 
Number of system minimal states 
Type of analysis (R if reliability analysis, U if 
unreliability analysis) 
~·~FF = free form. Information i terns in free form may be placed 
anywhere on a card as long as they are in the specified order and 
are separated by a comma, semicolon or blank space. 
I 
Card 3--Continued 
Column Parameter 
16-18 ALAB 
20-22 APUN 
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Description 
Source of labels (punch YES if supplied by user, 
leave blank otherwise) 
·Punches output of probability equation desired, 
(punch YES if desired, leave blank otherwise) 
Card 4--System Label Cards (Optional) 
Column Parameter Description 
7-9 COMPSl Alphameric label for system elements 
10-80 DESCR Alphameric description of system element or module 
Card 5--System Component Information Card 
Column Parameter 
TYPE· 
FF>': PORT 
FAILS 
Description 
Type of component (punch 1 if Bernoulli component, 
2 if time-to-failure component, 0 if system 
module) 
Number of success if Bernoulli componen~ or total 
testing units if time-to-failure components 
Number of failures observed in component tests· 
Card 6--System Minimal State Card 
Column Parameter 
MINPTH 
Description 
Minimal states ~or the system. May be either 
in hexidecimal ( 1 4A 1 ) qr binary ( 1 1010' B) 
representation 
Cards 7, 8, 9, and 10 are u~ed if the system under analysis has been 
divided into modules. 
~·:pp = free form. Information items in free form may be placed 
anywhere on a card as long as they are in the specified order and 
are separated by a comma, semicolon or blank space. 
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Card ?~~Module Control Card 
Column Parameter 
1-3 NCOM 
NPATH 
10 KODE 
Description 
Number of module components 
Number of module minimal states 
Form of input of module minimal states (H if 
hexadecimal; leave blank otherwise) 
Card 8-~Module Label Cards (Optional) 
Column Parameter Description 
7-9 COMSl Alphameric label for module component 
10~80 MDESCR Alphameric description of module components 
Card 9~~Module Component Information Cal)d 
Column Parameter 
TYPE 
PORT 
FF* FAILS 
Description 
Type of component (punch 1 if Bernoulli, 
2 if Poisson process) 
Number of observed successes if Bernoulli or 
total testing units if Poisson process 
Number of failures observed in component tests 
'i~FF = free form. Information i terns in free fonn may be placed 
anywhere on a card as long as they are in the specified order and 
are separated by a comma, semicolon or blank space. 
CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
Summary 
SPARCS (Simulation Program for Assessing the Reliability of 
Complex Systems) is a program designed to provide reliability confidence 
assessment for complex systems. The model uses Monte Carl6 techniques 
to furnish confidence bounds and limits for such systems. 
Work done by J. L. Burris is used as a basis around which the 
model is developed. Poincaire's Theorem (inclusion-exclusion) and 
a modular concept used in MAPS (by Burris) is found intact in SPARCS. 
Poincaire's Theorem develops an equation for the system as a function 
of the component reliabilities and their placement in the system. 
The modular concept allows large systems to be subdivided into smaller 
modules for easier analysis. 
The components for system analysis are limited to two basic 
types: Bernoulli components and Poisson process components. For Ber-
noulli components, the beta distribution is used in conjunction 
with Bayesian analysis to provide reliability estimates for these 
types of components. Historical test information ·on accumulated succes-
ses and failures are used as sufficient statistics for the beta parame-
ters. For Poisson process component, Bayesian analysis is used with 
the negative-log gamma prior distribution to provide component reliabi-
lities. Accumulated failures and accumulated total test time in units 
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are used as sufficient statistics for parameters of the negative-
log gamma prior. For both cases, a uniform prior is generated in 
the absence of data. 
The Monte Carlo techniques used in SPARCS generate an empirical 
distribution of reliability point estimates for the system under 
analysis. These values are ordered and analyzed statistically to 
provide information about the system. 
Conclusion 
The beta and gamma routines are tested in Chapter V. The Interna~ 
tional Mathematical and Statistical Library (IMSL) routines used 
to generate component reliabilities were tested and found to provide 
very good values. The IMSL routines have very small inherent error. 
The concepts used in SPARCS are analyzed to determine 
whether they are intact. The duality concept is shown to 
be functioning properly. The uniform (ignorance) prior is shown 
to be implemented correctly in both IMSL routines. 
Results of small system runs by SPARCS are compared to similar 
system analysis in the literature. The results supplied by SPARCS 
ar~ consistent with the results provided in the literature. Therefore, 
the Monte Carlo procedures and the theory utilized in SPARCS are 
proven correct. 
Finally, a large network model is run by SPARCS. This validated 
the ability of the model to handle large systems. The test network 
is a large complex network with randomly placed component types. 
The model accomodated the network very well and provided a network 
analysis with a reasonable amount of core usage. 
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Extension 
Two extensions of this work are suggested by results supplied 
by the model. First, the model generates point estimates for the 
reliability of each system under analysis. These estimates are ordered 
to provide an empirical distribution of the system (un)reliability. 
If these distributions were analyzed, some information might be 
obtained concerning the type or family of distributions that are 
being generated. Perhaps, they are all the same type or all may belong 
to the same family. Depending upon the results of such an analysis, 
a reasonably simple mathematical algorithm for providing reliability 
information for systems of any logical configuration may be found. 
Secondly, SPARCS has been found to be very efficient. Small 
sample sizes tend to produce very good results. A sample size determi-
nation procedure could be developed to provide a sample size signifi-
cantly smaller than those obtained with conventional methods. This 
would result in a saving of computer time and money. 
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ii.JWC4 Jl}U (XXX"'_A.XX_.o(jt.~_X!l)!1'_XJ<.X.•jl.i_t . ..t . JJ.) .. 'I.!.J.C~--c_Q_Ql,.EY 1 .• CLASS=L..•.--~---------
,, .tl~E=(~OC9.001 
•••hOUfl P~INT HllLU 
/~ LXfC PLILrCLG. 
II HLGJC.N•G0;:;:.2.7::)K_ --~---~--·-·--------------·- .. ------------------XA•~LIL f:')(EC P~.~N,ILMAAeiJ'A~~='LUAD.II.IODECk 1 •REGlON=I27K PLIL 00000600 
.CKS"f'";PIJ I NT OJ ~VSUuf~A PL lL 00000700 
..ii'I'LiL.SVSLIN JLJ ~ ... ACFi=l400.( 200,200) ~ 
.&fS'I' :.M..l"' . DJJ __ _Jl.Sl:IIAIJE..u..LllA.lJ.!iE:..L.a.l.!i2-=-t..H.GJ:. .. EASS.l...Ulil.I.~'AA._.. ___ _Jf!JI!L_Ulll-QO.Q.Q..O..Q.8QCL 
JIA SPACE=(400.I50.,201 ),Oca~eLKS[ZE=BOO PLIL 00000900 
~KSYSUTJ DO UNIT=SVSDA.SPACE~I80.(250,250)).0SN~&SYSUT3t PLIL 00001000 
~X ScP=SYSP~lNT.OCB=3L~SIZF=eO PLIL 00001100 
JlX..SYSl.IJ I QU _____ Ufil.L;r;!1.Y.!IoU.L.SP...A££.;..1.1A2.o........L.6..C...6Q.l.a..a.CONJJ.6..L....... --------- .. --et..J.L...O.D.QCl.J...ZOQ. 
~~ oca=aLKSIZL=I~24 PLIL OOOOIJOO 
.fii"Lil.!:VSIN DtJ * 
li::.t~?Jol ALLOC. r'IJ~ J-(.4 PLlL 
JEJ-.z.37J .i4.L ... _....o\L.LJ.JCA.ll.D....J..ll._!i.X.SH'B....U.I.I__. 
IEF2l71 131 ALLOCAI~D lO SY5LIN 
IEFZ.J71 IJI ALLUCATE.D TO SYSUT3 
IEFZJ7l 131 ALL~CATEO TO SVSUTl 
JEF..Z..J7 j ..3.0 2 AI I Oca TEll. .• JJ.L.SY.!ilN. --·---------~- __ ·- ..... -- ------ --------
I[FJ.117.1 - SI'EP .-A$ E.Xt,;CUTEU - ('OND .CODE. CCC4 
I(F~ASI SYS7~lSH.T07~•0J.RVOOO.J-C~.LD-C~ET PASSED 
IErZH51 VOL SER NU~= OI!;JI(05. 
-t~:~~f ·---:~~~.;.:~~~~-:w-~C..L-SJ..ti.JL.L ___ _ 
llFZdSI SYS15lOd.T075403.RVOOO.JWC4.ROCC.773 DELE TEO 
lt:t-28"iJ VOL SER NOS"" OISKO!:t-. 
1E£.17JI .S.IEP_/..J:!Ll.J,___...L...._AL4R.LJ.5..1..Sa.....2.2.2..:.______ ·------ -----·----~~---
IEFJ7•t STEP /PLIL / ~TUP 7518d•22?.- (PU l~IN OBeOOSEC M~IN 128K LCS OK 
XXLKI.I> EXEC P<iN=JEWLf4*0•PAH~='L15T•ii•P'•CONO~(Q8,LTePLlLle LK.~D OOOOt•oo 
Jl.X. _ .. _.. REhiJlb1=6Jif: . ' I KED PQOOI5QD 
//LIU·.O .. SYSLIB DO OSNA114E•£PLtLIO.DISP*CSHJ::.PASSt 
XIS'I'SLIB UO OSN~&PLlLlS.DISP=CSHRePA~S) LKEO 00001600 
*// 00 OSNAME=&PLIS~~.~lSP=(SHR.FA~St 
XL... __ . .oll._Q.S.N~P..L..l..SS.e.a.tH~.:::i..:il::f.R.a.P.~.S.J __ . ------~-· __ u;.E.Ll.._.O.Il.CCU.IA.O 
*'' ~0 OSNAME~SVSI.IMSL.UBJECT.DJ5P,(SHR.PAS5) 
*//. l)IJ OSNAME:=&FU+~TLIO.o·ISP:.(SHR,PASS) 
K)(SY5ol.Ma.l0 011 U~NA"4E.=~U05El((i0) eOJSP=;CJ\EIIII,PAS!i). LKEO OOOC1600 
kX ~- -·-··-- <>C.H<IiLI<.Sll=.lll2.~.WU.I.=S.!Sli...SeAC£~.1C:U....U.o..<.lJ L ___ .I..I!.CD._O QO.li9l!Jl. 
X~SYSUTl DO UNIT~(SYSOAeSCP=(SYSLMQO,fYSLlB)),SPACE=l1024. LKED 00002000 
x• (200,20J)eDSN~~SYSUtl.OCB•fLKSIZE21024 LKEO 00002100 
XXS'TSPRINT 00 SYSOUT=-A LKED 00002200 
XXS Y!&L.l.N~_..llO _ _D..S.NA~r...L.O AQSE I • ll1Sp_~L£.•C.ELE.l.IU~RI;.Cf'J!II~f....P......__._~.ECL0..0.0.0.Z.3_Qil. 
X)( lJLKSllb=dtiO) LK.ED 00002400 
kJI. 00 UDNAIIIE•SYSIN LKEO :i0002500 
ICF~~bl ALLOC• FOR JWC4 LK~D 
- :~~-~~-~--~i2-!ttt~:-~g--~t:~Sii.LcilJOd_J _____ ~ 
IEF.2J71 IJ4 ALLOCATED TO 
1Erl3rl 230 ALLOCATEO TO 
IEf Z37 .. LU.I. _ _ALLJl.C&li.ILIJLSX.~.L.IlCID. __________ ~ .. -------------
HT l-J71 2'32 ALLlJCA fi;:.D Ttl SY SUI I 
IO'.ZJ71 347 ALLOCAT~O TU 5YSPN.INT 
1Ef'Zl7l 131 ALLOCATfU TO ::,VSLIN 
:~~mt--'"- ~W:-Jtfd~TI:.!) - CONP 'll.D.E....U.l!L__-----,.,.ss£·~--~--
lEF2~51 VOL SEtt NOS= SY5H.SZ• 
IEF2~51 SVSI.~LISSP PASSED 
:-~~~:~! · · -~~~-i ~~:~~~~isj~~~Kou ___ --------·-~-- -p,.·ssED ·----·-· --·----
lt'IZ~::i• VllL 5Er.l NOS-= UISKO.c!• 
11-:.t:.l~~l SYSJ.FOH:TLiti PASSED 
j¥jl>ld~.TJ/~~~J~UV~O~.J•C4e~U~Fl 
VI'L :SL'I-< .,Jl]'j:;. U.l SIC}:-. .. 
SY~l~.1Hu.JC1~40i.P~OOJ.JAC4.5Y!lll 
VUL. ..">'1:.-"l .NuS-= .t.JJ.::.I(,::io •.. _ ··-··----·. . . 
SY37,IO~.TCI3403,~VOOO.JWC4.LO~CS£T 
VUL S~.R NO 5-= 0 I SKOS • 
SlEP /L~EU /STAnT 7~18Be222• 
PJ\SSF'l 
OCLLTE:O 
DE.LETED 
ILI.:I• .I 
'Li -~ t· • I 
.1 • ~r ~·1 ·, 1 
II.I.ZA-'1 
1Fh~"1!il 
rt::·r'Z~'::tl 
ll:.f" J7 J I 
•t:F.'Jl•l 5Tf.P /L"-l- 0 -./. SIUP 7.!:11-ti&.2229 CPU !lNl N 1 4. .• 02 SEC WAIN 
~;l•d F )(t:_CJJ~~~;; =~~~t j~~~~~Ui.J • CCI'\C= ( (; wL T • LK ED) • ( CB • L T 9 
;/(XSYSfiWINl ll.&J ~Y~Ul:A----·- -----------· 
. ,I'GO.t-l'UNCH DLJ SVSiJVT=.I:ItOCO=tJLKSJlE-.=80 
.l'tiii.FTOOFOC I OtJ SY:::Odt.T:::A 
/l'ltU.5Y:ioPIHNI DO SVSLJUT=·A 
//VU.S'fSIN 00 _. 
ALL0C. ~U~ Jw~4 ~ll 
IJI ALLUCAILU TU PGM~•.UO 
~;~ :tt~~: :~g . :t-~~~~1-NL--.. -· _ ·- ---··--··~ 
J•7 ALLOCATE:O TO FT06FOOI 
]4~ ALLOCATED TO SYSPRINT 
30] Al.l.UCAT£U TU S.YS..IfW. ...... . 
- 'jTt:.~ WAS tXL(.Ult.l> - (_UNO (UL)E lOCO 
SY::i7~1dd.TC7~4~J.~VOOO.J_C •• GO~El 
VUL Sf:R NLJS= UISK05. 
sr~P ./c;.u -- ·--...l .. ~l...AJ.-lt-J.:.l.al:l .. 222-g_ _________ _ 
PASSEt> 
64-K LC.S- .. - .QJ(_. 
(i(] 0000260() 
GO 0000270Q 
~1128.11~ 
// 
)Lf,~j~,J 
1 t_r .!JTI 
I"EI-~.J71 
u:.1-.;n '' IE'F2 37l 
lEF2J71 
IH-'?j71 
IU-1"-~1 
lf:t-'7.d~l 
lt.:t'.!tSO:.I 
lLr .17.'11 I 
lE:.F' .J7• I STE.P IGU / STOP 7S16B.22J7 CPU OMIN 51.84S·ec-,.-... iN 26"K LCS OK 
~~·~~~~ S'1ii.PLILIU 
lt:.t~~~l VrJL. 3Er~ NO!:.= S'I'~I11S~. KEPT 
IEJ-''2f'Jl SYSiePLJ 3SP 
l£t-'2d':lol -V&JL..---St.;.J.LN();- Ill SI<Oo Y.f:PT 
I(F2~51 SY~I•IMSL.OHJECT 
ltiF2SSI YflL Sf:R NO~= OISK02. KEPT 
1£~~851 SYSI.FONTLIU 
:~~~~t-·. ~~::";~~;~~~Oo~~-;c_-;-:GC~FT ----·------
ltr,,j, VOL S~R NU~= 015KQ~, 
KEPT 
OELETfO 
lf..t-.H~l JIJJ /JWC4 I ~TART 75168,2221 
IEJ-".Jl.UJ .-.JU...L.../....SW'* , SI•lf! 75188-2.2..3.7-,C-e.U...--ZM.J.llL..l...3.aB6Sf.C_ __ 
' 
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ROUTINES AS LOAD MODULES 
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• 
1/JW(.l, JtJ8 IX .IIJIIXXXXJOtXX)X)(XJI;X,9rr rr11 r 1 .1lH~ COOLEY' tCLASS•Lr 
II TIHE-•IOD09,001 
••• f-Oil/'!.S 9C01 
* II EKEC: FOIITGC. 
U PFIO£. IC.P• EBCDIC 
XJIFCAI fX[t PGM•IE'tFGRJ,A(GIU•29'iJK,PAP:f+o IU.PJ 
IHl~ll SUBSllll/TION JCL - FG"'•IEHCATIItEGICN-99K,PiifiM•IEIIC·Dit, 
XXSYSPRJNT DO SVSOIJT•A 
X XSYSLI N DD DSNAH E• &lOA GS EJ r 0 ISP• I HOD, PASS t tUN IT •SYSUA, 
KX SP ACE• C 8 00, C 20G tl 00 II, DC B• IIILKS llE•IIOO ,LRECL•DO, 
XX RECFH•FHi 
*//FCRT.SYSIN VD • 
IEF23l:d ALLOC .. FOFI: JWC~ FCAT 
IEF2HJ :Hl ALLOC.i.TED TO SYSPP:JNT 
I£F2311 Ill AI.LO(..ATEO TO SYSLIN 
JH231J ]"01 AllllCATEO TO SVSIN 
IEFU21 - STIEP )liAS EXEC.UTED - CONO CODE DODO 
IEF2f!51 SYS1SZ07, TO~OIOtt.RVOOO, JWt::'t.LCADSET ~ASS ED 
JH28SI VOl SER NOS• OISK05w 
IEFJHI SUP /FORI I STAPf 1S.207.ll,Z8 
00000010 
FORT 00000020 
FORT 00000030 
FOR f 000000.,0 
fOP.T OOOOOOSO 
FOR. f OOODOOt.O 
IEF11.,1 STEP /FURl I STOP '15207.1128 CPU l:lMIN OS .. TZSI:C MAIN 8BK LCS OK 
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tHE PJI:E'II'IOUS .JOBSTEP ,_EOJESTED l.lJI. lYlES OF JNUS.ED COlE. 
* II EXEC ASIIFC 
XX ASH EXEC P GH•IWA SM,IIEG lON•blKrPARM• 1 NOOEtK,LCA0' 
XXSYSLlB DO DSNAM.'E•CHAClllt.DISP•ISHRoPAS$1 . 
X X. SY SLll DO UNIT~SVSOA, SPAtE• C1 700, 140D, SO J J, OSN •&~Y SOT i 
I( X 5YSl.l 2 DO Ut.I1T"' S.Y SO I 1 SPIt E.:o. 11 700, 14 00, 50) t, OSN • t5YS0T 2 
.lXSUOT] do UNIT• f 5 YS LA, SEP•I SYSUT2o SYSUTI ,SYSLI BJ), 
li.X SPACE•I 1700, I._ 00,5 Oll1 OSfi•UYSUT 3 
XXSYSPRINT 00 SYSOUf•A 
JI.XS'fSGO DO OSNAHE•UOADSE T ,OJ SP•I fiiODoPASS J ,UNIT •SYSOA, 
IX s.P ACE•C400, I 200.50 t ),OCB•I BlKSilE•800 tLRECL•BO, 
XX RECFH•fSJ 
* 1/ASM,.SYSU 00 • 
1Ef2161 'LUJC.. FOR JIIIC'r ASH 
JEF2311 110 jlLOC.AT€0 TO SVSLIB 
JEF.231J Ill ALlOCAIEO TO S'f5Ull 
IEF2l1I Ul ALLOCA"TED lO SV'SUTZ 
IEFZHI 212 At..lOCAfEO TO SrSUTl 
1EF2l71 341 ALLOCATED TO SY SPRINT 
lHCJ11 Ul AlLOCATED TO SYSGO 
IEFB11 lC4 Al.LOC.ATEO TO SYSIN 
IUU21 - SUP WAS EXECUTED - COND C.ODE OOCO 
IEF21151 SYSl.HAtLU PASSED 
IEF28~J 'fOL SER NOS• SVSRSl. 
JEF.ZB51 nS75207. T080 I04.RI/ODO.JWC'f. SYSUT I DELETED 
IEF28'U VOL SEA NOS• DISK05. 
J£F28'51 S'Y5l520J. TOB0101t. RVOOO. J .. C.4 .SYSUT2 DELETED 
1EF2851 \o()l SER NOS• DJSKM. 
IEF21151 SYS1520 1.1080 lO •• RV OOD.JWt.,, SYSUT 3 DElE TED 
IEF285 J VOL S.ER NOS• DISK5tt. 
JEF.ZitJ I SYS.15Z0l • 1010 10,. _.'11'000. JWC., .LOAOS.El PASS ED 
JEF2B51 VOL SER NOS• OISKCS. 
IEF3lll STEP /ASM I START 15201,1128 
leF]lU STEP /ASH I STOP 15201.1127 CPY OMIN DZ.l45EC Mol~ 
1/ EXEC PLllfCLG1 
/'1 RE&IU·• GC•275K 
XXPUL HEC PGH• .I EMAA, P.lltN•'LOAO,NODEtK •,REGION•l271( 
ll.li..SYSPUU DD SYSOUT•A 
//PLlleSYSLIN DO SPACE• I ,(lC,C.ZCCt200J t 
K/SW'SLIN DO DSNAI'tE• tlCJAIJHT tD ISP•I MOO,PASSJ tUN IT •5 W'SDA, 
ll SPACE,.I-\00, 1501ZO)I,DC~Bl.KSILE•90D 
XXSYSLT3 no UfojJ l*SYS.li.!,SPACE•ia0,fZ50t250)1,CSN•£SHUT3, 
XX SE:.P,..SYSPR INT ,UCO•BlKSUe•BO 
XXSYSUll 00 UNIT•SYSOAoSP6CE•CIOU,C60,6QI.,CONTI~J 1 
XX OClf•BLKSilEf'lJ2,. 
IIFlll.SYSIN DO • 
IEF2.J6J -llOt. FOR JW(."t Plll 
IH2J71 347 AlLCiCATEO TO SYSPAHH 
IEF2371 131 ,I.LLOC,fEO 10 SYSLJN 
IEF2311 lll AllOCATED TO SVSUT3 
IEfZH 1 1ll AllOCATED. TU SVSUTl 
lefiHI 1~5. AllDCAH:O TC SYSIN 
IEF11t2l - STEP WAS fl(ECUTEO - CONO CODE OOOir 
I Ef285 I SYS1,SZ07 • lOBO 10.., .11.\1'000. JWC4 .. L D40SET 
1Ef2851 ij(L SER ~IJS• DISKO<;, PASSEO 
IEF 2851 5YS 15207. 10801 Olrw RV COO,. JNC., • SYSLITJ 
IEF28.SI VOL SER NOS• OISKCS. 
DELETED 
IE f28S I SY 515207 • l080 104 .RV 000, JWC.I,. R0001306 
HF2&5J VOL SER NOS• UISK05. 
DELE TED 
IEFHJI SHP /PL1L I START 75207.1729 
ASH D000001D 
A SM 00000020 
ASM OOOOODJO 
~51". 00000040 
:~; ~ggggg:g 
·~· SOOODOJO ASH oooooeQ 
ASM 0000090 
ASN d00001 DO 
MK LCS OK 
PL 1l OOOD0600 
PllL OOOC:IJOO 
PL ll 00000800 
PLIL 00000900 
PLlL 00001000, 
PLIL oqpouoo 
'plll 00001200 
~L1l DODOIJOO 
IEFlT .. I STEP /PLll I STOP 75207,1134 CPU IPUN D8,09SEt N.IN 1~8K LCS o• 
XXLitEO UEC PGM•I EW lfH C, FARM• 1 LI S J ,MAP' 1 C0hD•C Q8 1 L T, Plll t, 
XX REG Im~•&JK 
.. //LKED.SYSLIB DO DSN•SYSI.PllliBtDISP•SHRW 
X/S'f'SllB DO OSN•&PllLIO.DISP•IS~,PASSI 
*" DO oS;..•SY 5lwPll SSP till SP•St'A. 
X/ DO OSN•t:PllSSP,OJSP•CSHR,PASSI 
If DO OS"'•SYSI.FORfliB,OISP•SHR 
XXSYSLMOD CO OSNAME•&GGSEr I GOI tO I SP•INEW, PASS), 
. XX DC.B•BLKS llE•lDZ4,UNl T'"'SYSD-tSPACE•ItVL,C-\,,1 Jl 
XXS'i'SUll DO UNIJ•I SYSOA o·SEP•( SYSLMOD, 5YSll BJ t 1 SPACE•I l02._, 
XX 120Co20t It DSN•&SYSUT I tOC8•8LKSI U•10Z., 
X)(SYSPPlf'H CD SYSOUf•A • 
Xli.SYSLI N CD DSNAM E"' &L OAOSET ,o I SP•I.DlD ,DE LIE TE J ,0£.11• (RECFM- f8, 
.t.C 8lKS.llE~80DJ 
U Ct DDhAf'IIE.,SYSIPt: 
1/UED.SYSIN 00 • 
IEF2l61 AL.LDC. fOR JWC'f LkED 
I EF2lll 230 ALLOCATED TO SYSllft 
IEF.l!ll 2J~ AlLOU1ED TO 
I Ef 2371 2lC: AllOU TED. 10 
IEF2HI 131 AI.. lOCAl ED TO STSLMOO 
IEF2171 232 AllDC:ATED TO SYSUrt 
IEF2l11 3 .. 6 ALLOCAteD TO SYSPRIU 
HFllll lJ I AlLOCAT EO TO SVSLJN 
IHZ"Hl ~06 AllOCUED TO 
IEF1~21 - STEP WAS £JIIECUf ED- COHO tDOE 000., 
LKED OOOOloftOD 
LK ED 00001500 
LKfD OOOOUOO 
LKED oooonoo 
lKED 00001800 
LIUD 00001900 
u ED oaooiooo 
LKED 00002100 
LKEO 00002200 
LJ( ED 00002!00 
LKED ooooz .. ao 
LKED 00002500 
UEP tO,.LEflfJtt CODE - 0000 
STEP C.DMPLET ION tODE - 0000 
STEP CO.,LET ION COOlE - 00.,._ 
SYSI.PL llll 
VCI. SER NOS• SYSIII.$2. 
SYSl.PLJSS; 
\101. 5ER NOS• D I SK06. 
SYSl,;FOR.fl II 
VCL SER NOS• SYSRS2. 
n"SUZOl. JOIOI04.fi:VOOO.J~ .GOSEJ 
VOL SEA t«JS• tUSk OS. 
SY 57!201 • lOIO LOit.RV OOO.JWC4., SYSUT 1 
\lllL SER NOS• OISK56. 
$YS7520l.- T080LO't. III.VOOO. JWC4.LOADSEJ 
VOl SEA NOS• OISKC5. 
STEP /LKED I SUIU 75207.1734 
KEPT 
KEPT 
KEPT 
P.lSSEO 
DELETED 
DELETED 
n•zo" 
IEF2851 
IE.F2UI 
1Ef2151 
IEFZB51 
IEFZI51 
IEF28~1 
1Ef21151 
IEF2851 
IEF285J 
IEF2151 
IEF2851 
IEF37JI 
IEFllU STEP /LKED I SlOP 75207.11.15 CPU OMIN l2•15SEC MAIN 64K LCS o• 
XXGC EXEC PGM••.iKEO.SYSLMOD,CONO•I t 9tl T,LKEO) ,( 08tl T t 
XX PL1Lta,AEGI0*"6lK . 
JXSYSPRINT 00 S'tSD\.IT•A 
//G(.FUNCH DO SYSOUT•8.K8•8Ut.SUE•I!IO 
//GC.FT06F001 00 SVS'OUT•A 
1/(;IJ • .SVSPR. INT DO S'ISOUT•A 
//GC.SYSl~ tO • 
II 
1 Ef236l ALLOt. FDA J~Cit GC 
IEF2371 lll AlLOCATED TO PGI"'••.oo 
1H2.371 l-\6 AllOCATED TO SYSPR INT 
1EF2371 :HC ALLOC.AHO TO PUhCH 
IEF2371 3-\7 ALLOCATED TO FTV&FOOl 
1Ef2371 lltB ALLOCAtED 10 SYSPRJNT 
IEF2371 301 ALLOCATED TO SYSIN 
IEFl'tZI .. SHP IIIAS EkEC.UfE.D- CCND CODE 2000 
IEF 21151 !i.YS 75207. T08010'uRVOCO. JWC.4>.GOSE J 
IEF2851 VOL SER NOS• DISIC.O!i. 
lEnni StEP /liO I START UZ01.1 735 
IEFHitl SfEP /GO I SlOP 75207.1735 CPU 
PASSED 
GO 00002600 
GO 00002700 
oo booozaoo 
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C:Mitrt 01.8~5EC "AIN 268K LCS OK 
THE PREVIOUS JOBST EP AEWEST EO IK IIYT ES OF JlriiUSED Ca. E. 
UF.i:8~l 
I!F2t1SI 
1EF2851 
Uf2151 
IEF3751 
IEF.3761 
SYSl •. MACLI8 
'JOI. SER NOS• STSR 51. 
SY575207. 1080 l04>.RVOOO.JWC-\.GOSE T 
'tOL SER NOS• DlSKO~ • 
JCB /JWC" I STAIU 15207.11211 
JOI!I /JWt" I STOP 75207.1115 CPU 
KEPT 
DELETED 
lMI N 30. 62SEC 
STEP CO .. LET IDfl CODE - 2000 
APPENDIX C 
SOURCE PROGRAM LISTING OF SPARCS 
132 
2 
3 
4 
5 
b 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
16 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
lZ 
33 
H 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
H 
42 
43 
"" 45 
46 
H 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
t2 
63 
64 
66 
bl 
68 
69 
10 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
17 
19 
80 
82 
83 
8~ 
E5 
86 
til 
88 
89 
~0 
91 
94 
ISUBRGoSTRGoSIZEI: 
UNITED: PROCEDURE OPTIONS I MA 1~11 
Ll: 
s u: 
I• DECLARE STATEMENTS •1 
DCL AIZOI KEAL FIXEC DfCib,OI CONTROllED; 
DCL.ALAB CHARI31 I 
DCL APUN CHARIJII 
CCL ATYPf CHARilll 
OCL ATYPE~ C~ARI131 VARYING EXT; 
DCL AV REAL FIXED DECI31 EXT; 
ttl AVAL REAL FLOAT Uftll41 EXT; 
DCL AVREL REAL FLCAT OECI141 EXT; 
DCL BTYPE REAL fiXED O<tlll EXT; 
DCL BVAL REAL FIXED OECI6o01 EXT; 
DCL CAIZOI REAL FIXED DECI6,oi CONTROLLED: 
OCL tO REAL FIXED tECill EXT; 
OCL CE REAL FIXED OECIJI EXT; 
ttl ICPo. CCPI REAL FIXED OEtlbl; 
DCL ICS, CR, CTt CPCI REAL FIXED DH1511 
DCL CVAL REAL FLCAT DEtll41 EXT; 
DCL ICOMPSI128lo SLA81l<BII tHARill VAR EXT STATIC; 
~tl OCCMIMAX !L i REAL FIXED OEC131 CONTROLLED EXT; 
VCL OERMSIMAXEL,MAXELI ~IT 11281 CCNTRCLLED VAR EXT; 
DCL OMOO REAL FIXED DEC 131 EXT; 
CCL COEFIHAXEL,HAXELI REAL FIXED DEti41 CONTROLLED EXT; 
OCL OTHHIHAXELI REAL fiXED DECill CONTROLLED EXT; 
DCL C OVALo E VAll AEU FIXE 0 DEC llo 211 
DtL FERHS 115001 BIT I 1.181 VAR EXT; 
DCL FVAL REAL FLOAT 0Etl611 
DCL GAMMA RHL FLOAT OHI 1'>1 EXT; 
DtL KV REAL FIXED DEC I ~I EXT: 
CCL IKSoKT,KU,KX,KVI REAL FIXEU DEC 131 EXT; 
OCL KCOE tHARill VAR EXT; 
DCL LABELS REAL FlXED DEC Ill EXT; 
DCL LAIZOI REAL FIXED OEClb,SI CONTROLLED; 
CCL MEAN REAL FLOAT CEC I 141; 
OCL MTBF REAL FLGAT DECilOI; 
DCL MXTERH REAL FIXED DEC! 31; 
CCL NARG FIXED BINARVIlloDI EXT; 
OCL hCCH REAL FIXlC DEC Ill EXTI 
DCL NMOO REAl FIXED DEC Ill EXT; 
Otl NPATH REAL fiXED DEC 131 EXT; 
OtL FRELIHAXCCMI REAL FLOAT OECtl'l CONTROLLED EXT; 
UCL FUNOUT REAL FIXED OEC Ill EXT; 
OCL RELIHAXCOMI REAL FlOAT DECI HI CONTRGLLED EXT; 
OCL RELSTOISIMNUHI REAL FLOAT DECI141 CONTROLLED EXTI 
OCL RELVALISIM~UMI REAL FLOAT OECI14l CONTROLLED EXT; 
DCL RELSCRT FLCAT CECI141; 
DCL SEED REAL FLOAT DEC I lbl EXT; 
OCL ISCOH, STERM,SMOO I REAL FIXED DEC Ill EXT; 
OtL SIMCCHIHAXELI REAL FIXED OECill CCNTROLLEO EXT; 
OtL SIHNUM REAL FIXED DECibl EXT; 
DCL SN REAL fiXED OECI6o01 EXT; 
DCL SORTVAL fiXED CE,16,01; 
OtL SRElCNHOOI REAL FLOAT OECil'tl CChHOLLEO EXT; 
DCL STDEV REAL FLOAT DECi 1411 
DCL STII<E REAL FlOAT DECI811 
DCL SUhiTS CHAR IZCI VAR; 
OCL SYSIO CHAR 1801 VAR EXT I 
DCL SYSIN FILE STREAH INPUT; 
OCL SVSPRINT FILE STREAM OUTPUT PRINT; 
OCL TERMS 115001 BIT 11281 VAR EXT; 
OCL I TYPEIHAXEL,HAXCCHI, PORTIMAXEL,MAXCOMJ, 
FAILSIMAXELoHAXCOMII REAL FLOAT OECI141 CONTROLLED EXT; 
OCL VAR REAL FLOAT CEC11411 
OCL Zllll FIXED DECiboOI INITIAL 14,13,40olZ1,36~,1093.3ZBO, 
984lo 29524 0 88513,2657ZOI; 
CPEN fiLEISYSINio FILEISVSPRINTI; 
ON ENDFILEISYSI~I STOP; 
NARG • 1; 
GAMHA • RANFINARGJ; 
URG • O; 
SEED • • 75; 
GET FILE ISYSI~I LIST I~AXCOM,SIHNUM,MXTERH,STIIIE,SUNITSI; 
GET FILE ISVSINI EDIT ISYSIDI ICOLillo Al8011; 
GET FILE ISYSINI LIST INHOOoM:OM,NPATHJ; 
GET fiLE ISYSI~l ECIT I'TVPE,ALABoAPUNoKODEI 
ICOLUMNI L41 0 A(l loXIli,AOJ,XIli,AilloXIll, 
AlliJ I 
SN • 1; 
AV = 1 i 
MXTERH a 2••~XTERM - li 
IF NHOD c NCOH THEN HAXEL ~ NCOM + 1; 
ELSE MAXEL • ~CCII; 
IF NHOO • 0 THEN ALLOCATE TVPEil,HAXCCHio POATil,MAXCOIIIo 
FAILSil,HAXCOHI; 
ELSE ~LLOCATE TYPEI~AXELoMAXCOHio PORTIMAXEL,HAXCOMio 
fAILSI~AXEL,MAXtOIIJ; 
ALLOCATE RELIMAXCOMI; 
ALLOCATE SIHCOHIHAXELii 
ALLOCATE PRELIHAXWMI; 
ALLOCATE RELSTlliSIHNUHI; 
ALLOCATE SRELINHODJ; 
ALLOCATE DTERMIHAXELio OOEFIHAXEL,HXTERHJ, DERHSIMAXEL,HXTERHI, 
DCOHIHAXELI; 
SIHCDMill • NCOHI 
DHOD•O; 
SHDD•O; SCOH•O; STERM•O; 
SCOH ~ NCOM; 
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SL2: 
D~CO • NHOO; 
SHOO• NHOO; 
CE • II 
If SN > 1 THEN CO; 
~COM • SIHCOMI11; 
ELSE; 
CALL SIHOUTI 
GO TO SL21 
Eh.O; 
IF APUN-'VES• T11EN PUNOUT•I; 
ElSE PUNOUT•O; 
IF ALAS= 'YES•. THEN LABELS•!; 
ELSE LABELS•O; 
If ATYP€ • •u• THEN BTYPE • l; 
ELSE BTVPE • O; 
CALL DUTI; 
CALL FNPUTZI 
CALL E"iEN; 
CALL oun: 
IF OHOD•O THEN GO TO Rl; 
KV•I; 
~X•O; 
I• PROCESS HGOUI.ES */ 
01: IF KX•SHOO THEN GOTO L3; 
SL 3: 
IF SN > I THEN DO; 
ELSE 
NCCM • SIHCCHIKX+21; 
C.E =- KX t 2; 
CALL SIMULATE; 
CALL COHPUTE; 
GO TO SL3; 
END; 
CE a: KX + 2; 
CALL FNPUT I; 
SIHCCHIKX•21 • NCOM; 
CALL HGEN; 
CALL OUT3; 
CALL sour u 
CALL COHPUTE; 
CALL SOUT2; 
KX:KXtl; 
GOTO 01; 
13:00 KS•I TO SHOO; 
RELIKSI•SRELIKSI; 
COMPSIKSI•SLABI~SI; 
END L3; 
If SCOH~SHOO•O THEN GOTO Wl; 
DC KV•I TO SCOH-SHCC; 
RELIKY>SMODJ•PRE.LIKY>SHODI; 
COMPSI K HSHODI•SL ABI KY +SHOD I; 
END; 
Wl:DHUO•O; 
CE • I; 
CALL CCHPUTE; 
IF SN • 1 THEN CALL SOUT2; 
ELSE; 
If SN < SIMNUM THEN DO; 
SN • SN + ll 
GO TO SLI; 
END; . 
ELSE DC; 
IF AV • 1 THEN DG; 
AV • 4i 
ELSE; 
i;c ro Sll; 
END; 
FREE TYPEoPORToFAILS,REL,SIHCOH,PRELoSREL; 
FREE OTERH, DCEF, DERH~, DCqH; 
GO TO CALC"!L; ' 
,t:ND; 
Rl:KV•I; 
If S~ ) 1 THEN DO; 
CALL COMPUTE; 
SN • SN + ll t 
IF SN <• SIM~UM THEN GO TO S~ll 
ELSE DO; 
IF AV • I THEN DO; 
AV • 2.; I 
ELSE; 
ELSE 
GC fO Sll; 
ENI>; 
FREE TYPE, PCRT, F~ILSo REL, SIHCOM, PREL, SREL; 
fREe DTERM, DOEF, DERH~, DCOM; 
GO TO ~ALCUL; 
END;· 
END; 
CALL SOUT 1; 
CALL COIIPUTE; 
CALL SOUT2; 
IF S~ < SIMNUH THE~ CO; 
S~ • SN + 1 i 
GO TO SL I; 
END I 
ELSE DO; 
PRH TYPE ,PORT ,FAILS, RE loS IMCOM, PRElo SREL; 
FREE DTERM, OOEF, DERKS, DCOH; 
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215 
216 
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219 
:120 
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222 
221 
221t 
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HI 
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2l't 
435 
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237 
2H 
240 
21tl 
2U 
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245 
246 
247 
~'-9 
250 
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.155 
257 
258 
259 
260 
261 
262 
263 
~6· 
265 
2t6 
2Cl 
2o9 
270 
.171 
272 
273 
214 
276 
211 
HB 
219 
280 
281 
282 
<i83 
28~ 
285 
287 
ae 
289 
29C 
290 
~91 
292 
291t 
C&LCUU 
END; 
SUI1VAl • 0; 
SUMSC • O; 
CAL; DC IX • 1 TD SIM~UM; 
CQAAI 
CQA; 
CQB: 
toe: 
CQD: 
CQE: 
CN: 
SL4 I 
SUHVAL • SLIM VAL + RELSTOI lXII 
SUNSQ • SUHSQ + RELSTOI IXI**2i 
END CALi 
DC CS • 3 TO 11 i 
If ZICSI >• SIHNU" THEN DDi 
CR • CS-2; 
GC TO CIJAi 
ENOl 
ELSE IF CS • 11 THEN DDI 
CR • !Di 
GO TO CQAI 
END; 
ELSE i 
HO CQAA; 
UU C S • CR TO 1 BY - I i 
SORTVAL • SIHNUM I ZICSii 
DO CP ~ l TO Si~~UM eV I WHILE ISORTVAL+CP C• SIHNUHI; 
IF RELSTCICPI > RELSTCISORTVALtCPI T~f~ DO; 
REL SORT "' RELSTUlCPI; 
RELstOICP( • RELSTCISORTVAL+CPli 
RELSTOISORTVALtCPI • RELSCRT; 
END i 
ELSE; 
E~D CQB; 
END COA; 
DC CS • I TO SIMNUH-11 
If RELSTCICSI > RELSTOICSt11 THEN DO; 
CR c. CS; 
R~LSDRT • RELSTOICSI; 
RELSTOICSI • RELSTOICStll; 
RELSTDICS+ll • RELSCRTI 
If CS • I THEN GO TO tOE; 
ELSE i 
CO CP • CR TO 2 8Y -II 
If RELSTGICPI < RELSTOICP-11 THEN 001 
RELSORT • AELSTOICF-p; 
RELSTOICP-11 • AfLSTbltPII 
RELSTOICPI • AELSORTl 
END; 
ELSE GO TO CQE I 
EhO CCCI 
END CCC; 
PUT FILE ISVSPRINTI EDIT I'ORDEREO VALUES Of THE SYSTEM '• 
'AELIABILITIES AND UNRELIABILITIES'I ISKIP13loAoAI; 
DO CP • I TO SIHNUMI 
FUT fiLE ISYSPRINTJ EQq I~ELSTOICPio 1-RELSTDICPII 
ICOLI231, fl8 1 blo COLib2lo FIB 1 6ll; 
END CN; 
MEAN • SUHVAL I SIHNUMI 
VAA • SUHSQISIM~UH - IS~MVALISINNUHJ••2; 
STDEV • SQATIVARI; 
PUT PAGEl 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I'THE HEAh '• ATYPEI,' IS '• MEAN, 
'VARIANCE • ', VAR, 'STANDARD DEVIATION • ', STOEVI 
(SKIP C 2) , X ( 5), A, A, A, f t 8 • 6 It X 15), A, f ( 8 t b), X ( 5) ,A ,F C 8 t 6 )I ; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRII.TI EDIT I'THE ESTIMATED ',ATYPEI, 
' FOR' THE SYSTEM IS ', AVRELI 
I COL IC>Io AoA, Aofl Booll; 
IF SliME ,. 0 THH DC; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTJ EDIT ('THE MISSIDh TIME IS •,STIHE,SUNITSI 
I SKIP 12 I, COL I b I , A, fl e, 21, XI 21 , A I ; 
HTBF • STINE I -ILDGIHEANII; 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRI~TI EDIT ('THE ESTIMATED HTBF IS 'oMTBFI 
ICOLioloAoEII5o81li 
END; 
ELSE; 
IF STINE ,. 0 THEN DC; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRJNTI EDIT IATYPElo 'HTBF'l 
ISKIP13l,COLI251 1 A,t0LIIt91,AI I 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTl EDIT I'PERCEhTILE', 'PERCENTILE', 
'PERCENTILE' I 
ICOL'I41, Ao COL l25loAoCOLI1tb loA I; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I'PDINTS'o •POINTS'! 
ICOLI271,A,tCll4BI,AI; 
END; 
fLSE oo; 
PUT fiLE IHSP-~INTI (OH f'HRCI;NTILE'o 'PERCF.IHII.E'I 
I SK(Pill .~Oll ~~,A ,,GL l2ai.,AI; 
PUT fiLE ISV,SPRH;fl (tlH.I 0PdlNTS'I 
ltDL1211oAI I 
END; 
AVAL • siHNu,.. • .o1; 
lF AVAL < l THEN GO TO SL'ti 
ELSE CALL CONF; 
IF STIME ,. 0 THEh 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTJ EDIT I' 1 PERCE""' AVALoi1TBF,SUNIT51 
ISK IP I 21,CDLI21 ,A, tDLI2oloFI u, bl,COLI431 ,E 115 1 81, Xl21, AI; 
ELSE ' . 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRlNTI EDIT li 1 P£RCHT' 1 AVALI 
ISKIP121o COLI2J, A, COLI26lo fl8obll 1· 
AVAL • S IM~M • ,025 I 
IF AVAL < 1 THEI'i GC TO SL5; 
ELSE CALL CDNF; 
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Sl5: 
SL6 • 
If STI~E ,. 0 THEh 
PUT FilE ISYSPRINTI EDlT I' 2,5 PERCEhT', AVAl,IHBFoSUNITSI 
ICDLI21 1 A1 COLI261 ,FIB o61 ,C Oll431 ,E Cl5o 81 ,x 121 ,AI; 
ElSE 
PUT FilE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I' 2.5 PERCENT', AVALI 
ICOLI21o A, C0ll26lo fl8,611; 
AVAL a SIMNUM * ~0~; . 
If AVAl < 1 THEN GQ TO Sllo; 
ElSE CAll CChf i 
IF STillE ,. 0 THEN 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I' 5 PERCENT', AVAloHT8foSUNITSI 
ICDll21oAoCGll261,FiBo61oCOLI431oEI15o81,Xl21oAI; 
ELSE 
PUT FHE ISYSPRINTI EDIT 1 1 5 PERCENT', AVAU 
ICDLI2Io Ao COLI261o fl8o611: 
AVAL a SlllhUM • .10; 
CALl CONF; 
IF STIME ,. 0 THEN 
PUT filE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I' 10 PERCE"~T•, AVAloiHBF,SUNITSI 
ICOll21,A,COLl26lofl8o6loCOll't31,El15o81oXI21 ,AI; 
ELSE 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTJ EDIT l• 10 PERCENT', AVAll 
ICOLIZio A, COLI26Io Fl8o611; 
A VAl • 's IIINUH • • 20; 
CAll CONf; 
If STIHE ,. 0 THEN 
PUT FilE I SYSPRINTI EDIT I' 20 PERCHI', AVAl,HTBfoSUNITS I 
I COl I 21, Ao COLI261 ,fl 8o61,COLI431,E ll5o 81 ,Xl21 ,AI; 
ELSE 
PUT FILE I SYSPRINTI EDIT I' 20 PERCEhT', AVALI 
ICOLI21o Ao COLI26Io fl8,6110 
AVAl • SIHNUH • .25; 
CAll CONf; 
If STIME ,. 0 THEN 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTl EDIT I' 25 PERCENT'o AVAloHTBF,SUNITSI 
' ICOll21oAoCOll26lofl8o61,COll431oEI15o81oXI21oAI; 
ELSE 
PLT FILE ISYSPRINTl EDIT I' 25 PERCENT', AVALl 
ICOL12lo Ao CCLI261, fl8o61l; 
AVAL • SIHNUM • .50; 
CALL CONF; 
If STIHE ,. 0 THEN 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I' 50 PERCEhT'o AVALoHT8FoSUNlTSI 
ICOLI21oAoCDLI26loflBo6loCOLlit31 oEI15o81,Xl21,AI; 
ELSE 
PUT FILE ISYSPRihTI EDIT I' 50 PERCENT•, AVALI 
ICOLI21, A, CCLI261, Fl8,611; 
AVAL ., SIHNUM • .75; 
CALL CONF; 
If STI~E ,. 0 THEh 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I' 75 PERCE~T', AVAL,HTBFoSUNITSI 
I COL 121, A, COL I 261 ,FI 8 o61 ,COLI 431 oE 115,81 oX 121 oA I; 
ELSE , 
PUT FILE I SVSPRINTI EDIT 1 1 75 PERCE~T', AVALI 
"I COL IZio A, COLI261o fl8o 611: 
A~AL • SIH~UH • .80; 
CALL CC~F; . 
If SliME ,. 0 THEN I 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTI EDIT 1/ 80 PERCENT' o AVAL,HTBF,SUNITSI 
ICOL 121oAo COLI261ofl8 o61'1COLI43IoEI15o81oX 121 oA I; 
ELSE ( 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EOIT I'! 80 PERCENT', AVALI 
ICOLI21o A, COLI261o Fl8o611; 
A~AL • SIH~UM • .90; 
CALL CONF; 
If SliME,. 0 T"EN 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I' ~0 PERCENT', AVAL,HT8foSUNITSI 
ICULI21oAoCOLI261oF18o6loCOLI43IoEI15o81,XI21oAI; 
ELSE 
. 
PLT FILE ISYSPRINT I EDIT I' 90 PERCENT', AVALI 
ICOLI21o Ao CCLI261o Fl8o6ll; 
AVAL ., S IHNUM • • 95; 
CALL .CONF; 
IF STJ~E ,. 0 THEN 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I' 95 rERCE~T•, AVAL,HTBF,SUNITSI 
I COL 121, Ao COLI 26lofl8 o6lo COLI4~1, Ell5o Bl oX I 21 ,A I; 
ELSE 1 ' " 
PUT fILE ( SYSPRIN T l EDIT I' 95 RERCEhl', A VALl 
ICOLI21o A, COLI261o fl8o611; 
AVAL • SIMhUM • .975; 
CALL C CNF; 
IF STJHE ,. 0 THEN 
PUT FILE (SYSPRINTI EDIT 1'97.5 RERCENT•, AVALoHTBFoSUNITSJ 
ICOLIZI,AoCOLIZ6Iofl8o61otOLI4lloEI15o81,XIZioAI; 
ELSE 
PUT FILE ISYSFRI~T I EDIT 1'97,5 PERCENT', AVALI 
ICOU21o A, CGU261o Fl8o611; 
AVAL • SIMNUH • .99; 
(ALL CONf; 
IF STI~E ,. 0 THEh 
PUT FILE I SYSPRINTI EDIT I' 99 PERCHl' o AVALoiH8F,SUNITS I 
ICOU 21o Ao COll261 ofl,B o6loCOLI 431 oE ll5, 81 oX121 oAI; 
ELSE 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I' 99PERCHl' 1 AVALI 
ICOU2Io A, COU26Io fi8,6JI; 
ALLCCATE LAo CAo A; 
oo cs • 1 TO zo; 
A!CSI • O; 
END; 
\)VAL ~ RELSfQ( 11; 
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401 
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HI. 
U2 
413 
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CO: 
COil 
cu: 
HAL • REL~lOI~IMhUMl • .01: 
fVAL • IEVAL - OVALl I 20; 
00 CR • 1 TO 20; 
LAICAl • O~AL • CR • fVAL; 
END; 
DC CCP • 1 TO ~IMNUH; 
00 CPC • 1 TO 20; 
If RELSTOICCPl <• LAICPCl THEN DO; 
AICPCl • AICPCl + 1: 
GO TO CQ; 
END; 
EL~E; 
END COl; 
E~O CC; 
CAlli = All); 
to CS • 2 TO 20; 
CAICSl • CAICS-ll + AICSl; 
END; 
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PUT FILE I SYSPRiNTl EDIT l'fREQUENCV AND CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY•, 
' COUNTS Of CASE~' I ISKIP13l,COU25l 1 A,Al; 
CONF: 
fUT fiLE ISVSPRINTl EDIT IILAill CO I • 1 TO lOll ISKIP12lo 
CCLI5lo 1Cifl6o4l• XllllH 
PUT FILE ISYSPR!NTl ED!f IIA(Il DO I~ 1 TO lOll ICOLI5l, 
IOIFI6,0l, Xlllll; 
PUT FILE ISYSPPihTl EDIT IICAI!l 00 I • 1 TO lOll ICOLI5lo 
IOIFI6o0l, Xtllll; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTl EDIT IILAI!l DO I • 11 TO 2011 ISKIPillo 
COL15l, 101flbo4l, Xlllll; 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTl EOIT IIAiil 00 I • 11 TO 2011 ICOL15lo 
101fl6o01, XIJIIJ; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTl EDIT IICAIII 00 I= 1l TO 2011 ICOLI5l, 
lOiflboOlo Xlllll; 
FREE LA, CA, A; 
FREE RELSTO; 
GO TOLl: 
PROCEDURE; 
BVAL • A VAL; 
If BVAL ~· AVAL THEN 00; 
AVAL :; AVAL - eVAL; 
CVAL • RELSTCitVAL+Il- RELSTCIBVALl~ 
AVAL z CVAL * AVAL; 
AVAL • RELSTOIBVAll • AVAL; 
END; 
ELSE AVAL RELSTCieVAll; 
If SliME ~= 0 THEN OO; 
END; 
lF STYPE • 1 THEN MTBF • SliME I -ILOGil-AVAlll; 
ELSE HTBf = STIME I -ILOGIAVALll; 
ELSE; 
RETUR~; 
END CUNF; 
F~PUT:PROCEUURE; 
IO DEClARE STATEMENTS •I 
OCL CE REAL fl XED DEC Ill EXT; 
CCL I REAL FIXED DEC. 131; 
DCL KOOE CHAR Ill VAR EXT; 
OCL HINPTH IZ5bl BIT 11281 VAR EXT; 
OCL hCCM REAL fiXIC DEC Ill EXT; 
OCL NPATH REAL FIXED DEC 131 EXT; 
/0 ENTRY POINT fOR MODULES •1 
HPUTl :ENTRY; 
GET FilE ISYS!hl LIST I~COHoNP.THJ; 
GET FILE I SVSINI EDIT I KOOEJ ICOlllOl,Ailll; 
CALL OUT'2; 
fhPUT2 :ENTRY; 
10 ENTRY POihT FOR THE SYSJEH •1 
I• CHECK KOOE TO DETERMINE If H!NIHAL 
STAT.ES ARE _TO BE INPUT IN BINARY 
OR HEXADECIMAL NOTATION •1 
If KOOE~'H' JHH CALL HEXIN; 
ELSE GET FILE ISVSINl LIST IIMINPTHIII 00 1•1 TO NPATHJl; 
RETURN; 
END FNPUT; 
HEXIN: PROCEDURE; 
IO CECL ARE S TA'TEHENTS •1 
DCL CCOE CHARI32l VAR; . 
OCL COOEO(lb) CHAR(l) 1NITC'A 1 ,•s•,•c•,•o•,•E•,•F•, 
IQ t t I~ t t I 2 t-1 I 3 It I itt-, I 5 It I 6 I t 17t t t i3 I t t 9 1 ) ; 
CCL nEXI16l 611141 INITC'1010'Bo'l0ll'Bo'll00'B, 
•110 t•s,•lltO•a, '1111' a, •coco• s,•ooot• a,• ooto•a,•oott•s, 
•ot_oo•s, •otot•a, •ottc•a, •ottt•s,•looo•a, 'lOOl'BI; 
CCL TEMPI CHARill; 
DCL hPATH REAL FIXED OEC Ill EXT; 
DCL NCOH REAL· FIXED DEC 131 EXT; 
oCL· HPTH Jll T 11281 VARYING; 
OCL MINPTHI25bl BIT1!281 VARYING EXTERNAL; 
OCL IJloJ3oJ4oJJl RE.L FIXED DEC Ill; 
DO JJ•l TO 25b; 
HJNPTH CJJJ ::s "Bi 
END; 
HEXU UO J4•l TO NPA TH; 
HPTH= 1 '6; 
GET filE ISYSihl LIST ICCOfl; 
DECODE: OC Jl•l TO INCOM+3114; · 
TEHPL•SUBSTRICOOEoJloll; 
SEARCn: 00 Jl•l TO t6; 
If TEMP!•CDOECIJ31 THEN OO; 
HPTH•MPTHj lt1EXIJ3l; 
GO TO NEXT; END; 
it'-ll 
450 
457 
it 58 
462 
Hit 
466 
469 
H1 
472 
H3 
4H 
476 
477 
478 
47~ 
it80 
lt81 
it82 
483 
484 
485 
'o86 
487 
488 
489 
'o90 
492 
493 
495 
4~6 
'o97 
.498 
4~\l 
5CO 
501 
502 
503 
50ft 
505 
506 
507 
~C9 
!11 
512 
513 
~lit 
515 
516 
~11 
518 
519 
520 
521 
~22 
523 
52~ 
525 
~2b 
527 
~2 B 
!29 
530 
531 
~32 
533 
53'o 
535 
536 
537 
538 
539 
!~0 
5H 
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:~~ i~t:cr;YSP~INTI LISTI'J08 rERM!NAIED- INVALID CHARACTER' • 
• ENCOUNTERED IN MINIMAL STATE 'oJ4H 
STOP; 
NEXT: END DECODE: 
MINPTHI J4.I•HINPTHI Jitl II SU~~ TRI MP THo L • hCOHI I 
END HEXL; 
END HEX I~;. 
EQGEh: PROCEOURE; 
1• DECLARE S U TEHENTS O/ 
DCL COEF 115001 REAL FIXED DEC 1-.1 EXT; 
DCL IILo NSUB,Ii, hCUPo INC2o 13, 14, 15, KKL, 16, KOUPo 171 
REAL FIXED DEC 131; 
DCL H!NPTHI25bl ~1!(1281 VARYING EXTERNAL: 
DCL INCOH, NPATHoNTERHI REAL FIXED DEC 131 EXT; 
DCL THHS ll5001 BIT 11281 VAR EXT; 
1• FIRST TH~EE TERMS •1 
1• INITIALIZE PRObABILITY EQUATION •1 
TERHSili•HINPTHilll COEF111•1; 
IF NPATH•1 THH DC; 
NTERH•1; RETURN; END; 
TERHSI21•MINPTHI21; COEFI 21•1; 
TERHSI31•HINPTHI11 I HINPTHI21; 
COEFI31•-1; 
NT ERMa 3; 
IF NPATH•2 THEN GO TO ENDEQ; 
I• REMAINING TERMS •1 
LOOP1: DO 11 • 3 TO NPATH; 
TERHS I NSUB I•HI ~PTH I Ill; 
CCEFINSUBI•l; 
NSUB•NSUH•I; 
LOOP2: GO 12 • I TO NTERH; 
TERHSINSU81•~1hPTHII11 I TERH51121; 
I• DETERMINE COEFFICIENT •1 
COEFINSUBI•-COEF1121; 
NSUB•NSUB•1; 
HOA: ENJ LOCP2; 
1• ACCUMULATE DUPLICATE TERMS •1 
NDUP:.O; 
lhC2*NSUB-1; 
00 I 3•NIERH+2 TO I ~C2; 
DO 14•3 TO ll-1-NDUP; 
If TERMSII41~•TERHS113-~DUPI THEN GO TO EN014; 
CCEFII4i•COEFII'tl + COEfii3-NDUPJ; 
IF ll-NDUP•NSUS-1 THEN GO TO SUB; 
DO 15•13-NOUP TO INC2-1-NDUPI 
TERMSII51•TER~SII5<11; 
cueFU51•COEF115•11; 
END; 
SUB: hSUB•NSU8-1; 
t.OUP•NOUP+li 
GO TO ENDI3; 
ENDI'o: END; 
E~CI3: END; 
1• REHO~E IERHS WITH ZERO COEFFICIENTS •1 
KOUP•O; 
KKl•I\SUS-l i 
DO 16•3 TO KK1; 
IF CUEfllb-KDUPI~•O THEN GO TO ENDI6; 
IF 16-1\DUP•NSUS-1 THEN (Q TO KSU8; 
DC 17•16-KDUP TO KK1-l-KOUP; 
TERHSII71•TERHSI 17•ll; 
COEFI 171•COEFII7+11; 
E~D; 
K SIJB: N SUU•NSUB-11 
KOUP•KDUP•1; 
ENDib: ENO; 
NTE R~·~SUB-1; 
END LOOP 1: 
ENDEC: END ECGEN; 
OUT!: PROCEDURE; 
CCL BTYPE REAL FIXEC CECil! EXT; 
DCL CEREAL FIXED DECI31 EXT; 
OCL C~ARI CHARI1201 VAR EXT; 
DCL CHAR2 CHARIL201 ~AR EXT; 
DCL CHECK1 REAL FIXED DEC 131; 
DCL COEf 115001 REAL fiXED DEC l'ol EXT; 
OCL COHPSl CHAR Ill: 
DCL CCHPS2 CHARill; 
DCL COEFF CHARill VARYING; 
OCL ICOHPSI1281, SLA811Z811 CHAR(]J VAR EXT STATIC; 
OCL CTYPE CHARIL31 VARYING STATIC; 
DCL OESCR CHARI741; 
DCL OCOHIHAXELI REAL FIXED DEC131 CONTROLLED EXT; 
OCL DEkiiSIHAXEL,MAXELI HIT I 1281 CONTROLLED VAR EXT; 
CCL OCEFIHAXELoHAXELI REAL FIXED DECI4l CGNTRCLLED txT; 
OCL DTERHIMAXELI REAL FIX ED DECill COI<TROLLED EXT; 
DCL GAMMA REAL FLOAT OECIL'ol EXT; 
OCL JH REAL FIXEC CEC 131 EXT; 
DCL JMCO REAL FIXEC OEC 131 EXT; 
·DCL KOHPSC1281 'CHARC31 \JARY'ING INIJIAU'l', 1 2•,•3 1 , 
I lf It I 5 I i I 6 I I I 7 I I I 8 I I I 9 It I 10 I I I 11 1 1 1 12 I 1 I 1) I I I l't I 1 I 15 I II 161 1 
I 11 1 I I UJ I I I 19 I I I 2Q I I I 21 1 1 I 22 1 t I 23 1 1 I 24 I 1 I 25 1 1 I 2b I 1 I 27 1 1 
I 28 I I I 29 I 1 I ]Q I ,t I 31 1 1 I 32 It I 3 )I 1 I 34 1 1 I 35 1 II 36 1 t I JJI 1 1]8 I t 
1 39'• 1 '-0', 1 -it1'•'"*2 1 • ''t3 1 , '"'"'•'"5'•'"6'•''-'71 ,'.ftl8' ,•~t9•1 
I 50 I t I 51 1 1 ~ 52 1 1 I 53 1 1 I 5"' I 1 I 55 1 f I 56 1 1 I 57 1 1 I 58 I 1 I 5'J I 1 I 6QI 1 
I 6 1 1 t I (12 1 1 I 6 J I I I 64 I 1 I 6 5 I 1 I 6 6' 1 I 67 1 1 I 6 8 I 1 1 6 9 I I I 70 I 1 I 7 1 1 1 
1 72. I 1 I 73 I I I 7 It I I I 75 I I I 76 1 1 1 71 i, I I 76 I I I 19 1 1 I 8(] I I I 81 1 t I 82 I 1 
I 8) 1 1 I Bit I 1 1 8 5 1 1 1 6b 1 1 I 8 7 1 1 1 8 8 1 1 I 89 1 1 1 90 I I 1 91 1 1 I 92 1 1 1 9 3 1 1 
H2 
~'o3 
51olt 
51t5 
51t6 
547 
51o8 
5'<9 
550 
551 
552 
553 
·55~ 
555 
5,56 
~51 
558 
559 
560 
5bl 
562 
·563 
:64 
565 
566 
567 
51>8 
569 
H1 
51Z 
51 to 
575 
571 
578 
579 
580 
581 
582 
593 
58~ 
585 
586 
567 
588 
589 
591 
592 
5?3 
595 
597 
598 
599 
600 
6C2 
603 
604 
6C5 
607 
tea 
tiD 
I 9" It I 95 It I 96 1 t I 97 1 t I 'Jl8 I 1 I 99 1 1 I 1QQI 1 I lQ 1 1 1 I 102 1 I I 103 I I 
• 101e •, •to 5', • to6• , • 1 o 1 • , • 1 ca •, • to9• , • Ito• ,• ttt• , • L_l2 • , 
•ttl'• •tt'-'•'115', •it6•,•tll','lte•,•tt9• ,•tzc•,•tzt•, 
•tz.z•, 1 123', '12ft', '12S•,•t.2t•'•'ll7','128') STATJC.i 
OCL HEAOL CHARibOI VARYING; 
OCL IMi~PL,NM!NI REAL fiXED DEC 131; 
OCL Kb REAL fiXED OEC 1~1 EXT; 
OCL K7 REAL fiXED CEC 131 EXT; 
OCL KX REAL flXEC CECI3) EXT; 
DCL LABELS REAL fIX EO DEC I 11 EXT; 
DCL MDESCRILZel ChARI701; 
DCL M!NP CHARI5001 VARYING; 
OCL ~I~PTHI25bl BITI1281 VARYING EXTERNAL; 
OCL MODSYI1281 CHARI31 VARYING 1Nifl'A';'8', •c•, 
, o.• , • e,, , F,, , c,, • tt,, , 1 ., , J , , • K. , , L. , '"' , •·N. , • 0 ._, • P •, • o• , 
'R'' • s •' •r • • •u' '•v • '' w-- •'), • • • v' '' z• '• At' '• a~ • '• c t• •' ot• • 
1 El', 1 fl 1 ,'Gl','Hl'• •t-L't 'Jl','Kl' ,•Lt' •' Joll 1 ,i)u•,•Ot' t 
•pt•, •ot•,•Rt•,• s1•, •-Tl•·,•ui•, •ovt• .•wt• .~ Xl 1 tiYt 1 , 1 Zl 1 1 
• A2. I I 82 I I. C2. I I 02 • •• E2 1 I' F2 I I • ~2. •• I H2' '' 12. •• I J2 I ''1(2 I' 
• L2 I • '"'2 I I. N2'' '02 I I I P2 •• 1 Q2 I I • R2 1 • 'S2 1 'I T2 •• I U2-' I. V2 I • 
'W2 I I • )(2 I. I v 2'' 1 l2 I I I AlI I I 6 3 I I I c 3 1 • I D 3 1 I' E 3. I 1 fl I I 'G 3 1 • 
• H.3' I. 13.'. J 3 1 I •t<. 3.' • L 3' I I M3 1 '. N3 1 '' 03. I' p 3. '' 03. '. Rl.' 
• S3 • , • r .3 • , • uJ•-.1 • v 3 • , • w 3 •. • x1 • , • .,~I, • ll •, • A4' , • 64' , I C4 1 1 
I 0-4 1 I 'Eo\' I 1 F't 1 , 1 G4•. 'Hit I. 'I" I' I J~· ,. K4 1 t 1 l't 1 •' M4 1 -· •Nit'' 
'04 1 , 1 P-'\ 1 , 1 1J~ 1 , 1 R't 1 ,'S't 1 t 1 l'e!','Uie 1 t 1 VIt 1 1 1 W~'~'X4'l STATIC; 
CCL HODSYH 11281 C~AR Ill EXT; 
OCL LE~ ~EAL fiXED CEC 131 EXT; 
DCL INCOH,NIIOO,NPATH,NTERMI REAL fiXED DEC 13) EXT; 
OCL HAAG fiXED BINARYIJIIOII 
CCL NPAGE REAL fiXED DEC l'ol EXT; 
OCL IJI,Kl 1 KZtKl 1 ~o\,K5 1 JS,LCIKlO,Kl5,KlbeLENb,JL,Kl3,I,Kll) 
REAL fiXED DEC Ill;. 
·OCL PREL IHAXCOHI REAL FLOAT OECI lit I CGNTROLLED EXT; 
CCL PUNCH fiLE STREAM OUTPUT; 
OCL F~NOLT REAL FIXIC DEC Ill EXT; 
OCL RELIHAXCOHI REAL FLCAT OECII'ol CONTROLLED EXT; 
OCL STATE CHARI51 VARYING STATIC; 
CCL SYSIO CHARI801 VAR EXT; 
OCL TERMS 115001 BIT 11<81 VAR EXT; 
OCL I TYPE I MAXEL, HAXCOMI •I PORT I MA XEL, IIAXCOIIIo 
fAILSIMAXEL,HAXCOHII REAL FLOAT OECIHl CONTROLLED EXT; 
DCL XCCHPS CHAR 13 I VARY INGI 
OPEN flLEIPUNCHI; 
0~11: ENTRY; 
I* ENTRY POINT TO PRINT CONTROL DATA, 
AND PROCESS LABELS fOR THE SYSTEM •I 
/a SET LABELS DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF 
ANALYSIS PERFORMED *I 
If 8TYPE • 0 THEN CJYPE • 'RELIABILITY•; 
ELSE CTYPE • 'U~RELIABILITY'; 
If BTYPE E 0 THEN STATE • 'PATHS'; 
ELSE STATE • 'CUTS'I 
I* PUNCH SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION, AND 
NUMBER llf MODULES *I 
If PUNOUT•O THEN GO TO LZO; 
PUT FILEIPUNCH) ECITISYSIOI IAI80ll; 
PUT FILE IPUNCHI ECIT I~MOO, BTYPEl 
lfl31oXIllofllll; 
LZ 0: DO J 1•1 TO 12 8; 
HOOSYM IJI) • ~llDSY IJII; 
COMPS IJII • KOMPS IJI); 
END; 
JEN•O; 
JMOD•O i 
NPAGE•l; 
I• PRINT SYSTEM CONTROL INFORMATION •I 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I'SPARCS: EQUATION GENERATION ', 
1 ROUTlNE' 1 'PAGE 1 ,NPAGEJ IPAGE,A,AtCOLllll,,Aiffl.t)li 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTl EDIT I 'SIMULATION PROGRAM fOR T~E ', 
'ANALYSIS Of ThE RELIABILITY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS' I ISKIPI11oA, 
AI; 
PUT FILe ISYSPRINT I EDIT I'COLLEGE OF BUSINESS '• 
•ADMINISTRATION, OKLAHC~A STATE UNIVERSITY'! ISKIPIIJ,A,AI; 
139 
PUT FILE I SYSPKINT) fDI T ('SYSTEM IOEhTIFJC.ATION ••••••••••••' 1 
'••• ' 1 ,SYSI0) CSKIP(2) ,A,A,A!i 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I'NUM8ER Of MODULES •••••••••••••••'• 
'•••• •,NMOO), lSKlPC2J,AfAIF(311i 
PU1 FILE" ISISPRINTI EDIT I 'NUMBER Of ~ONHCOULAR COMPONENTS', 
'·'•••• •,NCOH- NMOOI CSKIPClltA 1 A,f(l)); 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTI ECIT I'TOTAL ~UMBER Of SYSTEM ELEMENTS ••'• 
'••• •,NCOI-'1 lSKIPClJ,-,A,Fl3JJ; 
PUT fiLE. ISYSPRINH EOIT'"I'NUHSER OF MINIMAL 'oSTATE,'•••••••'• 
'·~··•• ;•,NPATHJ CSKIP(fJ,A,A,C.OL(2S)tAIA,fl311; 
PUT fiLE ISISPRINTI EDIT I' PUN,HEO GUT PUT OF EQUATIOI!I ••••.•••' 
•'f•• 'I tSK~PClJ,A,AJi 
lf 1PUNOUT•O THEN PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTl EDIT I' hO'I UIJIJ; 
ELSE PUT FILE ISYSPR INTI EDIT I'YES'I IAI3lll 
,PUT FJLE ISYSPRINTI EDIT ('LABELS SUPPLIED BY USER •••••••.•••'• 
:E~;J~~.~~~~ Pill ,A,MK 1~1111; 
IF NMUO•O THEN GO TO Ll2; 
DC K10~1 TC NMOO; 
COMPSIKLOI•MODSYIKLOI; 
END; 
IF N~OO•NCOH THEN GQ TO Ll2; 
I* HANDLE NOhHODULAR ELEMENTS Of THE 
SYSTEM· *I 
DO Kl5•1 Til NCilM-NMOO; 
COMPSIK15+~MOOI•KC~fSIKI51; ENO; 
LlZ: If LABELS • 0 THEN If N~OO • 0 I NHCD • NCOH THEN 
612 
U3 
6l't 
615 
616 
618 
619 
620 
621 
622 
f23 
623 
624 
625 
f26 
627 
628 
629 
uc 
631 
t32 
633 
b34 
635 
636 
637 
638 
639 
6 ... 0 
641 
t~2 
f~5 
646 
649 
651 
t52 
65) 
65~ 
t55 
656 
651 
659 
66C 
661 
663 
664 
665 
t66 
668 
669 
670 
611 
t72 
t13 
614 
615 
676 
617 
679 
680 
t81 
683 
664 
t85 
686 
681 
688 
689 
691 
t92 
693 
694 
695 
696 
697 
698 
699 
100 
. 701 
702 
703 
104 
705 
106 
1C 1 
108 
709 
lll 
112 
Cf: 
CG: 
L9: 
L22: 
LL2: 
LL3: 
S IHOUT: 
BA: DO_; 
-PUT fILE ISYSPRINT I EDIT I' NO' I I A Ill I; 
88: DO KJ • 1 TC NCOHi 
GET fiLE ISYSINI LIST ITYPEiloKJJ, Pll\Til,KJI, FAILSiloKJII; 
IF NMOD ,. 0 THEN SLABIKJI • HOOSYIKJII 
ELSE; 
END BSI 
CALL SIMULATE; 
RETURN I 
END BA; 
ELSE 
CA: DO; 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I' NO'I 1413111 
CB: DO KL • 1 TO NCOHi ' 
GET fiLE ISYSINI liST ITYPEilol<Lio PO~Til,Kllo FAILSiloKLII; 
END CS; 
tALL SIMULATE; 
CC: DC KM z NMDD • 1 TO NCOM; 
- PRELIKMI • REL IKHI; 
END CC; 
DO K~ • 1 TC NMOD; 
SLA81Khl • MODSYIK~I; 
END Cf; 
DC KC • NMOD+1 TO NCOH; 
SLABIKOI • KCHPSIKC-~HOCii 
END CG; ' 
RETURN; 
END CAi 
ELSE PUT FILE ISVSPRINTI EDIT I'YES'I IAI311 i 
PUT FILE_ ISYSPRINTI EDIT I'LA~EL INFORMATION FOR THE SYSTEM' I 
ISKIP151,CCLU~~I20J,Aii 
DO LC•l 'TO 4i CALL DLINE; END; 
PUT FILE ISYSPkiNII EDIT, I 'LABEL' ,•DESCRIPTION' I 
ISK IP 12 I, COLUiiNilO i, Ao COLUMN( 45 I ,A, SKIP I 21 I i 
DC LC•1 TO 2; CALL CLINE; ENOl 
If NIIOOaO THEN GOTO LL21 
DO Kl•l TO. NHOD; 
GET fiLE ISYS':I~I HIT ICOHPSloMDESCRIKlll 
I COL Ill , A 131 , CCLI 101 , AI 1.0111 
SLA81Kli=COMPS1; 
XCCMPS•••; 
DO KlO•l TO 3; 
COMPS2•SU8STRICOMPS1,Kl0oll; 
If COMPS2•' ' THEN \GO TO: L 221 
XCOMPS•XCOHPSILCOHPSZ; 
EhD; 
IF XCOHPS,a" THEN COHPSIKlloHODSYMIKli•XCOHPS; 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I'HOOULE •,COMPSIKll.tZOI',' ,• ', 
HDESCRIKlll ISKIP,A,A,CQLI15Io~oAoAII 
CALL DLINE; 
END L'"Ji 
IF NCCI'= NHGD THEN RETUR Nl 
DO KZ•~MCD+l TO NCOM; 
GET FILE ISYSINI LIST ITYPEiloKZI, PORTil,K21. FAILSI1 0 K2111 
CALL SIMULATE; 
FRELIK21•RELIK21; , , 
GET FILE ISYSINI E~IT tcPMPSloDESCRI 
ICOLI71oAI31oCOLI1QioAI 1011; 
SLA81K21•COHPS1; -
XCOHPS•••; 
DO Kll•l TO ~i , ~ 
COMPSZ•SUBSTR1COHPSl,K1loll; 
IF CCMPS2•' •. THEN GO H L23; 
XCOHPS•XCOMPSI (CD~FS2; 
END; 
IF XUOMPS,•'' THEN COMP~IK21•XCOMPS; 
fL SE XCOHPS•COMPS I~~~ II 
PUT FIL~ I SVSPRINTI EDIT;' I 'COifPONENT 'oXCOMPS.1201'•' •' 't 
- DEStRI ISKIPilloAo4oCOLI151oAoAoAI; 
CALL OLINE; 
END LUi 
RETURN; 
I• ENTRY POINT FOR ~IHUL~TION *I 
ENTRY; 
IF LABELS • 0 THEN If NMDD • q I NMOD • NCOM THEN 
BAl:·Do: 
CALL SI~ULATE; 
RETURN; 
END 841; 
ELSE 00: 
CAl: 
CALL SIMULATE: 
DO KM • 'h~CO+l TG hCOM: 
PRELl KMI • RELIKMII 
END CAl; 
RETURN; 
END; 
1• ENTRY POihT TO PRINT CONTROL DATA, 
AND PROCESS LABELS FOR MODULES •1 
OUT2: ENTRY; 
DO JL•l TO 128; 
MODSYMIJLI•HCOSYIJLI; 
COHPS(JLI•KOMPSIJLI; 
END; 
J..-OO•Jt-IQOf-li 
CALL DLINE; 
IF LABELS•il 'THEN GOTO JC; 
00 JS=l T C NMCD; . 
MODSY 141 JS !=SLAB IJS II 
140 
113 
7H 
716 
716 
117 
718 
119 
720 
iZI 
124 
725 
1Z6 
727 
72B 
12~ 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
137 
738 
139 
JloO 
HI 
H2 
743 
745 
746 
747 
749 
750 
751 
752 
753 
l5't 
1~5 
756 
757. 
158 
759 
lbO 
161 
762 
763 
761t 
166 
768 
769 
170 
111 
H2 
773 
775 
775 
176 
179 
180 
1U 
782 
783 
781t 
785 
786 ~ 
787 
789 
790 
191 
792 
793 
l9't 
795 
796 
797 
798 
799 
BOO 
801 
802 
END; 
I• PRI~T CONTROL INFORMATICN fOR THE 
HODULE OJ 
JC:If LABELS•O THE~ PUT filE lSYSPRINTi EGIT ('MODULE '• 
MCDSYMIJ140DII lSKlPl41,A,All ELSE 
PUT FILE ISVSPRINTI EDIT !'MODULE •,1400SYMIJMOOI,• 'oll31'•'• 
i 'oHCESCRIJMODII lSKIPI41oAoAiAiAoAoAI; 
CALL OL!NE; 
141 
PUT fiLE l SVSPRINTI EDIT I' NUMBER CF COHPCNENTS ',1161',' ,• '• 
NCOHI lSKIPllloAoAoAofl3111 
CALL DLINE; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT !'NUMBER Of ~IN[MAL •,STATE,• 'ol131 
'•'•' •,NPATHt (SK.IPtlJ,A,A,A,A.,A,f(3)J; 
DO LC~l TO 21 CALL CLINE; END; 
If LABELS • 0 THE~ 
LA: DO; 
LB: DO K3 • 1 TC NCOH; 
GET FILE lSYSitO LIST CTYPEICE,K31 0 PORTICE,K31, FAILSICE,K31J; 
END LS; 
CALL SIMULATE; 
RETURN; 
END LA; 
ELSE PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I' LABEL INFORHATI.DN fOR ', 
'14CDULE •,~OOSYHIJHODII iSKIPl5loCOLl201,A,A,AI; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EOif I'LABEL'o'DESCRIPTION'l 
I SKIP IZ loCOLUHNl 10 I,A,COLUHNI451; AI; 
DO LC•l TO 7; CALL CLINE; END; 
LL4: DO K3•1 TO NCGH; 
GET FILE ISYSINI LIST ITYPEICE,K31, PORTICEoK31o FAILSICE;K31J; 
GET FILE ISVSINI EDIT ICOHPSioDESCRI 
ICOL 171,AI31,CCLI!OioAI lOll; 
XCOHPSz 1 1 ; 
DO Kl3•1 TO 3; 
COMPS2•SUBSTRICOHPSloK13oll; 
If COMPSZ• • ' THEN GO T [ L24; 
XCOHPS•XCOHPSIICOMPS2; 
L24: EhD; 
IF SUBSTRIXCOMPS,! olh•" THE~ COMPS IKJI•XCOHPS; 
ELSE XCOHPS•COMPSIK31; 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTI EDIT l •COMPONENT •,XCOHPSoiZOI',' ,• ' 
DESCRI lSKIPI11,A,A,COLI151,AoA 0 AI; 
CALL DLINE; 
END LL41 
CALL S IHUL ATE; 
RETURh; 
I• ENTRY POINI TO PRINT HlhiHAL STATES, 
AND PROBABILITY EQUATIONS 0/ 
OLI3: ENTRY; 
OTERHICE I • 0; 
OWMICEI • O; 
OCOMICEI • NCC~; 
OTERMICEl ~ NTERM; 
00 1•1 TO NTERM; 
OCEFICE,II • CCEFIII; 
OERMSICE.ll • TERHSIII; 
END; 
/0 PUNCH NU~BER Of COHPO~E~TS, NUHBEP Of 
TERMS, LABELS ANO THE TERMS •1 
If PUNOUT•O TH.EN GO TO L2l; 
If JHCO•O THEN PUT fiLEIPUNCHI EDITINCOH,NTERHI 
I CCL UHN Ill , f l 31 , X ( 51, F ( 31 I; 
ELSE PUT FILEIPUNCH.I LISTIHOOS¥MIJHOOI,NCOM,NTERHI; 
PUT FILE(PUNCHI SKIP LISTIICOHPSIII DO 1•1 
TO NCOHII; 
PUT FILEIPLtiCHI SKIP LISTIICOEFIII VO 1•1 
10 NTERHIII 
PUT FILEIPUNCHI SKIP LISTllTERHSIII 00 1•1 
TO NT ERM I II 
1• PRINT HINIHAL STATES •1 
L211CALL CLINE; 
IF JHOO=O THEN PUT FILE jSYSPRINTI EDITI•THE •,NPATH, 
' MI~UIAL •,STATE,• FOR THE SYSTEM fOLLOW: 'I 
lSKIPl21oAoFl31oAoAoAoSKIP1211; ELSE 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT l'THE •,NPATH,'HINIHAL •,STATE, 
' FOR MODULE ',HODSYHIJHOOio' FOLLOW:') 
I SKI PI 21 , A ,f( 3 loX l 11, A, A, A, A, A, SKIP l 211; 
DO LC•.1 TO 2; CALL OLINE! END; 
L5: DO K4•1 TO NPATH; ' ' 
HI NP• 1 I; 
MINP• 1 <'i 
HINPL•1; 
Lb: OC K5•1 TO NCOM; 
If SUBSTRIHINPTHIK1ti,K5,11•'1' B 
THEN :HINP•IIINP IICCHPSI K51ll' ,•; 
ChECK1•LENGTHJHINPI/HINPLI 
If CHECKI>l28 THEN CO; 
END; 
HIN,PL•HI~PL>ll 
DO 1•1 TO 132-CHECKI; 
MIN·P•HINP II •• ; 
END; 
END L6 I 
~HIN•LENGTHIHINPI; 
SU8STRIHINP,NM!No11•'>'; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT CHINPI lSKIPIII,COLl11oAI; 
CALL CLINE I 
END L5; 
IF JHOO•O THEN 
HEA01•'SYSTEH 'IICTVPEII' EQUATIGN l'; 
ELSE HEAD1•'S~BSYSTEH 'IICTYPEII' EQUATION' 
80/o 
807 
808 
809 
811 
812 
815 
816 
818 
820 
821 
f2J 
826 
829 
f3C 
83Z 
/ 8l3 
834 
!35 
831 
838 
e~9 
840 
641 
f43 
&45 
8~6 
f47 
H~ 
851 
652 
f53 
854 
855 
85t 
857 
858 
es9 
f6C 
861 
862 
81>3 
864 
865 
866 
667 
868 
870 
871 
872 
874 
675 
876 
871 
878 
880 
881 
E8Z 
883 
864 
885 
886 
887 
888 
889 
891 
892 
893 
894 
es5 
896 
897 
898 
899 
900 
~02 
903 
904 
905 
9Db 
907 
908 
909 
910 
Sll 
912 
913 
~14 
915 
916 
917 
918 
919 
11' ••••• MODULE 'II MOOSYNIJHOOI II' I'; 
PUT FILE ISYSP~INTI EDIT IHU01 0 NTERH 0 ' TERMSI'I 
I SKI PJ 21 ,COLI321, A, f 13 I, A, SKIP 12 II; 
DO LC•l TO 2; CALL OLINE; END; 
CHAR1"'' 1 ; 
(t1AA23 •IR I i 
I• DETERMINATION OF COMPONENT SYMBOLS 
FGR CUTPUT •1 
If JHOD~O THE~ CHAR1•CHAR111'SYS •; ELSE 
CHA~1•CHARliiHODSY~IJHOOIII' •: 
IF JMODaO THEN CHAR~•CHAR211' • '; ElSE OO; 
DO Kl0•1 TO LENGTHIHOOSYMIJHOOIItl; 
CHAR2•CHAR211' 'I END; 
CHAR2~CHAR211'• 1 i 'END; 
K6•0: 
L1: ·If Kb•NTERH ThEN GO TO KKZ; 
IF caeF IKo+II>O ThEN ci:JEFF•' • •: HSE oa: 
COEF(K6+l)~•COEFCK~+l.; COEff•' - •; END; 
KJ6::~~Kb+l; 
IF Kl6~•1 THEN VO; 
CHAR2•CHAR21 ICCEFF; 
CHARI•CHAR111' ·~ 
END; 
If CCEFIK6+11~•1 THEN CO; 
CHARi•CHARlll' '; 
CHAR2<CHAR2IIKOMPSICOEfiK6+111; 
END; 
K7•0; 
AG: :~ ~~;~~~~T~~~~~~~.I~.~~~i,ll•'0'8 THEN GO To L50; 
CHAR1•CHARIIICGHPSIK7+1lll' •; 
I* DETERMINE R-STRING FOR OUTPUT •I 
LEN6•LENGTHICOHPSIK7+1!1; 
IF LEN6=l THEN GO TO GO!: 
If LENb•2 THE~ GG TO GO<!; 
ELSE GU TO GOJ: 
GOU CHAR2•CHAR2H 'R 'i 
GO TO Ll1i 
G02: CHAR2 .. CHAR2II 1 R '; 
GO· TO Ll1; 
G03: CHAR2•CHAR211'~ 0 ; 
Lll:LEN•LENGJHICHAR21 ;, 
CALL SUNE; 
L50:K7•K71-t: 
GOTO AG: 
KC 1: Kb>=Kb ... l; 
GOTO L7; 
K'KZ:CALL SLINE: 
CLOSE FILEIPUNCHI: 
END OUT I; 
Sll~E:FROCEOURE; 
DCL ILENoNCOHoNTERHI REAL FIXED DEC 131 EXT; 
If LEN>ll2 & LEN <120 THEN DO: 
GCL C~.AR2 CHARI1201 VAR EXT; 
OCL IK6oK71 REAL fiXE!) CEC 131 EXT; 
If K7+l~•NCOH THEN CHAR2•CHAR211•••: 
CALL PRINTER; 
RETURN: 
END; 
ELSE 00: 
If Kb•NTERM T~EN CALL PRINTER; 
RETURN; 
END; 
E~O SLINE; 
PRINTER: PROCEDURE: 
DCL ICHAR!,CHARZI CHAR1!201 VAR EXT; 
DCL LEN REAL fiXED GEC Ill EXT: 
CAll ULINE; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT ICHAR2! ISI'liPI21,COLIHoAI: 
PUT FILE fSYSPRINTI EDIT ICHARU ICOLI41,AI; 
CALL CLINE·: CALL CL !NE; 
LEN•O; 
CHARt•• •; 
CHAP2-= 11 ; 
RETURN; 
END FRIMER; 
OLINE:PROCEDURE; 
DCL JEN REAL FIXED OEC 131 EXT; 
DCL NPAGE REAL fiXEC DEC 141 EXT; 
JH•JEN+l: 
IF J EN<S' THEN. GO TO OVER'; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT 1' .. CONTINUED ••'I 
ISKIPI31oCCLI6CioAI: 
NPAGEa:NPAGE..,.l; 
PUT fiLE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I'PAGE•,NPAGEI 
I PAG Eo COL IIlli , A oX I 11~· F I 4 I, SKIP I 211 ; 
JEN~O; -, 
OVER: RETURN; . 
END DL INE: 
COMPUTE: PROCEDURE; 
DCL A REAL FLOAT DEC 1141: 
OCL •v REAL FIXEC CECI31 EXT; 
DCL AVREL REAL FLCAT OECIJ41 EXT; 
DCL BROD REAL FLOAT DEC IJ41: 
CCL CEREAL FIXED C·fCI31\EXT: 
OCl DCGHIHAX Ell ROl' FIXED OECI31 CCNTROLLED EXT: 
DCL DHOO REAl FIXED DEC 131 EXT; 
CCL DERHS( HAXEL ,HAXEL I BIT 11281 CONTROLLED ~AR EXT; 
CC.L OOEFIMAXEL,MAXELI REAL FIXED DECI41 CONTROLLED EXT; 
OCL OTERHI MAXELI REAL F !XED DECI31 CCNTROLLED EXT; 
OCL KA REAL FIXED DEC I !li, 
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920 
921 
922 
~23 
924 
925 
926 
~27 
S28 
929 
930 
931 
932 
933 
B4 
935 
931> 
938 
939 
9~0 
941 
942 
9H 
Slt4 
945 
947 
948 
91t9 
950 
SSI 
952 
953 
955 
955 
951> 
957 
958 
S59 
960 
961 
HZ 
96j 
SM 
965 
966 
967 
968 
91>9 
970 
sn 
972 
973 
974 
975 
971> 
917 
978 
979 
982 
s 83 
984 
986 
987 
988 
991 
992 
993 
995 
996 
~97 
H1 
998 
1001 
1002 
1004" 
I 005 
IC06 
1C07 
1 co8 
1CC9 
1CIO 
1Cl3 
IC14 
1016 
1017 
I (18 
1C19 
FIN: 
CUTII: 
SOUTI: 
SOHZ: 
CCL KB RE~L fiXED CEC Ill: 
OC L K V REAL F I XE 0 C E C Dl EXT; 
OCL MODREL RE~L FLOAT DEC I 141 EXT; 
OCL PMB REAL FLOAT DEC 11 .. 1 I 
OCL RELI~AXCCHI RE'L FLCAT DECil~l CChTROLLED EXT; 
OCL RELSTOISIMNUMI REAL FLOAT DECII'tl CONTROLLED EXT; 
CCL SN REAL FIXED OECib~OI EXT; 
DCL SRELINHOCI REH FLOAT OECil'tl CONTROLLED EXTI 
DCL SYSREL REAL FLCAT DEC 1141 EXT; 
OCL ZUM REAL FLOAT DEC 11411 
ZUH•O.O; 
DO KA = 1 TO DTER~ICEJ; 
PPIB•O.O ; 
6R00•1.0; 
A•O.O 
00 Kb • 1 TO CCGMICEI; 
IF SUBSTRIDERMSICE,KAI, KBo 11 ,. '1'8 THEN GO TO FIN; 
A•BROD•RELIKBI; 
EIPCD=A; 
A•O.O; 
END; 
PMB • BROO • CCEFICEoKAII 
lUH•ZUH•PMB; 
END; 
If DHOO,•O THEN DO; 
HODREL•lUH; 
SRELI K\1) alUM; 
KV31 K V .. l; 
ENO; 
ELSE DO; 
SYSREL •ZUH; 
IF AV • 2 THEN AVREL • SYSREL; 
ELSE 
RELSTGISNI • SYSREL; 
CE a 1; 
END; 
END COHPUT E; 
F~OCECURE: 
1• DECLARE SIATEHENTS •1 
DCL ATYPE1 CHAR(IJI VARYING EXT; 
DCL ATYPE2 CHARII51 VARYING; 
OCL ATYPE3 C~ARII31 VARYING; 
DCL BEGA10:21 CHARI11 INITIAL I'HOOULe '• 
I BET.6 • • I GAMMA ., ; 
DCL BTYPE REAL FIXED DECI11 EXT; 
DCL IC1,C2ol oLCI REAL FIXED DEC Ill; 
DCL CE REAL Fl XED· DEC I 31 EXT; 
DCL OCC11IMAXELI RE'L FIXED DECill CONTROLLED EXT; 
CCL OHCD REAL FIX!C CEC Ill EXT; 
DCL JHOO REAL FIXED DEC 131 EXT; 
OCL KQ REAL FIXED DEC Ill; 
DCL COPIPS112BI CHARI31 ~AR EXT STATIC; 
OCL MOUREL REAL FLCAT DCC 11~1 EXT: 
DCL MOOSYH 11281 CHAR I ~I EXT; 
OCL REUHAXCOHI REAL FLOAT OECI 141 CONTROLLED EXT; 
OCL SYSREL REAL FLCAT DEC ll'ol EXT; 
J• ENTRY POihT TO PRINT HEADINGS •1 
ENTRY; 
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PuT FILE ISYSPRihTI EDIT ('SPARCS: PROBABILITY COMPUTATION '• 
'ROUTINE'I IS~IPI51oAoAI; ' 
PUT FILE I SYSPRINTI EDIT I 'IT HE COMPONENT AND SYSTEM ', 
'RELIABILITY INFDRHATIOt; IS FOR THE FIRST ITERATION ONLY!' I 
ISKIPilloAoAl; 
~~T~~;! TO 5; CALL CLINE: E.D; 
,. ~NTRY POINT TQ PRINT PROBABILITIES •1 
ENTRY; 
IF BTYPE • 0 THEN DO; 
A TYPE l• 'REL I ABI Ll TY•; 
ATYPEZ•'RELIABILITIES•; 
ATYPE3•'U~RELIABILITY'I END; 
ATYPE1•'UNRELIABI~ITY'I 
ATYPE2•'UNRELIA81 !TIES'; 
ATVPE3• 1 REL1ABILI ~·i ENO; 
,IF DHOD •• 0 THEN 
~lSE DO; 
PUT FILCISYSPRINTI EDITI'COMPONENT ',ATYPEZ,• FOR MODULE • 0 
HCOSYHIJMODII ISKIPI31 oCOLilloAoAoAoAI; ELSE 
~u:0=1~~~S~e:~~~~: ECifl'HOOULE AND CGHPCNENT 0 ,ATYPE2, 
I SKIPI3l,COLUHNill ,A,A,AI; 
DC LC~1 TO 3; CALL CLINE; ENOl 
p•!;. 
IF OCOHICEI < ~ THEN CZ • DCOMICEII 
ELSE C2 • ~~ 
DO KQ • 1 10 OCOHICEI/~ • .9; 
PUT FILEISYSPRINTI EDlf I<'R • '• RELIII DO I•C~ TO C211 
ISKIPI21, CCLIII, 151 'IAII.I, fl8,61, X1121111 • 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDll IICOMPSIII 1 'TYPE • '• 
8EGAITYPEICE.III CO I • C1 TO C2ll 
ICOLI21o 1511AI31oXI21,A 1 A,X171ll; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT II'P CR TIME • '• PORTICE,tl DO I • 
C·J TO C Z l I I C OLI71 , 15 I I A, f 17, 21 , X I 71 II ; 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI ED)T 11 1 FAILURES • '• FAILSICEoll 00 I • 
Cl TO C211 ICCLI7J, 151 lA, Fl1o2J, XIBIII; 
DO LC•1 TO 3; CALl DUNE; END; 
C1 " C1 + '; ' 
(F C2•4 > DCCH!CEI T~EN C2 • DCOMICEI; 
ElSE C.2 • Cl .. 4; 
END •Ww; 
IF OHQO,•O IHEh 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT I'MODULE '•"CDSYMIJMOOI, ATYPEl, 
1020 
1C20 
1021 
1C24 
1025 
lC2t 
1027 
1 cze 
1028 
lC29 
1030 
1031 
1032 
1033 
1034 
IC35 
IC36 
1037 
1038 
109 
1040 
1041 
1042 
1043 
1044 
IC45 
IC46 
1047 
IC48 
lC49 
1051 
1C52 
1053 
1054 
IC54 
1056 
IC58 
IC59 
1(60 
1061 
I Co2 
I ~63 
ldblo 
1065 
1 C,6f 
1067 
1068 
IC69 
IC70 
1072 
1073 
1C74 
1 c 75 
IC76 
1(17 
1078 
I C79 
1(80 
1001 
1082 
1(83 
1(84 
1085 
1 C8b 
1CB7 
lCBB 
lC89 
1090 
1092 
1093 
IC94 
1095 
IC96 
1(97 
1098 
1099 
1100 
llOI 
ll02 
1103 
1104 
1105 
1106 
llC7 
ll08 
1109 
1110 
1111 
1112 
• • 1 1 HOOR.EL, ATYPE3t 1 .:. ',1.-MOORELI 
ISKIP12IoCOLl1loAoAoAoAoF18ol>loXI151oAoAofl8ol>ll; ELSE 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINT I EDIT I'SYSTEH '• ATYPE1o 1 • '• SYSRElo 
ATYPE3t 1 a 1 , 1.-SYSt:IELt 
ISKIPI21o COLillo A, Ao A, Fl Bol>loXI151o A, Ao FIBol>ll; 
DO L C•1 TO 2: CALL CLINE I END; 
HTURN: 
1• ENTRY POINT FOR SIMULATICN OUTPUT •1 
S !HOT: ENTRY; 
If BTYPE • 0 THEN 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDIT ISYSRELo 1.-SYSRELI 
ICOLI22Io FIBol>lo Xllllo FIBooll; 
ELSE . 
PUT FILE ISYSPRINTI EDU ISYSREL, 1.-SYSRELI 
ICOLI241, f(B,I>I, Xl291, fl8o611; 
DC LC = 1 TO 2: 
CALL DLINE: 
END; 
RETURN; 
END DUTil; 
SIHULAH: PROCEDURE: . 
CCL AV REAL FIXED CECill EXTi 
DCL STYPE REAL FIXED CECill EXT; 
DCL CD REAL fiXED DECI31 EXT; 
DCL CE REAL FIXED DECIH EXT: 
DECLARE FLAG EXTERNAL: 
DCL GAHHA REAL FLOAT OE(1141 EXT; 
OCL NARG FIXED BINARYI31o01 EXT; 
CCL NCOM REAL FIXEC CECI31 EXT; 
DCL NHOD REAL FIXED DECI31 EXT; 
DCL NVAL FIXED l7o61 EXT; ' 
DCL RELIHAXCCHI REAL fLOAT DECillol CONTROLLED EXT; 
CCL SEED REAL FLOAT DECI161 EXT; 
UCL ITYPEIHAXEL,HAXCOHI, PORTIHAXELoHAXCOHI, fAILSIHAXEL,HAXCOHII 
REAL FLOAT DECI141 CONTROLLED EXT: 
REED: CO CO • 1 TC NCC~; 
IF TYPE ICE ,COl • 0 THEN DC;, 
kELICDI = O: 
GO TC ER: 
END; 
ELSE 
IF TYPE ICE. COl • 1 HEN Gli TO BET AVAL; 
ELSE IF TYPEICE,CDI • 2 THEN GO TO GAH~AVAL; 
PUT SKIP L1 ST I TYPEICE,CDII: 
PLT LIST I'TVPE CESIG~ATED IN ERROR'I: 
GO TC WRITE~: 
~ETAVAL: CALL BETASUB: 
GC TO ER: 
GAHHAVAL: CALL GAHASUB: 
GO TO ER: 
WRITE~: PUT SKIPI21 EDIT IGAHHA,FLAGoNVAL,PORT,FAILSoTYPE,PSUBLI 
ICOLUHNI21oFI7o5lo CCLUHNU21,F12o01o COLUMNI18IoF19oblo 
COLUIINI291,F19oZio COLUMNI4lloFI4o01o CCLUHNI49IoFI2oDI, 
COLU11Nl551o Fl8 0 611: 
HT~RN: 
ER: 
IF BTYPE • I THEN RELICOI • 1- RELICDI: 
ELSE: 
If TYPEICE,CCI • I ThE~ GA~HA • RA~flNARGI: 
ELSE: 
END RHC: 
HTURN: 
BETASU8: PROCEDURE: 
DCL il.V REAL FIXED DECI31 EXT: 
CCL CO REAL FIXEC CECI31 EXT: 
DCL CE REAL FIXED OECI31 EXT; 
CCL GAMMA REAL FLOAT DEC I HI EXT: -
'CCL I~R REAL fiXED BINI311: 
DECLARE LAHDA FIXEOI12olDI; 
DCL NCOH REAL FIXED DEC131 EXT: 
OCL NVAL fiXEC 17,61 EXT; 
OCL IP,AA,S,XI REAL FLCAT CEC; 
DCL RELIMAXCOIII REAL FLOAT DECII41 CONTROLLED EXT: 
CCL ITYPEIHAXEL,HAXCOIII, PORTlHAXEL 0 11AXCOIIIo FAILSIHAXEL,HAXCOIIII 
REAL FLOAT OECl141 CC~TJCLLEO EXT; 
AA • PORTICE,COI + 1; 
8 z FAILSICE,CDI + li 
P • GAMMA; 
If AV • 2 THEN DO; 
RELICDI • AA I IAA+BI: 
GO TO SETAl: 
E~D: 
ELSE; 
CALL HDBET I lPoAAoBoXoiER I; 
RELICDI ~ X: 
~ETA I: RETURN; 
END BETASUB: 
GAHASue: PROCEDURE: 
OCL IAA,B,Rilll REAL FLOAT DEC; 
DCL AV REAL FIXED DECI31 EXT: 
CCL CO REAL FIXED CECI31 EXT; 
DCL CE REAL FIXED CECI31 EXT; 
UCL GAMMA REAL FLOAT OECI141 EXT; 
DCL Nl REAL FIXEC ~INIJII INIT!Allll; 
OCL ~CC~ RE•L FIXED CECIJI EXJ: 
OCL NVAL fiXED 17 0 61 EXT: 
DCL REL IMAXCOi•tJ REAL fLOAT DEC1141 CONTROLLED EXT; 
OCL SEED REAL FLCAT CECII61 EXT; 
OCL ITYPEIIIAXELo~AXCCHio PCRT.IHAXELoHAXCCHio fAILSIMAXEloHAXCOMII 
REAL FLOAT DECl141 CONTROLLED EXT: 
CCL WAIMAI REAL FLOAT DEC CONTROLLED: 
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1113 
1114 
111~ 
1117 
1118 
111~ 
1120 
1121 
1122 
1123 
1124 
112~ 
1126 
1127 
1128 
1129 
1130 
1131 
1132 
1133 
1134 
1135 
1136 
1131 
1138 
1139 
1140 
1141 
1142 
1143 
11H 
114~ 
1146 
IIH 
1148 
ll49 
1150 
llH 
115~ 
1152 
11~4 
1155 
11 ~t 
1157 
1158 
115~ 
116C 
1161 
1162 
1163 
111>4 
1165 
1166 
1167 
1168 
1170 
1171 
1172 
1173 
1174 
117~ 
•• • FAILSCCE,CDI • 11 
8 • 1 I lPORTCCE,CDI • 111 
IF AV • 2 THE~ DC; 
ELSE; 
RELlCDI • Cl LIB I I 1118+111 oo AA; 
GO TO GAM; 
END; 
ALLOCATE WAlAA>ll; 
CALL GGTHAJ lSEED,UoBohloW.l1loRUII; 
FREE WA; 
REllCD I • EXPI-R 1111; 
GAM: RETURN; 
E~D GAHHUB; 
FINIS: END SIMULATE; 
lNOFIXEOOVERFlDW 1: 
RANF: PROClNARGI RETURNSlfLOAT BINARYI; 
I• 
ThiS FUNCTION GENERATES PSEUOD-RANDDM NUMBERS, UNIFORMLY 
DISTRIBUTED ON (0,11. THIS ~ERSION IS FOR THE IBM 360, 
J, P. CHA~DLER, COMPUTER SCIENCE DEPT,, GKL.HOH• ST.Tf UNIVERSITY. 
HETHOC,., COMPOSITE OF THREE MULTIPLICATIVE CONGRUENTIAL GENERUO~S 
G. HARSAGLIA AND To A. BRAY, COMH. ACM 11 i19681 757. 
:; ~~~~ :~ ~~~~~~ ~:~~ ~~~~!~o. T~~EN~~~E::~g~H 1 ~u~~~N:~~:~~~~~Eo. 
USING [A8Sl2•NARG+11 ANC THE FIRST RANDOM hUMBER FROM THE NEW 
SEQUENCE IS RETURNED. 
*I 
IO 
CCL J FIXED BINARYlL5,0I STATIC; 
DCL JRAN BASEDIP_RUJ FIXED 8[NARYI3l,OI; 
DCL K FIXED BINARYl31oOI INITIALI765432ll STATIC; 
DCL KLH FIXED fiNA~Yll1o01 STATIC; 
CCL L fiXED 8HARYl31 0 01 INITIAL176543211 STATIC 
OCL H FIXED BINARYlHoOI INITULl765432ll STATIC 
OCL HK FIXED BINARYI31 0 01 STATIC INITIALI2826291 
DCL HL FIXED BINARYl31 0 01 STATIC !N!TIALi3482ll; 
DCio ~H FIXED BINARYI31o01 STATIC IN!TIAll655'tll; 
DCL Nl1281 FIXED BINARYl·3l,OI STATIC; 
CCL NARG FIXED BINARYl31oOI; 
CCL NDIV FIXED BINARYl31,01 STATIC; 
DCL NFIRST BITIII STATIC INITIAll'1'81; 
DCL NR FIXED B!NARYI31,01 STATIC; 
DCL P_RAN POINTER STATIC; 
DCL RA~ FLCAT BINARY SHTIC; 
DCL RDIV FLOAT BINARY STATIC; 
If NARG ,. 0 THEN 
DO; 
I• 
RE-INITIALIZE USING NARGo 
•I 
KLH • ABSI2 o N~HG + 11; 
K,l,Jot = !<.LH; 
END; 
ELSE 
oo; 
If ~ NFIJ\ST THEti GO TO SKIP; 
END; 
INITIALIZE THE ROUT! ~E. 
•I 
P_RAN • AODRlR~NI; 
r..FIRST ;a 1 0 1 Bi 
NDIV • 16777216; 
RDIV • 3276H,O o 65536,C; 
I• 
FILL ThE TABLE. 
•I 
I• 
DC J • 1 TO 128; 
K"'K•HKi 
N(JJ • K; 
END; 
COMPUTE THE NEXT RANDOM 
•I 
NUMBER, 
SKIP: 
/0 
L ~ L t ML; 
J = 1 + AB St ll I NOI V; 
1't -= H • MMi \ 
~R • ABStNIJI + L +HI; 
RAN • FLCATINRI I RCIV; 
FIXUP THE LEAST $1GNIFICANT,BIT. 
•I ! . " IF J >. 1>4 & RAN < 1.0 THEN 
I• \ 
JRAN • 
REFILL THE J-TH PLACE IN ThE TABLE. 
•I 
KsK•HK; 
MJI • K; 
RETURNIRANJ; 
END RANF; 
CLOSE FILElSYSINio FILECSYSPRINTI; 
HD UNITED; 
JRAN + 1; 
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RANF0010 
RANF0020 
RANF0030 
RANF0040 
RANF0050 
RANFOOI>O 
RANF0070 
RANFD080 
RANF0090 
RANFOIOO 
RANFOllO 
RANF0120 
RANF0130 
RANF0140 
RANF0150 
RANF0160 
RANF0170 
RANF0180 
RANF0190 
RANF0200 
RANF0210 
RANF022 0 
R ANF0230 
RANF0240 
RANF0250 
RANF0260 
RANFOZ70 
RANF0280 
RANF0290 
RANF0300 
RANF031 0 
RANF0320 
RANF0330 
RANF0340 
RANF0350 
RANF0360 
RANF03l0 
R ANF03BO 
RANF0390 
RANF0400 
RANF041 0 
RANFO't20 
RANFO't30 
RANFO't40 
RANFO't50 
RANF0460 
RANF0470 
RANF0480 
RANF0490 
RANf0500 
RANF051 0 
RANF0520 
RANF0530 
RANF0540 
RANF0550 
RANF0560 
RANF0570 
RANF0580 
RANF0590 
RANF0600 
RANF0610 
RANF062 0 
RANF0630 
RANF0640 
RANF0650 
RANF0660 
RANF0670 
RANF0680 
RANF0690 
RANF0700 
RANF0710 
RANF072 0 
RANF0730 
RANF0740 
RANF0750 
RANF0760 
RANF0770 
APPENDIX D 
APOLLO-SATURN LUNAR EXCURSION MODULE (LEM) 
LARGE SAMPLE RUN FROM PRESSURIZAT10N 
THROUGH POWERED ASCENT 
146 
147 
LEM Large System Test 
SPARCS was tested using a large network consisting of both beta 
and gamma components placed througho~t the network in an arbitrary 
pattern. A network diagram was obtained for the Apollo Lunar Excursion 
Module (LEM) from pressurization through powered ascent. Although no 
data was provided with the network, component test data from previous 
Apollo-Saturn tests was found and arbitrarily placed in the LEM network. 
The network is a logically complex network consisting of both 
series and parallel components. It is subdivided into 13 modules each 
of which contains a varying number of components. Beta and gamma com-
ponents are arbitrarily dispersed throughout the network. Thus to assess 
this system, the module would have to handle a large complex network, 
using the modularity concept, with the two component types being ran-
domly interspersed. 
' The run results and system assessment are presented in this 
appendix. Due to the size of the network, only 50 simulation runs 
were made. These runs took approximately 15 minutes on the IBM 360/65 
at Oklahoma State and almost 2 minutes on the IBM 370/124 at Phillips 
in Bartlesville, Oklahoma. The results showed that SPARCS could ade-
quately handle a system of any reasonable size and configuration. 
Apollo Lunar'Ex~ursion Module (LEM) from 
Pressurization Through Powered Ascent 
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MAPS-I: EQUAl 10" GE"ERATIO" ROUT I"E 
MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PR08ABill TIES OF SYS TEHS 
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, OKLAHOMA STAH lJNIVERSITi 
SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION oo••••••••••••• HH REliABILITY INH~PATED ASCENT PRESSURizATION & FEED SYSTEM 
NUMBER OF MOOUlfS •• •• •••• • • •• •• •• •• • 13 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS •••••••••••••••• 2 
TOTAL NUMBER OF SYSTfH ELEHfNTS ••••• 15 
NUMBER OF MINIMAL PATHS •o••••••••••• 1 
PUNCHED OUTPUT OF EQIJAfJON • •• •••• ••. NO 
l AHU_ES SUPPLI EO BY USER • • • •. •• • • •• • NO 
THE 1 M'I.NI HAL PAT~S FOR TtiE SYSTEM FOI.LOW: 
(A, B ,C rDtEtF ,G rU, l, J ti<. tl •Mtl t ?."> 
SYSTEM RELIABILITY EQUATION I 
\ 
TERMS I 
R R R R R ~ • R R R R R R R R R 
SYS A R C D E F G H I J K L M 1 2 
MOOULE A 
/lUMBER OF CL1MPON£NTS • •••••• •• • •·••••• 
NUMBER OF Ml Nt MAL PATHS _. •• •• •• i. •• ••. 
THE 2 HINIHAL PATHS FOR MODULE A 
<1,3 1 4 1 5,6,7> 
<2t3t4rSr6t7> 
FOLLOW: 
SUBSYSTEH RELIA61LITY EQUATION ••••• ~ODULE A 
R R R R R R t R R R R R R - R R R R R R R 
1 3 4 5 6 7 2 ~ 4 5 6 7 1 z 3 4 ~ b 7 
HAPS-II: PROBABILITY COMPUTATION ROUTINE 
COHPONENT RELIABILITIES FOR MOOIJLE A 
R < o. 994544 R . 0.997936 R z.oo 3 I TYPE • 2. 00 2 TYPE • 
P OR TIME,. 250.00 P OR TIME . 256.10 
~. 00 FAILURES = 0. 0 0 FA ILURFS "' 
• 0. 998626 R 
• 5 
o.~a766i. • 
TVPE • 2.00 6 TVPE • 2,00 7 
P OR TIME • 310.00 
fAILURES • 1.00 
P OR TIME • 325.20 
FAILURES • 1.00 
MUOULE A PELIABILJTY • 0.960056 
MODULE ~ 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS •••••••••••••••• 10 
NUMBER OF MINIMAL PATHS ·•~·••••••••• ~ 
' THE 4 HI Nl MAL PATHS FOR MODULE R 
<1,3t4t5t6,7t8,9) 
<1 ,3,4t5tOt7t8rl'l> 
<2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) 
(2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t1t8 t 10> 
FOLLOW: 
. 0.998947 
TV'PE :.: 2. 00 
P OR TIME . 3'09.20 
FA I LURES o. 00 
o.q9B492 
TYPE -. z,.oO 
P OR TIME • 275,60 
FAILURES • Q,OO 
•• C.DrdiNUED •• 
;SURSV~TEM RELIABILITY FQUATION MODULE 8 
R • 0.996221t 
z. 00 4 TYPf • 
P OR TIME . 315.00 
FA II URES ;: Ol 0 0 
9 TERMS I 
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R ~ R R R R R R R R + q R R R R R R R - R R P R R R P R Rt t R R R R R R R ~ - R R R R R k R R R + R R ~ • 
B 1 3 4 5 6 7 0 9 1 3 ~ 5 6 ~ 8 !0 I 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 ~0 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 I 6 9 2 3 4 
I ' 
R R R R R t o R R R R R R R R R - R R R R R R R R R - R R • i R R R R R 
5 b 7 8 10 I 2 3 4 5 b 7 B 9 !0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
MAPS-II: PROBAeiLITY COMPUTATION ROUTINE 
COMPONENT RFLIA81LITIES FOR MOOUI.F B 
R 
l 
" 5 
R 
9 
. ~.n!OO! 
JVPE . 1. 00 
p OR TIME . 275. DO 
FA I LURES . 1· 00 
. o.-;94775 
TVPE . 2. 00 
P OR J IHE = 252. 0 Q 
FAILURES . o. 00 
• 0.9865~3 
TYPE • 1.00 
R 
2 
R 
6 
R 
10 
0.995998 
TVPE . 
p OR TI~E 
FAILURES 
0,997664 
TYPE . 
p OR T I HF 
FAILURES 
• o. 992491 
TYPE • 
. 
. 
P OR TIME • 249 0 00 
FAILURES • 1.00 
P OR TIME 
FAILURES • 
MODULE B RELIABILITY • 0,97e2t0 
l. Q 0 
. 275.00 
1.00 
2. 00 
. 325.00 
1.00 
1.00 
Z51.00 
1. 00 
R . 
3 
R . 
7 
~y~~6~9~ 2. 00 
p OR Tl~f . 302.00 
FAILURE' . o.oo 
0.994522 
TYPE . £. 00 
p OR TIME 325 .. 00 
FAILURES . !.DO 
UNRELIABILITY • 0.023790 
R 
4 
R 
d 
0.999081 
TYPE = , 2.0 Q 
p [lR TIME . 300. ilO 
FAILURES . ~.DO 
, o.91:J34bO 
TYPE . 2. 00 
p OR riME . JDZ.OO 
FA ll.UR[S . o. 00 
MODULE C 
NUM~ER OF COMPONENTS , ,, , , , • , , •• ••• ,, 14 
NUMBER OF MINIMAL PATHS ••••••••••••• 4 
!HE 4 MINIMAL PATHS FOR MODULE C FOLLOW: 
<1,2,3,4,5,7'> 
<1,2 ,l,4,bt 7> 
<8,9,10,llt12,llr) 
(8,9,10rlltl3rl4) 
SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY fOUATJON '''" MOOULE 
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R • R R R R R R + R R R R R R - R R R R R R R + R R R R R R - R R R R R R R R R .R R ;R - R R R R R o 
C 1 J 3 4 5 1 I Z 3 4 6 1 1 2 3 It 5 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 14 I Z 3 4 5 1 8 9 10 11 I~ 11t 1 Z 3 4 6 
RRRRRRR R R R R R R R R R R R R R + R R R • R R - R R R R R R R R R R R R - R R R R R o 
I 2 3 4 5 6 1 B 9 10 11 12 14 8 9 10 11 13 14 I 2 3 4 5 1 B 9 10 11 13 14 I 2 3 It 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 1~ 
R R R R R R R + P R R R R R R R R R R R R - R R R R · R R R R R R R R R R R iR R R R R R R o 
1 8 9 10 11 13 14 1 z 3 ~ 5 6 1 8 9 10 11 13 14 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 z 3 4 5 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 
R R R R R R R R R R R - R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
3 4 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
MAPS-II: PROBABILITY COMPUTATION ROUTINE 
COMPONENT REliABILITIES FOR MODULE C 
R • 0.985782 R . 0.995716 R a 0,981222 
1 TYPE • 2. 00 2 TYPE • 2.00 3 TYPE • · 2.00 
P OR TIME . ZU,60 P OR TIME • 215.70 P OR T IHE • 231.60 
FAILURES • 1• 00 FAILURES • 1. 00 FAilUReS.• 1.00 
R . 0,996925 R . 0,986412 p 
-
0,996692 
5 TYPE. • 1. 00 6 TYPE • 1. 00 7 TYPE .,. 2,00 
P OR TIME c. 221.00 P OR TIME . 252.00 P OR Tl ME • 305.20 
FAILURES • 1. DO FAILURES • 1. 00 FAILURES 1.00 
R . 0.992307 R . 0.985021 R . 0.9.83919 
9 TYPE • 2.00 10 TYPE • 2. DO u TYPE • 2.00 
P OR TIME • 310.20 P OR TIM£ . 325. zo P O.R TIME 251.50 
FidLUHS • 1. 90 FAILURES • 1.0 0 FAILURES • o.oo 
R • 0.995567 R . o,9an37 
13 TYPE • 1,00 14 TYPE =- 2. 00 
P OR T IHE • 206. 00 P OR TIME ~ 220.40 
fAILURES • 1. 00 FAILURES • 1. 00 
MODULE C RELIARILITY • 0,997187 UNRELIABILITY • 0,002813 
HOOULE D 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS ...... , ....... .. 
NU~BER OF HI Nl HAL PATHS •• • • .. •.,. .. • 
THE 
<I> 
<2> 
<3> 
3 HI Nl HAL PATHS FQ)! MODULE 0 FOLLOW: 
SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY EQUATION ••••• MODULE 0 
R ~ R + R - R R 
0 I 2 1 2 
R - R R 
3 1 3 
R R t R R R 
2 3 1 2 3 
MAPS-II: PROBABILITY t~MPUTATIQN ROUTINE 
COMPONENT RELIABILITIES FOR HOOULE 0 
R 
I 
• 0.996975 
TYPE a 1.00 
P OR TIME • 245.00 
FAILURES • 1.00 
R 
2 
• 0,992268 
HPE • 1.00 
P OR TIHE • 230.00 
FAILURES • 1.00 
R~ • ¥;:~7~90 l.OO 
P OR TIME • 240.00 
FAILURES • 1.00 
MODULE D RELIABILITY • 1,000000 UNRELIABILITY • 0,000000 
R .. 6.989727 
4 TYPE . 2.00 
P OR TIME • 209. 00 
FAILURES • o. 0 0 
.R . ~.99195.8 
8 TYPE • 2.0 0 
P OR T1 HE • 300.10 
FAILURES • 1,00 
R 5 0.995136 
12 TYPE a 1.00 
P OR TIME . 220.00 
FAILURES • 1. DO 
7 TEPMSI 
IIODULE E 
NUMBER OF COMPONENT'S • • • • • •" • ••• • •• •• 3 
NUMBER OF MINIMAL PATHS ••••••••••••• 3 
THE 
<1> 
<z> 
(3) 
3 HII\IIMAL PATHS FOR 140DULE E FOLLOW: 
R 
E 
• R 
I 
R - R R 
2 I Z 
SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY EOUATION ••••• MODULE E 
R - R R - R R t R R R 
3 I 3 2 3 I 2 3 
MAPS-11: PROBABILITY COMPUTATION RO!JTINE 
COMPONENT RELIABILITIES FOR MODULE E 
R 
I 
• ~.98~993 R 
TYPE • . 1.00 2 
P OR TIME 3 225.00 
FAILURES • 1,00 
• 0.967080 R 
TYPE 3 1.00 3 
P OR TIME • 240.00 
FAILURES • 1.00 
• 0,997087 
TYPE 3 1.00 
P OR TIME • 232,00 
FAILURES • loDO 
MODULE RELIABILITY • 0,999999 UNREliABILITv • 0.00.0001 
MODULE F 
NUMII ER nf COMPONENTS ~ • ••••• •••••• •• • 6 
NUMBER OF MINI~AL PATHS ••••••••••••• ~ 
THE 4 MINI HAL PATHS FOR MODULE F FOLLOWS 
<ltZ,3,5> 
<l,Z,3,6> 
<1,2,1t,~) 
<lt2 ,4,6) 
SUBSYSTEM RHIA&ILITY EQUATION ,.,,, MODULE 
** COJITINUED •• 
152 
1 TERNSI 
9 TERMS I ... --- -·-·-
PAGE 
R 
F 
• R R R R + R R R R - R R R R R + R R R R - R R R R R R R R R + R R R R R R - R R R R R - R R R R • 
1 z 3 5 1 2 3 6 1 2 3 5 6 1 2 4 5 1 z 3 4 5 1 2 4 6 1 2 3 ~ 5 6 1 2 3 4 b I 2 4 5
 
R 
0 
MAPS-II: PROBABILITY COMPUTATION ROUTINE 
COMPONENT RELIABILITIES FOR MODULE F 
R 
1 
• 0,996050 R 
TYPE • 2,00 2 
P OR TIME 2 250,90 
FA I LURES • 1. 00 
R • 0.~9855q R 
5 TYPE • 2.00 6 
P.OR Tl~E = 279.40 
FAILURES • 1.00 
z: o. ~-t)8690 ~ 
TYPf • 2.00 3 
P OR TIME • 212.30 
FAILURES • 1.00 
0.995052 
TYPE = · 2.00 
P OR TIMF • 220,90 
FAILURES • 0,00 
• 0,997227 R 
TVPE • l.CO 4 
P OR Tl~f • 249.00 
FAILURES z 1.00 
MODULE F RELIABILITY • 0.~94709 UNRELIA~Il!TY 
MODULE G 
NUMBER OF COHPONE~TS •••••••••••••••• 
NUMBER OF MINIMAl PATHS ••••••••••••• 4 
THE 4 ~INIMAL PATHS FOR MODULE G FOLLOW: 
(1,2,5> 
<1·?·6> 
<3r.(tt5'> 
<3,4,6> 
SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY EQUATIOt.l ••• •• MOOULf G 
2 0.989677 
TYPE • loOO 
P OR TIME • 262.00 
FAILURES • 1.00 
9 TERMSI 
R • R R R + R R R - R R R R + R R R - R P R R R • R R A t R R R R R R - R R R R R - R R R R f . iT's 1 z 6 1 i 5 ' ., ~ 5 1 2 3 ~ 5 3 ~ 6 1 2 3 ~ s 6 . I 2 3 ,. 6 3 ~o 5 6 
MAPS-II: PROBABILITY COMPUUTION ROUTINE 
COMPONENT RELIABILITIES FOR HOOULE G 
• 0,985847 R • o. 990153 p R 
1 TYPE • · 1.00 Z TYPE • l.DO 3 
p.OR TIME • 205,00 P OR f!ME • 249,00 
FAILURES • 1.00 FAILURES • ZoOO 
R • o. ~n993 R • 0.990351 
5 TYPE • 1,00 6 TYPE • 10 00 
• 0,995867 R 
TYPE • 1.00 4 
• n,982Z96 
TYPE • 1o0D 
P OR TIME • 179.00 P OR TIME • ZOO. 00 
FAILURES • 1.00 FAILURES • 1.00 
P OR TIME • 2Z~. DO P 0~ TillE • 250,00 
FUL.Uit!$ a loGO ~ULU~ES • 2, 00 
NODULe G RHIA&ILJTV • Oo'I994U UHReLiABILITV • I,0005l4 
MODULE H 
NUIIBE~ OF COIIPONEIITS , ,,.,.,,.,,. ~ 
NUMBER OF MINifUl PATHS ••••••••••••• 4 
THE 4 MINI MAL PATHS FOR •OOULE H FOLLOW: 
<1,3,5> 
< l 1 1t,S) 
<2J3.~> 
<2,4,5> 
SLIHSYSHM RfliABll!TY EQUATION ••••• MODULE II q TERHSI 
R 
H 
• R R R t R R R - A R R H • A R A - k R R R A R H R R - R R R R - R H H R 
I 3 5 1 4 5 1 3 4 5 2 3 5 1 2 3 5 
MAPS-II: PROBABILITY COMPUTATION ROUTINE 
CGHPONENf RELIABILITIES FOR MODULE H 
R 
l 
• 0,998158 
tVPf • 
P OR TIME 
FAILURES • 
.a.oo 
252.90 
1. 00 
~ • 0.990379 
5 TYPE ~ 2.00 
P OR TIME • 209,1C 
FAILURES • 1o00 
• o. 995081> 
TYPE • 
Y OR TIME 
FAILURES • 
2. 00 
222.20 
lo 00 
R 
3 
" r..095102 
TYPE = 
P !IH. TIME 
r•nuRr:s • 
MODULE H RELIABILITY • 0.~~0364 WtRti.IAf'lliT'I 
MODULE .j 
NUitBER OF COMPONENTS .,, • ••• .... ,,.,. 6 
NUMBER OF MINIMAL PATHS ,.,.,,.,.,,., 4 
THE 4 II IN! HAL ,ATHS FOR MODULE I FOLLOW: 
<1,3,4,5> 
<1,3,6> 
<2,3,4,5> 
<2,3,6> 
I 2 3 4 5 1 2 4 5 2 3 4 5 
.. 0.99657'8 
HPE = 
P OR TIHf 
FAILURES a 
2.00 
L 95. 20 
~ ,Q 0 
SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY EQUATION ..... MODULE 9 TERMS! 
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R • R R R R R R R - R R R R R + R R R R. - R R R R R • R R R t R R R R R R - R R R R - R K R R R 
I 1 3 ~ 5 1 3 b I 3 'o 5 b 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Z 3 b 1 2 ~.'I ~ IL ... l 2 3 .. C. • Z .. l -~ ~.II 
"APS-11: PROeABIL lrY COMPUTATION ROUTINE 
COMPONENT RELIABILITJES FOR ""DULE 1 
R 
1 
R 
5 
• 0,911~06 
TYPE • 2.00 
P OR TIME • 200,20 
FAILURES • 2,00 
R 
2 
• 0,985117 R 
TYPE • z,QO b 
P OR TINE • 250.20 
FAILURES a z. 00 
• 0 •• 910~3 
TYPE • 2, 00 
P OR TIME • ZOO,ZO 
FAILURES • 2,00 
• 0.989208 
TYPE • 2.00 
P OR TIME • 198.10 
FAILURES • 1.00 
k 
3 
• 0.989489 
TYPE . • 
P OR TIME 
FA !lURES • 
2.00 
232.50 
1. ao 
MODULE I RELIABILITY • 0,988959 UNRELIABILITY • 0,011041 
MODULE J 
NU,t.tBER OF C0f!4PONENTS • • • •• • ••• •••• ••• 4 
NUMBER OF MlNIMAL ~ATHS ••••••••••••• 4 
THE 4 MINI MAL PATHS FOR MODULE J 
<1,3> FOLLOW: 
(1,4> 
<2,3) 
<2rlt> 
SUBSYST.EM RELIABILITY EQUATION ,.,,. MODULE J 
R 
" 
R 
J • R R • R R - R R R R R - R R R t R R • R R R R 1 3 1 ~ 1 3 4 2 3" 1"2 3 2 4 1 2 3 4 R R R - R R R I 2 4 2 3 4 
MAPS-I!: PROBABILITY COMPUTATION ROUTINE 
COMPONENT ~ELJUILITIES FOR MODULE J 
• 0,991919 R 
- 0.976123 R 
• 0.912101 
TYPE • 2.00 
P OR TIME • 242. bO 
FAILURES • 2.00 
9 TERMS! 
• 0.994587 
TYPE ;, 2otci 
P OR TIME •. 199.90 
TVPE • z,to 
P Oil TIME • . 20Zo40 
TYPE • 1.00 4 
P OR TIME • 249.00 
TYPE • 1o 00 
P OR TIME • 269, 00 
FAILURFS • 1.00 FAILURES • 1.00 FAILURES • 2.00 FAILURES • 2.00 
MODULE J RELIABILITY • 0,999794 UNRELIABILITY • 0,000206 
HOOIILE K 
NUH8 EA. Of CO~PONENT $· • • • • • •• •. • • • • • • • 6 
NUMBER OF liiNIHAL PATHS •••••••.,•••• 4 
THE 4 MINIMAL PATitS fOR MODULE k fOLLOWr (1,2,5> 
<1.2,6> 
(],.,5> 
<3,4 ,6> 
SUBSYSTEM RELIABiliTY EQUATION ••••• MODULE k 9 TERMSI 
R • R R R + R R R - R R R R + R R R - R R) R R + R R R R R R R ~ R - R R R R R R R·R R 
K 1 2 5 1 2 6 1 2 5 6 3 4 5 I Z 3 4 5 3 4 6 1 Z 3 4 5 6 1 ~ 3 4 6 3 4 5 6 
MAPS-II: PROBABILITY tQHPUTATIBN ROUTINE 
COHPONENT RELIABILITIES fOR MODULE K 
R 
I 
R 
5 
• 0,9915B1 R 
TYPE • z,OO Z 
P OR TIME • 1~8.10 
FAILURES • 2.00 
• 0.992313 R 
TYPE • 2.00 6 
P OR TIME • 210.00 
FA I LURES • 0. DO 
• 0,981691 R 
TYPE • 2.00 3 
P OR Tl HE • 199.10 
FAILURES • 1.00 
• 0.999391 
TYPE • z. 00 
P OR TIME • 215.10 
FAILURES • 0,00 
• 0,997981 R 
TYPE • . 2.00 4 
P OR TIME • 206,00 
FAILURES • O,oo 
MODULE k RELIABILITY • 0.999919 UNRELIABILITY • 0.000D81 
MODULE L 
NUMBER OF COMPONENTS •, ••, ,., , • •• ,, , , , 5 
NUMBER OF HINH, .. L PATtiS •••••••• ••••• 4 
TltE 4 MINI HAL PATHS FOR MODULE L 
<1,3t5> 
FOLLOW: 
<l ,4,5) 
<2,3 ,5> 
(2, •• 5> 
SUBSYSTEM R!LIABILITY EQUATION ..... MODULE L 
• 0.999155 
TYPE • 2,00 
P OR TIME • 210,00 
FAILURES • 0,00 
9 TERMS I 
R 
L 
• R R R 
1 3 ' 
R ~ R - R R R R + R II a - R R R R + R R R + R R R R R - R R R R - R R.R R 
1 ~ 5 1 3 4 5 2 l 5 l ·~ 3 5 2 ~ 5 I 2 3 4 5 l 2 ~ 5 2 J.~.J. 
HAPS-IIr PROBABILITY COMPUTATION ROUTINE 
COMPONENT RELIAB IL IT IES FOR MODULE L 
R 
l 
• O. 9976b4t R 
TYPE • 2oGt 2 
P 011 T I liE • 182.60 
FAILURES • 0.00 
R • 0,994559 
5 TY'E • ZoOO 
P OR TIME • 21>0,90 
fA !LURES • l• 00 
• 0.997453 R 
TYPE • z.oo 3 
P OR TIME • 189,60 
FAILURES • 0.00 
• 0,992979 R 
TVPE • 1.00 4 
P OR TIME • 249,00 
FAILURES • Z.OO 
MODULE UNRE(UBILITY • 0,005555 
MODULE M 
NUMBER OF COHPONENTS •••••••••••••••• 6 
NUMBER OF MlNilltAL PATHS ••••••••••••• 4 
TltE 4 Ml Nl MAL PATHS fOR MODUU M FOLLOW: 
<1.3,4,5) 
<1,3,6) 
<2,3,4,5> 
(2rlr6> 
SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY EQUATION ..... MODULE H 
• 0.984631 
TYPE • 1.00 
P OR TIME • 251,00 
FAILURES • 2,00 
9 TERMSI 
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R 
H 
• R R R R R R R - R R R R R + R R R R - R R R R R + R R R + R R R R R R - R R R R - R R R R R 
l 3 4 5 1 3 6 1 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 S 1 2 3 4 5 2 3 6 I 2 3 4 5 6 I 2 3 6 2 3 4 5 6 
HAPS-II: PROBABILITY COMPUTATION ROUTINE 
COMPONENT A!LIAIJLIT!ES FOR MODULE ~ 
R 
1 
• 0.986934 R • 0,981026 R • 0,993153 R 
TYPE • 2.00 4 
R 
5 
TYPE • · 2.00 2 
P 011 TIME • 242,60. 
FAILLUI.ES • 2.00 
• 0,982185 R 
TYPE • 1,00 ~ 
P OR TIME·· 250~00 
FAILURES ~ z.OO 
TYPE • 2.00 3 
P OR TIME • 201,50 
HILURES • 1.00 
P OR TillE • 200,10 
FAILURES • a.oo 
• 0.990429 
TYPE • 1,00 
P OR TIME • 240.00 
FAILURES • 1,00 
MODULE M RHIABI L lTV • 0. 993316 UNRELIABILITY • 0,006624 
MODULE ANO COHI'DNEIIT ,ELIABILITHS FOR THE SYSTEM 
R • 0.98M!16 R . •• 916211 R .. 0.997181 
A TYPE • 0.00 8 TYPf • I, DO c TYPE • I • DO 
P OR TIME • o.oo P OR TINE • o.oo P OR iiME • o.oo 
FAILURES • o.oo f.A !LURES 
·-
.o.oo .. FAILURES ~-- o.oo 
R • 0.999999 R 0.99~709 R • 0.999466 
E TYPE • o,oo F TYPE • O. DO G TYPE • n.oo 
P OR T !HE • o.oo P OR TIME • o.oo P OR TIME • o.oo 
FAILURES • o.oo FAILURES • o.oo FAILURES • o.oo 
R • 0.988959 R • ~.999791o p • 0,999919 
I TYPE • o .• oo J TYPE • o.oo K TYPE • o.oo 
P OR TIME • o.ao P IJR TIME • o.oo P OR TIME • o.oo 
FA ILUR!S • o. 00 FAILUR£5 • o:oo FAILURES • o.oo 
R • 0.993376 R 
TVPE • 0,00 1 
P OR TIME • OoOD 
FAILURES • 0,00 
• d. 999.H1 _p. 
TYPE • z.oo Z 
P 011 TIME • 118.50 
FULURES • 0.00 
• 0.997!19 
TYPE • 2oU 
P OR T1 ME • 256.11 
FAilURES • 0.00 
M 
SYSTEM RELIA81LITV • 0.914624 
o.naut 
UNRELIABiliTY.• 0,085376 
0,161633 
0.123180 0,116501 . 
o. 87137~__:___:_ __ ----
o. 884099 
o, 8~5395 
o. 885404 
0.885706 
0.889522 
0,889554 
0,893957 
o. 99443d 
o. 896596 
0.897614 
0,900380 
0,901933 
o.~04009 
0.911390 
o.nl959 
0,914624 
o. 928642 
__ O,l226H 
0.115901 
0.114605 
0.114596 
0.114294 
0.110478 
0.110446 
0.106043 
0.105562 
0.103404 
0.102386 
0.099620 
Q,Jl98167 
0,0959"1 
0.088610 
0,088041 
0.085376 
0.071358 
R 
D 
R 
H 
R 
L 
• o.'9fl5785 
TYPE • 1.00 
P OR TJHE • 249.00 
FAILURES • 2,00 
· hn'~10 0.01 
P OR TIME • o. 08 
.fAilU!IES • o.oo 
• 0,990364 o; DO TYPE • 
P OR TIME • o. 00 
FA I LURES • o. 00 
• o.99ltlt't5 
TYPE • o.oo 
P OR TIME • o. 00 
FAILURES • o.oo 
THE MEAN RELIABILITY IS O.ltl35l VARIANCE • O.Oot327 STANDARD DEVIATION • 0,111116 THE ESTIMATED RELIABILITY FOil THE SYSTEM IS 0,895148 
THE MISSICN TIME IS 90,00 DAYS 
THE ESTIMATED HTBF IS 7o98091965E+OZ 
RELIABILITY HTBF PERCENTILE PERCENTILE PERCENTILE 
POINTS POl N75 
5 PERCENT 0.838367 5.10497067Et02 DAYS 
10 PERCENT 0,876300 6.8157H33Et02 DAYS 
20 PERCENT 0.884099 7,30601605Et02 DAYS 
2 5 PERCENT 0.885395 7o39393492Et02 DAYS 
50 PERCENT 0.893957 8.02B67158Et02 DAYS 
75 PERCENT 0,901833 8o 71027B22Et0Z DAYS 
90 PERCENT o. 904009 9.91829229Et0Z DAYS 
90 PERCENT 0.911959 9.76554280Et02 DAYS 
95 PERCENT 0,914624 1,00849020Et03 DAYS 
97. 5 PERCENT 0,921633 lo10282636Et 03 DAYS 
99 PERCEI'H 0.925838 1.lb798lloZEt03 DAYS 
F~EQUENCV AND CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY COUNTS OF CASES 
o. 8350 o.e.~oo 0,8450 0. 850 0 0.8550 0.8600 0.9650 0.8700 0. 8750 o.8eoo· 0 1· 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 
0.8850 0.9900 o. 8950 0.9000 0.9050 0.9100 0.9150 0,9200 0.9250 0,9300 1 5 2 2 3 0 3 0 0 1 
4 9 11 13 lb 16 19 19 19 20 
155 
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